Web 控制台此前所有 admin 角色用户共享全部设备。新增设备级归属:内置 admin 把设备绑定给一个用户名后,该设备对其他 admin/viewer 不可见不可控,只有 owner 与内置 admin 可见可控。 - 新增 device_acl.json(与 users.json 同目录,YAMA_DEVICE_ACL_FILE 可覆盖), 原子写、启动加载;文件损坏拒绝启动,避免私人设备变成公共。 - 可见性:内置 admin 全部;未绑定设备仅 admin 角色;绑定设备仅 owner。 覆盖 get_devices、/api/devices、屏幕墙,以及 connect/term_open/mouse/key/ clipboard/keyframe/rdp_reset 全部控制通道;device_update 也只推给可见者。 - 只有内置 admin(用户名 admin + role admin)能 bind/unbind;admin 角色保留 建用户、删设备、审计等既有功能。删设备清绑定。 - 审计日志也按归属过滤:非内置 admin 只能看到公共设备和自己绑定设备的记录 (device_id / device / devices 三种写法都识别);auditquery 增 DeviceAllowed 钩子,ACL 提供 Owner 快照,避免扫描时逐条加锁。 - 删用户会解绑其设备;但账号名下有绑定设备时只有内置 admin 能删,其他 admin 删除会把设备释放到公共池,属于越权。解绑在删除前完成,解绑失败中止删除; 删除失败时回滚绑定。 - 绑定/解绑后立即重新校验在线会话:失去权限的屏幕/终端会话被断开。 - 本地用户名禁止 '@'(保留给 SSO 邮箱);本地密码登录拒绝 '@' 用户名, SSO 拒绝名为 admin 的身份,避免绕过超级管理员判定。 - 前端:superadmin 卡片显示 owner、绑定按钮和弹窗(本地用户 datalist + SSO 邮箱自由输入);deviceAcl 能力位由服务端挑战下发,C++ 端无此位不显示; 设备 ID 经 jsAttr 转义后再进 onclick,修掉存储型 XSS。 验证:go build/test/vet 全绿;新增 ACL 持久化、可见性矩阵、控制通道拒绝、 绑定/解绑会话重校验、device_update 不泄露、分组过滤、删用户解绑与越权拒绝、 审计按归属过滤等测试;本地起 Go 服务 + WebSocket 探针验证 challenge、绑定、 非 superadmin 拒绝、解绑。 Model: deepseek-flash Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
105 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
105 lines
3.2 KiB
Go
package web
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import (
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"encoding/json"
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"github.com/yuanyuanxiang/SimpleRemoter/server/go/auditquery"
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)
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// Audit-log query support for the admin-only "Audit Log" page.
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//
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// The scanner itself (file tail, filters, paging) lives in package
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// auditquery so the MCP get_audit_log tool can share it; this file keeps only
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// the WebSocket command handler and the reply shaping specific to the UI.
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// auditQueryMaxLimit caps the page size of the audit page. It is tighter than
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// auditquery.MaxLimit (the protocol-wide cap the MCP tool uses) because the
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// admin table is meant to be paged, not downloaded.
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const auditQueryMaxLimit = 500
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// handleQueryAudit implements the admin-only audit query command. The reply is
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// `{cmd:"audit_result", ok, events, total, ...}`; events are newest-first.
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func (h *wsHub) handleQueryAudit(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
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const replyCmd = "audit_result"
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if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
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return
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}
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var in auditquery.Query
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if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
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c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid request"}))
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return
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}
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in.Limit = auditquery.ClampLimit(in.Limit, auditQueryMaxLimit)
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in.Offset = auditquery.ClampOffset(in.Offset)
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// The audit trail is another visibility channel for devices. An admin-role
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// user may see public devices and their own, but not another user's bound
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// devices; the superadmin sees everything. One owner snapshot per query
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// keeps the scanner off the ACL lock per record.
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if h.acl != nil && !c.isSuperAdmin() {
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owners := h.acl.Owners()
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user := c.user
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in.DeviceAllowed = func(deviceID string) bool {
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owner := owners[deviceID]
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return owner == "" || owner == user
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}
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}
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path := h.log.AuditPath()
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if path == "" {
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h.audit(c, true, auditQuery, map[string]any{
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"ok": false,
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"reason": "audit_log_disabled",
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})
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c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
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"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false,
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"msg": "Audit log file is disabled on this server (YAMA_AUDIT_LOG=off)",
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}))
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return
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}
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res, err := auditquery.Scan(path, in)
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if err != nil {
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h.audit(c, true, auditQuery, map[string]any{
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"ok": false,
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"reason": "read_failed",
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"error": err.Error(),
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})
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c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
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"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false,
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"msg": "Failed to read audit log: " + err.Error(),
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}))
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return
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}
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// Record the query itself: an audit viewer is privileged, and reading the
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// trail is itself an auditable action. Filter terms are included so an
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// investigator can see what was searched for.
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h.audit(c, false, auditQuery, map[string]any{
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"ok": true,
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"event_filter": in.Event,
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"actor_filter": in.Actor,
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"ip_filter": in.IP,
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"device_filter": in.DeviceID,
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"keyword": in.Keyword,
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"warn_only": in.WarnOnly,
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"matches": res.Total,
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"returned": len(res.Events),
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"offset": in.Offset,
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})
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c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
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"cmd": replyCmd,
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"ok": true,
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"events": res.Events,
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"total": res.Total,
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"offset": in.Offset,
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"limit": in.Limit,
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"file": path,
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"file_exists": res.FileExists,
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"file_size": res.FileSize,
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"scanned_bytes": res.ScannedBytes,
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"truncated": res.Truncated,
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}))
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}
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