Files
SimpleRemoter/server/go/web/audit_query.go
T
yuanyuanxiangandClaude Code 46434b46d0 Feature: add per-device owner bindings to the web console
Web 控制台此前所有 admin 角色用户共享全部设备。新增设备级归属:内置 admin
把设备绑定给一个用户名后,该设备对其他 admin/viewer 不可见不可控,只有
owner 与内置 admin 可见可控。

- 新增 device_acl.json(与 users.json 同目录,YAMA_DEVICE_ACL_FILE 可覆盖),
  原子写、启动加载;文件损坏拒绝启动,避免私人设备变成公共。
- 可见性:内置 admin 全部;未绑定设备仅 admin 角色;绑定设备仅 owner。
  覆盖 get_devices、/api/devices、屏幕墙,以及 connect/term_open/mouse/key/
  clipboard/keyframe/rdp_reset 全部控制通道;device_update 也只推给可见者。
- 只有内置 admin(用户名 admin + role admin)能 bind/unbind;admin 角色保留
  建用户、删设备、审计等既有功能。删设备清绑定。
- 审计日志也按归属过滤:非内置 admin 只能看到公共设备和自己绑定设备的记录
  (device_id / device / devices 三种写法都识别);auditquery 增 DeviceAllowed
  钩子,ACL 提供 Owner 快照,避免扫描时逐条加锁。
- 删用户会解绑其设备;但账号名下有绑定设备时只有内置 admin 能删,其他 admin
  删除会把设备释放到公共池,属于越权。解绑在删除前完成,解绑失败中止删除;
  删除失败时回滚绑定。
- 绑定/解绑后立即重新校验在线会话:失去权限的屏幕/终端会话被断开。
- 本地用户名禁止 '@'(保留给 SSO 邮箱);本地密码登录拒绝 '@' 用户名,
  SSO 拒绝名为 admin 的身份,避免绕过超级管理员判定。
- 前端:superadmin 卡片显示 owner、绑定按钮和弹窗(本地用户 datalist +
  SSO 邮箱自由输入);deviceAcl 能力位由服务端挑战下发,C++ 端无此位不显示;
  设备 ID 经 jsAttr 转义后再进 onclick,修掉存储型 XSS。

验证:go build/test/vet 全绿;新增 ACL 持久化、可见性矩阵、控制通道拒绝、
绑定/解绑会话重校验、device_update 不泄露、分组过滤、删用户解绑与越权拒绝、
审计按归属过滤等测试;本地起 Go 服务 + WebSocket 探针验证 challenge、绑定、
非 superadmin 拒绝、解绑。

Model: deepseek-flash
Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-11-19 11:17:51 +01:00

105 lines
3.2 KiB
Go

package web
import (
"encoding/json"
"github.com/yuanyuanxiang/SimpleRemoter/server/go/auditquery"
)
// Audit-log query support for the admin-only "Audit Log" page.
//
// The scanner itself (file tail, filters, paging) lives in package
// auditquery so the MCP get_audit_log tool can share it; this file keeps only
// the WebSocket command handler and the reply shaping specific to the UI.
// auditQueryMaxLimit caps the page size of the audit page. It is tighter than
// auditquery.MaxLimit (the protocol-wide cap the MCP tool uses) because the
// admin table is meant to be paged, not downloaded.
const auditQueryMaxLimit = 500
// handleQueryAudit implements the admin-only audit query command. The reply is
// `{cmd:"audit_result", ok, events, total, ...}`; events are newest-first.
func (h *wsHub) handleQueryAudit(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
const replyCmd = "audit_result"
if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
return
}
var in auditquery.Query
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid request"}))
return
}
in.Limit = auditquery.ClampLimit(in.Limit, auditQueryMaxLimit)
in.Offset = auditquery.ClampOffset(in.Offset)
// The audit trail is another visibility channel for devices. An admin-role
// user may see public devices and their own, but not another user's bound
// devices; the superadmin sees everything. One owner snapshot per query
// keeps the scanner off the ACL lock per record.
if h.acl != nil && !c.isSuperAdmin() {
owners := h.acl.Owners()
user := c.user
in.DeviceAllowed = func(deviceID string) bool {
owner := owners[deviceID]
return owner == "" || owner == user
}
}
path := h.log.AuditPath()
if path == "" {
h.audit(c, true, auditQuery, map[string]any{
"ok": false,
"reason": "audit_log_disabled",
})
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false,
"msg": "Audit log file is disabled on this server (YAMA_AUDIT_LOG=off)",
}))
return
}
res, err := auditquery.Scan(path, in)
if err != nil {
h.audit(c, true, auditQuery, map[string]any{
"ok": false,
"reason": "read_failed",
"error": err.Error(),
})
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false,
"msg": "Failed to read audit log: " + err.Error(),
}))
return
}
// Record the query itself: an audit viewer is privileged, and reading the
// trail is itself an auditable action. Filter terms are included so an
// investigator can see what was searched for.
h.audit(c, false, auditQuery, map[string]any{
"ok": true,
"event_filter": in.Event,
"actor_filter": in.Actor,
"ip_filter": in.IP,
"device_filter": in.DeviceID,
"keyword": in.Keyword,
"warn_only": in.WarnOnly,
"matches": res.Total,
"returned": len(res.Events),
"offset": in.Offset,
})
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": replyCmd,
"ok": true,
"events": res.Events,
"total": res.Total,
"offset": in.Offset,
"limit": in.Limit,
"file": path,
"file_exists": res.FileExists,
"file_size": res.FileSize,
"scanned_bytes": res.ScannedBytes,
"truncated": res.Truncated,
}))
}