MCP was served by a plain httplib::Server, so remote clients could only use cleartext HTTP. YAMA now terminates TLS itself: a small front-end owns the MCP port, sniffs the first byte and either runs a Schannel handshake and forwards the decrypted bytes or passes plaintext through, with httplib moving to a loopback-only internal port. No OpenSSL, no frp change, existing local HTTP clients keep working, and an unusable certificate fails closed instead of falling back to cleartext. The identity loader grew the two things a public certificate needs. ECDSA (P-256/P-384/P-521) keys are persisted by importing PKCS#8 with an NCRYPTBUFFER_PKCS_KEY_NAME parameter, the only route MS Software KSP supports for Schannel; RSA keeps its old export-and-repersist path. Fullchains are accepted, and the intermediates are added to the current user's CA store so Schannel, which builds chains only from system stores, actually sends them. The shared handshake also now buffers a full TLS record before the first AcceptSecurityContext, which a partial ClientHello would otherwise poison (SEC_E_UNKNOWN_CREDENTIALS). Session resumption exposed a second trap: when a client resumes a session, ChangeCipherSpec, Finished and the first application record arrive in one segment and AcceptSecurityContext leaves the application record pending in the session. Nothing drained it, because both callers only decrypt when new ciphertext arrives, so the request waited until the peer gave up (the MCP front-end saw no request at all and the client reported "fetch failed (other side closed)"; the device port had the same hole behind its occasional login timeouts). Decrypt now drains pending data on len == 0, and both the front-end and the device port's handshake thread use it before entering their receive loops. Configuration is McpHttps, McpCertPath, McpKeyPath and McpInternalPort, the first three editable in the MCP settings dialog (the certificate rows stay greyed out until HTTPS is enabled and saving rejects missing files). Verified with a real Let's Encrypt ECDSA fullchain (53 tools over TLS, 401 with no or bad token), a local three-level chain whose intermediate was absent from the store, Node 24's fetch on a resumed session (initialize, notifications/initialized and tools/list all complete), and the device port's RSA handshake as a regression check. Details in docs/Mcp_Design.md section 13. Co-Authored-By: deepseek-flash
120 lines
6.0 KiB
C++
120 lines
6.0 KiB
C++
// ServerTlsSession.h — MFC 服务端单向 TLS(Schannel 入站)会话封装
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//
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// 与客户端 TlsChannel 对称:客户端走 InitializeSecurityContext(出站),本类走
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// AcceptSecurityContext(入站)。单向 TLS:不请求/校验客户端证书,客户端身份仍由
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// 隧道内登录(V1 PwdHmac / V2 ECDSA)承担。
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//
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// 分层:
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// ServerTlsIdentity —— 进程级「服务端身份」(证书 + 私钥 → 入站凭据)。可重入加载
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// (Load 禁止用 call_once,供未来 UI/指令热切换),本轮启动时加载一次。
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// ServerTlsSession —— 每条连接一个,持有握手/加解密所需的 Schannel 上下文与缓冲,
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// 随 CONTEXT_OBJECT 池化复用而重建。
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//
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// 线程模型:Handshake 在专用握手线程上阻塞执行(方案 A);握手完成后,Decrypt 由
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// IOCP 工作线程调用(每连接同一时刻只有一个未决 WSARecv,天然串行)、Encrypt 在
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// SendLock 内调用。Schannel 上下文非线程安全,故 Encrypt/Decrypt 内部以 m_mtx 互斥。
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//
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// 选型:Schannel(Windows 原生 SSPI),secur32.lib / crypt32.lib / ncrypt.lib 系统库。
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// 证书/私钥为 PEM(与 Go 服务端 YAMA_TLS_CERT/KEY 同构,可共用同一对密钥);私钥
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// 须为 PKCS#8(-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----),见 ServerTlsSession.cpp 的加载实现。
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#pragma once
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#include <WinSock2.h>
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#ifndef SECURITY_WIN32
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#define SECURITY_WIN32 1
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#endif
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#include <security.h>
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#include <schannel.h>
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#include <mutex>
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#include <string>
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#include <vector>
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class config; // common/iniFile.h(仅需引用,避免把 ini 头拖进 Server.h 的 include 图)
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// ---- 进程级服务端身份(证书 + 私钥),可重入加载(禁止 call_once,供未来热切换)----
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class ServerTlsIdentity
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{
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public:
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// 从 cfg(THIS_CFG)读 [tls] 节:Enabled / CertPath / KeyPath,并加载身份。
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// 返回 true 表示「配置已生效」(开关关、或开关开且身份加载成功);开关开但加载
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// 失败时返回 false 且 IsLoadError()==true,服务端须对 TLS ClientHello fail-closed。
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static bool Load(config& cfg);
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static bool IsEnabled(); // [tls] Enabled != 0
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static bool IsReady(); // 开关开 && 身份加载成功(有可用入站凭据)
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static bool IsLoadError(); // 开关开 && 身份加载失败(fail-closed)
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// 入站凭据(AcquireCredentialsHandle 产出)。返回拷贝;句柄值本身可安全拷贝。
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static CredHandle Cred();
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private:
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static void FreeIdentity();
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static bool LoadIdentity(const std::string& certPath, const std::string& keyPath);
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};
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// ---- 额外入站身份(MCP 等第二套证书)----
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//
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// 进程级身份 ServerTlsIdentity 只服务设备端口,证书由 [tls] 指定(通常是自签
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// CN=localhost)。MCP 要暴露给公网客户端,必须用公共 CA 签发的证书,故需要第二份
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// 身份。两者可并存:证书/私钥各自加载,持久化私钥用不同的键名(keyName)分开存放,
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// 不会互相覆盖。调用方负责在停止时调用 ServerTlsFreeIdentity。
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struct ServerTlsExtraIdentity
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{
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CredHandle cred = {}; // AcquireCredentialsHandle 产出的入站凭据
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PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = NULL; // 凭据按名引用的证书上下文
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ULONG_PTR key = 0; // NCrypt 持久化私钥句柄(NCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE)
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};
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// 从 PEM(证书链 + PKCS#8 私钥)构造一份独立入站身份。keyName 为 CNG 持久化键名,
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// 须与其它身份不同(例如 L"YamaServerTlsKey" / L"YamaMcpTlsKey")。
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bool ServerTlsLoadIdentityFromPem(const std::string& certPath, const std::string& keyPath,
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const wchar_t* keyName, ServerTlsExtraIdentity& out);
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// 释放 ServerTlsLoadIdentityFromPem 构造的身份(先凭据、再证书、最后删除持久化私钥)。
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void ServerTlsFreeIdentity(ServerTlsExtraIdentity& id);
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// ---- 单连接服务端 TLS 会话(握手 + 加解密)----
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class ServerTlsSession
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{
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public:
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ServerTlsSession() {}
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~ServerTlsSession() { CloseHandles(); }
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ServerTlsSession(const ServerTlsSession&) = delete;
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ServerTlsSession& operator=(const ServerTlsSession&) = delete;
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// 阻塞式服务端握手(方案 A:专用握手线程上调用)。initial/initialLen 是嗅探阶段已
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// 收到的 ClientHello 字节(可能只是分片;内部按 SEC_E_INCOMPLETE_MESSAGE 续收补齐)。
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// 成功返回 true,失败 false(调用方关闭连接,fail-closed)。
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bool Handshake(SOCKET sock, const BYTE* initial, int initialLen);
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// 同上,但使用调用方提供的入站凭据(MCP TLS 前端用独立的第二份身份,
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// 见 ServerTlsLoadIdentityFromPem)。
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bool HandshakeWithCred(SOCKET sock, const BYTE* initial, int initialLen, CredHandle cred);
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// 解密:把本次 WSARecv 收到的密文 cipher[0..len] 喂入,把能解出的明文追加到 plain。
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// len == 0 表示只解出会话里已缓存的密文(握手结束后必须先取一次,否则紧随 Finished
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// 到达的首条应用数据会一直躺着,直到客户端再发一包)。
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// 返回 0 = 成功(可能无明文);-1 = 错误 / 对端 close_notify(调用方关闭连接)。
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int Decrypt(const BYTE* cipher, int len, std::vector<BYTE>& plain);
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// 加密:把明文 plain[0..len] 加密成完整 TLS 记录,追加到 wire。
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// 返回加密的明文字节数(== len);-1 = 错误。
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int Encrypt(const BYTE* plain, int len, std::vector<BYTE>& wire);
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bool Ready() const { return m_ready; }
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private:
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void CloseHandles();
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bool SendAll(SOCKET sock, const void* data, int len);
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std::mutex m_mtx; // 序列化对 m_ctx 的 Encrypt/Decrypt(Schannel 非线程安全)
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CtxtHandle m_ctx = {};
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bool m_ctxValid = false;
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bool m_ready = false;
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SecPkgContext_StreamSizes m_sizes = {};
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std::vector<BYTE> m_raw; // 尚未解密 / 未消费完的 TLS 记录原始字节
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};
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