SimpleRemoter/server/go/web/sso_jwt.go

package web

import (
	"errors"
	"net/http"
	"strings"

	"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
)

// JWTDetector is an SSODetector for portals that hand the browser a signed
// JWT as an HttpOnly session cookie (or an Authorization: Bearer header). It
// verifies the token with a shared HMAC secret and maps the identity claims
// to a YAMA role. It is portal-agnostic: the secret, cookie name, claim keys
// and the role value that means "admin" are all supplied at construction, so
// the same detector serves any portal using this pattern.
type JWTDetector struct {
	secret        []byte
	cookieName    string
	usernameClaim string
	roleClaim     string
	adminRole     string
}

// JWTDetectorConfig configures a JWTDetector. Secret is the shared HMAC key
// (required). The remaining fields have defaults for a typical portal:
// CookieName "auth_token", UsernameClaim "username", RoleClaim "rolename",
// AdminRole "admin".
type JWTDetectorConfig struct {
	Secret        string
	CookieName    string
	UsernameClaim string
	RoleClaim     string
	AdminRole     string
}

// NewJWTDetector builds a JWTDetector, applying defaults for any unset
// optional field.
func NewJWTDetector(cfg JWTDetectorConfig) *JWTDetector {
	if cfg.CookieName == "" {
		cfg.CookieName = "auth_token"
	}
	if cfg.UsernameClaim == "" {
		cfg.UsernameClaim = "username"
	}
	if cfg.RoleClaim == "" {
		cfg.RoleClaim = "rolename"
	}
	if cfg.AdminRole == "" {
		cfg.AdminRole = "admin"
	}
	return &JWTDetector{
		secret:        []byte(cfg.Secret),
		cookieName:    cfg.CookieName,
		usernameClaim: cfg.UsernameClaim,
		roleClaim:     cfg.RoleClaim,
		adminRole:     cfg.AdminRole,
	}
}

// Detect reads the JWT from the configured cookie (falling back to a Bearer
// header), verifies its signature and expiry, and maps the identity to a YAMA
// role. Only HMAC algorithms are accepted, rejecting algorithm-confusion
// attempts (alg=none / asymmetric algorithms).
func (d *JWTDetector) Detect(r *http.Request) (username, role string, ok bool) {
	tokenString := d.extract(r)
	if tokenString == "" {
		return "", "", false
	}

	claims, ok := d.parse(tokenString)
	if !ok {
		return "", "", false
	}

	username, _ = claims[d.usernameClaim].(string)
	if username == "" {
		return "", "", false
	}

	rolename, _ := claims[d.roleClaim].(string)
	if rolename == d.adminRole {
		role = "admin"
	} else {
		role = "viewer"
	}
	return username, role, true
}

// extract returns the raw JWT from the configured cookie, or from a Bearer
// header as a fallback.
func (d *JWTDetector) extract(r *http.Request) string {
	if d.cookieName != "" {
		if ck, err := r.Cookie(d.cookieName); err == nil && ck.Value != "" {
			return ck.Value
		}
	}
	if hdr := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); strings.HasPrefix(hdr, "Bearer ") {
		return strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(hdr, "Bearer "))
	}
	return ""
}

// parse verifies a JWT against the shared HMAC secret and returns its claims.
func (d *JWTDetector) parse(tokenString string) (jwt.MapClaims, bool) {
	if len(d.secret) == 0 {
		// Fail closed: an unset shared secret must never accept a token.
		// A detector wired up with an empty secret is a misconfiguration, and
		// accepting an empty-key-signed token here would be a trivial auth
		// bypass. Rejecting everything means SSO silently falls back to login.
		return nil, false
	}
	token, err := jwt.Parse(tokenString, func(t *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
		if _, ok := t.Method.(*jwt.SigningMethodHMAC); !ok {
			return nil, errors.New("invalid signing algorithm")
		}
		return d.secret, nil
	})
	if err != nil || !token.Valid {
		return nil, false
	}
	claims, ok := token.Claims.(jwt.MapClaims)
	if !ok {
		return nil, false
	}
	return claims, true
}