package web

import (
	"encoding/json"
	"errors"
	"sort"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/yuanyuanxiang/SimpleRemoter/server/go/hub"
	"github.com/yuanyuanxiang/SimpleRemoter/server/go/protocol"
	"github.com/yuanyuanxiang/SimpleRemoter/server/go/wsauth"
	"golang.org/x/text/encoding/simplifiedchinese"
)

// rotateChallenge replaces the client's nonce with a fresh one and pushes a
// {cmd:"challenge"} message so the browser updates its stored nonce. Called
// after every login failure so a retry on the SAME WebSocket works without
// the user having to refresh — the old nonce is still burned for replay
// protection, but the client now has a usable new one.
func (h *wsHub) rotateChallenge(c *wsClient) {
	n, err := wsauth.NewNonce()
	if err != nil {
		h.log.Error("nonce regen failed: %v", err)
		c.nonce = ""
		return
	}
	c.nonce = n
	// Must carry caps too: the browser replaces serverCaps on every challenge.
	c.queue([]byte(`{"cmd":"challenge","nonce":"` + n + `"` + challengeCaps + `}`))
}

// dispatch routes one inbound message to its handler. The `raw` payload is
// passed through so handlers can re-parse to their own shape.
//
// Phase 3 implements: get_salt, login, get_devices, ping, disconnect.
// Phase 4 adds: connect, screen frame relay.
// Phase 5 adds: mouse, key (input forwarding to the device screen sub-conn).
// Phase 6 adds: term_open / term_input / term_resize / term_close (PTY relay).
// Phase 7 covers admin: create_user / delete_user / list_users / get_groups.
func (h *wsHub) dispatch(c *wsClient, cmd string, raw []byte) {
	// Connection-scoped counters feed the web.ws.close audit summary, which
	// is what turns a silent port scan into a visible event.
	c.statCommands++
	switch cmd {
	case "get_salt":
		h.handleGetSalt(c, raw)
	case "login":
		h.handleLogin(c, raw)
	case "get_devices":
		h.handleGetDevices(c, raw)
	case "ping":
		// no-op heartbeat; the read itself was the keep-alive signal
	case "disconnect":
		h.handleDisconnect(c, raw)

	case "connect":
		h.handleConnect(c, raw)
	case "keyframe":
		h.handleKeyframe(c, raw)
	case "rdp_reset":
		h.handleRdpReset(c, raw)
	case "audio_toggle":
		// Audio capture/forwarding is not yet ported from the C++ WebService
		// (see project_go_webservice_port). Reply explicitly so the front-end
		// console shows why the toolbar button has no effect, instead of the
		// request being silently dropped by the default case.
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
			"cmd": "audio_toggle_result", "ok": false,
			"msg": "Audio toggle not supported on Go server yet",
		}))
	case "mouse":
		h.handleMouse(c, raw)
	case "key":
		h.handleKey(c, raw)
	case "clipboard_set":
		h.handleClipboardSet(c, raw)
	case "clipboard_get":
		h.handleClipboardGet(c, raw)
	case "term_open":
		h.handleTermOpen(c, raw)
	case "term_input":
		h.handleTermInput(c, raw)
	case "term_resize":
		h.handleTermResize(c, raw)
	case "term_close":
		h.handleTermClose(c, raw)

	// Admin operations (Phase 7).
	case "delete_device":
		h.handleDeleteDevice(c, raw)
	case "create_user":
		h.handleCreateUser(c, raw)
	case "delete_user":
		h.handleDeleteUser(c, raw)
	case "list_users":
		h.handleListUsers(c, raw)
	case "get_groups":
		h.handleGetGroups(c, raw)
	case "query_audit":
		h.handleQueryAudit(c, raw)
	default:
		// Unknown commands are attacker-controlled and can be sent in a tight
		// loop. Count them for the close summary and record only the first
		// one per connection so the audit trail cannot be flooded.
		c.statUnknownCmd++
		if !c.auditUnknownCmdLogged {
			c.auditUnknownCmdLogged = true
			h.audit(c, true, auditUnknownCmd, map[string]any{
				"command": cmd,
			})
		}
	}
}

// requireAdmin combines token validation with a role=="admin" check. The
// reply on failure has the standard `{cmd, ok:false, msg}` shape so the
// front-end's generic toast handler can surface the reason.
func (h *wsHub) requireAdmin(c *wsClient, raw []byte, replyCmd string) (ok bool) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return false
	}
	// c.role is cached on first successful requireAuth; safe to read here.
	if c.role != "admin" {
		c.statAdminDenied++
		h.audit(c, true, auditDenied, map[string]any{
			"operation": strings.TrimSuffix(replyCmd, "_result"),
			"reason":    "not_admin",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
			"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Permission denied",
		}))
		return false
	}
	return true
}

// ----- handlers ------------------------------------------------------------

func (h *wsHub) handleGetSalt(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	// Throttle the salt-probe surface together with login: an attacker
	// who can poll get_salt freely would otherwise still learn nothing
	// (the unknown-user fake salt mitigation handles that), but the
	// endpoint is otherwise free CPU on the server. Limiting by IP is
	// enough; we don't have a username yet to limit by user.
	if !h.allowLoginByIP(c) {
		// Stall the response so a tight-loop attacker doesn't flood the
		// queue. Still return a well-formed salt to avoid making the
		// limit detectable from the client side.
		time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
	}

	var in struct {
		Username string `json:"username"`
	}
	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)

	salt, exists := h.auth.GetSalt(in.Username)
	// The response deliberately hides whether the user exists (fake salt),
	// but the audit trail should not: repeated probes for a nonexistent
	// account are a strong signal of username enumeration. Record the first
	// probe per connection only; the close summary carries the total.
	if !exists {
		c.statUnknownSalt++
		if !c.auditUnknownSaltLogged {
			c.auditUnknownSaltLogged = true
			h.audit(c, true, auditSaltProbe, map[string]any{
				"username": in.Username,
				"reason":   "unknown_user",
			})
		}
	}
	// GetSalt now returns a deterministic fake salt (16 hex chars) for
	// unknown users — same shape as a real salt — so an attacker can't
	// tell from this response alone whether the username exists.
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
		"cmd":  "salt",
		"ok":   true,
		"salt": salt,
	}))
}

func (h *wsHub) handleLogin(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	var in struct {
		Username string `json:"username"`
		Response string `json:"response"`
		Nonce    string `json:"nonce"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		c.statLoginFailures++
		h.audit(c, true, auditLoginFail, map[string]any{"reason": "malformed_request"})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid request"}))
		return
	}

	// Rate-limit BEFORE doing the hash work, so a flood doesn't pin CPU.
	// Two-dimensional throttle: per-IP catches scanners that try many
	// usernames; per-username catches scanners that rotate IPs against a
	// known account (admin). Either dimension tripping rejects the call
	// with a uniform "credentials" error so the limit is not detectable.
	if !h.allowLoginByIP(c) || !h.allowLoginByUsername(in.Username) {
		c.statLoginFailures++
		h.audit(c, true, auditLoginThrot, map[string]any{
			"username": in.Username,
			"reason":   "rate_limited",
		})
		time.Sleep(500 * time.Millisecond)
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid credentials"}))
		// Rotate the challenge: burns the previous nonce (replay protection)
		// AND hands the client a fresh one so the next attempt does not
		// require a page refresh.
		h.rotateChallenge(c)
		return
	}

	// Bind the response to the challenge we issued at connect time so that
	// replays from a different connection can't reuse a captured response.
	if in.Nonce == "" || in.Nonce != c.nonce {
		c.statLoginFailures++
		h.audit(c, true, auditLoginFail, map[string]any{
			"username": in.Username,
			"reason":   "invalid_challenge",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid challenge"}))
		h.rotateChallenge(c)
		return
	}

	token, role, err := h.auth.VerifyLogin(in.Username, in.Response, in.Nonce)
	if err != nil {
		// Record whether the account exists — an attack that keeps hammering
		// a real account (or scans for names) reads very differently from a
		// user mistyping their own password.
		_, exists := h.auth.GetSalt(in.Username)
		c.statLoginFailures++
		h.audit(c, true, auditLoginFail, map[string]any{
			"username":    in.Username,
			"reason":      "invalid_credentials",
			"user_exists": exists,
		})
		// Fixed delay on failure: makes online brute force impractical
		// even within the rate-limit budget, and erases the timing
		// difference between "wrong password" and "wrong nonce".
		time.Sleep(250 * time.Millisecond)
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid credentials"}))
		h.rotateChallenge(c)
		return
	}
	// Successful login: clear the per-IP/per-user budgets so a legitimate
	// user who fat-fingered a few times doesn't stay throttled.
	h.resetLoginThrottle(c, in.Username)

	// Identity fields are read by audit() from hub goroutines, so publish
	// them under h.mu.
	h.mu.Lock()
	c.nonce = ""
	c.token = token
	c.role = role
	c.user = in.Username
	h.mu.Unlock()

	fields := c.wsRequestFields()
	fields["method"] = "password"
	fields["actor"] = in.Username
	fields["role"] = role
	h.audit(c, false, auditLoginOK, fields)

	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
		"cmd":   "login_result",
		"ok":    true,
		"token": token,
		"role":  role,
	}))
}

// allowLoginByIP / allowLoginByUsername return true when the call is
// within budget; nil limiter always returns true (effectively disabled).
func (h *wsHub) allowLoginByIP(c *wsClient) bool {
	if h.loginIPLimit == nil || c == nil || c.addr == "" {
		return true
	}
	return h.loginIPLimit.Allow(c.addr)
}

func (h *wsHub) allowLoginByUsername(username string) bool {
	if h.loginUserLimit == nil || username == "" {
		return true
	}
	return h.loginUserLimit.Allow(username)
}

func (h *wsHub) resetLoginThrottle(c *wsClient, username string) {
	if h.loginIPLimit != nil && c != nil && c.addr != "" {
		h.loginIPLimit.Reset(c.addr)
	}
	if h.loginUserLimit != nil && username != "" {
		h.loginUserLimit.Reset(username)
	}
}

// handleConnect kicks off a screen-sharing session for the browser. We send
// COMMAND_SCREEN_SPY to the device's main TCP connection; the device then
// opens a new sub-connection (TOKEN_BITMAPINFO) which the TCP side binds to
// the device via hub.BindScreenConn. Frame relay to the browser is handled
// in Phase 4.2 once frames actually arrive.
//
// Reply semantics: returning connect_result.ok=true (without width/height)
// triggers the browser's "Waiting for video..." spinner. We can't deliver
// width/height here because we don't yet know them — they show up in the
// first TOKEN_BITMAPINFO from the device.
// handleDisconnect detaches this client from any device it was watching and
// — if no other authenticated client is still watching — closes the device's
// screen sub-connection. Closing the TCP sub-conn is the signal the C++
// device firmware uses to stop screen capture, so this is how we ask the
// device to free its encoder.
func (h *wsHub) handleDisconnect(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	var in struct {
		ID         string `json:"id"`
		MultiWatch bool   `json:"multiWatch"`
		Req        string `json:"req"`
	}
	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)

	// Take h.mu so event-handler readers (OnResolutionChange/OnScreenFrame)
	// get a consistent view of the watch set.
	var closed []string
	starts := make(map[string]time.Time)
	h.mu.Lock()
	if in.MultiWatch && in.ID != "" {
		// New frontend: drop only this device; the other wall tiles keep
		// streaming on the same connection.
		if c.isWatching(in.ID) {
			delete(c.watchIDs, in.ID)
			delete(c.keyframeAt, in.ID)
			starts[in.ID] = c.watchStartedAt[in.ID]
			delete(c.watchStartedAt, in.ID)
			closed = append(closed, in.ID)
		}
	} else {
		// Old frontend, or a disconnect without an id: it only ever watched
		// one device, so clear everything.
		for id := range c.watchIDs {
			closed = append(closed, id)
			starts[id] = c.watchStartedAt[id]
		}
		c.watchIDs = make(map[string]struct{})
		c.keyframeAt = make(map[string]int64)
		c.watchStartedAt = make(map[string]time.Time)
	}
	h.mu.Unlock()

	res := map[string]any{"cmd": "disconnect_result", "ok": true}
	if in.ID != "" {
		res["id"] = in.ID
	}
	if in.Req != "" {
		res["req"] = in.Req
	}
	c.queue(mustJSON(res))

	// deferredCloseScreen takes h.mu, so it must run outside the lock above.
	for _, id := range closed {
		if !starts[id].IsZero() {
			h.audit(c, false, auditScreenStop, map[string]any{
				"device_id":   id,
				"duration_ms": durationMs(starts[id]),
				"reason":      "disconnect",
			})
		}
		if h.countWatchers(id) == 0 {
			h.deferredCloseScreen(id)
		}
	}
}

// countWatchers returns how many clients still have deviceID in their watch
// set. Called from disconnect paths.
func (h *wsHub) countWatchers(deviceID string) int {
	h.mu.RLock()
	defer h.mu.RUnlock()
	n := 0
	for c := range h.clients {
		if c.isWatching(deviceID) {
			n++
		}
	}
	return n
}

// applyConnectWatch mutates c.watchIDs for a connect request. The caller must
// hold h.mu.
//
// It returns the ids dropped by the legacy replace-all semantics; the caller
// must stop their screen sessions outside the lock (only if nobody else still
// watches them). tooMany reports that the per-connection cap blocked the id.
func applyConnectWatch(c *wsClient, id string, multiWatch bool) (stopped []string, tooMany bool) {
	if c.watchIDs == nil {
		c.watchIDs = make(map[string]struct{})
	}
	if !multiWatch {
		// Old frontend: one device per connection. Replace the whole set so
		// switching devices repeatedly cannot grow it without bound.
		for old := range c.watchIDs {
			if old != id {
				stopped = append(stopped, old)
			}
		}
		c.watchIDs = make(map[string]struct{})
	}
	if _, ok := c.watchIDs[id]; ok {
		return stopped, false // repeated connect (focus switch) is a no-op
	}
	if len(c.watchIDs) >= maxWatchPerClient {
		return stopped, true
	}
	c.watchIDs[id] = struct{}{}
	return stopped, false
}

// resolveWatchDevice maps an input command to the device it targets. The new
// frontend sends an explicit id, which must be in this connection's watch set
// so a stale or forged id can never inject input into a device the browser is
// not viewing. Old frontends omit id — accepted only while exactly one device
// is watched. With several devices and no id the command is dropped.
func (h *wsHub) resolveWatchDevice(c *wsClient, raw []byte) string {
	var in struct {
		ID string `json:"id"`
	}
	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)
	h.mu.RLock()
	defer h.mu.RUnlock()
	if in.ID != "" {
		if c.isWatching(in.ID) {
			return in.ID
		}
		return ""
	}
	if len(c.watchIDs) == 1 {
		for id := range c.watchIDs {
			return id
		}
	}
	return ""
}

func (h *wsHub) handleConnect(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "connect_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID         string `json:"id"`
		MultiWatch bool   `json:"multiWatch"`
		Req        string `json:"req"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil || in.ID == "" {
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "connect_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Bad request"}))
		return
	}

	// Every response echoes id and req: one socket may now serve several
	// devices (screen wall), so the browser routes by id (and req when it
	// needs to pair a reply with a specific request).
	reply := func(ok bool, msg string) map[string]any {
		m := map[string]any{"cmd": "connect_result", "ok": ok, "id": in.ID}
		if in.Req != "" {
			m["req"] = in.Req
		}
		if msg != "" {
			m["msg"] = msg
		}
		return m
	}

	var stopped []string
	starts := make(map[string]time.Time)
	var tooMany, already bool
	h.mu.Lock()
	_, already = c.watchIDs[in.ID]
	stopped, tooMany = applyConnectWatch(c, in.ID, in.MultiWatch)
	// A pending deferred close means the previous session is still alive for
	// a few seconds; cancel it so the cached resolution + IDR hot path wins.
	// Only when the subscription was accepted: a rejected connect must not
	// cancel the teardown of a device nobody is watching any more, or that
	// session would keep streaming forever.
	if !tooMany {
		if t, ok := h.screenCloseTimers[in.ID]; ok {
			t.Stop()
			delete(h.screenCloseTimers, in.ID)
		}
		// Repeated connect (focus switch / wall re-subscribe) keeps the
		// original start time so its audit duration covers the whole watch.
		if _, ok := c.watchStartedAt[in.ID]; !ok {
			c.watchStartedAt[in.ID] = time.Now()
		}
		for _, id := range stopped {
			starts[id] = c.watchStartedAt[id]
			delete(c.watchStartedAt, id)
			delete(c.keyframeAt, id)
		}
	}
	h.mu.Unlock()

	if tooMany {
		h.audit(c, true, auditScreenDenied, map[string]any{
			"device_id": in.ID,
			"reason":    "too_many_watches",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(reply(false, "Too many devices on one connection")))
		return
	}
	// Only the legacy replace-all semantics can produce stopped ids. Their
	// screen sessions are torn down outside the lock; deferredCloseScreen is
	// a no-op while another browser still watches the device.
	for _, id := range stopped {
		if !starts[id].IsZero() {
			h.audit(c, false, auditScreenStop, map[string]any{
				"device_id":   id,
				"duration_ms": durationMs(starts[id]),
				"reason":      "replaced",
			})
		}
		if h.countWatchers(id) == 0 {
			h.deferredCloseScreen(id)
		}
	}

	// If a screen session is already live for this device (another browser
	// is already watching, or this connection reconnected), reuse it: hand
	// the viewer the cached resolution and the most recent IDR keyframe so
	// its decoder can start rendering immediately, without waiting for the
	// next IDR (~15 s).
	cache := h.devices.ScreenState(in.ID)
	if cache.Active {
		if !already {
			h.audit(c, false, auditScreenStart, map[string]any{
				"device_id":   in.ID,
				"mode":        "cached",
				"multi_watch": in.MultiWatch,
				"width":       cache.Width,
				"height":      cache.Height,
			})
		}
		m := reply(true, "")
		m["width"] = cache.Width
		m["height"] = cache.Height
		c.queue(mustJSON(m))
		if len(cache.Keyframe) > 0 {
			c.queueBinary(cache.Keyframe)
		}
		return
	}

	// No active session — kick the device to start capturing. We send the
	// same 32-byte COMMAND_SCREEN_SPY payload the C++ WebService sends:
	//   [0]=COMMAND_SCREEN_SPY, [1]=0 (GDI), [2]=ALGORITHM_H264, [3]=1 (multi-screen),
	//   [4..31]=0.
	cmd := make([]byte, 32)
	cmd[0] = protocol.CommandScreenSpy
	cmd[2] = protocol.AlgorithmH264
	cmd[3] = 1

	// CRITICAL: the watch entry is inserted above (applyConnectWatch) BEFORE
	// asking the device to start capturing. On fast reconnects the device's
	// screen sub-conn handshake completes in <100 ms, so TOKEN_BITMAPINFO and
	// even the first H264 frame can arrive before this handler finishes — and
	// the resolution_changed / frame broadcasts filter on the watch set. If
	// the entry were added afterwards the new viewer would silently miss the
	// very first IDR and resolution_changed, leaving the page stuck on
	// "Waiting for video".
	if err := h.devices.SendToDevice(in.ID, cmd); err != nil {
		// Roll back the subscription: no screen session was started.
		h.mu.Lock()
		delete(c.watchIDs, in.ID)
		delete(c.keyframeAt, in.ID)
		delete(c.watchStartedAt, in.ID)
		h.mu.Unlock()
		msg := "Device offline"
		reason := "device_offline"
		if err != hub.ErrDeviceOffline {
			msg = "Failed to start screen capture"
			reason = "start_failed"
			h.log.Error("SendToDevice(%s): %v", in.ID, err)
		}
		h.audit(c, true, auditScreenDenied, map[string]any{
			"device_id": in.ID,
			"reason":    reason,
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(reply(false, msg)))
		return
	}
	h.log.Debug("[timing] COMMAND_SCREEN_SPY sent to device=%s (cold start)", in.ID)
	if !already {
		h.audit(c, false, auditScreenStart, map[string]any{
			"device_id":   in.ID,
			"mode":        "started",
			"multi_watch": in.MultiWatch,
		})
	}

	c.queue(mustJSON(reply(true, "")))
}

// handleKeyframe asks the device to emit an IDR immediately. The browser calls
// it when it resumes decoding a wall tile, or right after connecting to reset
// the reference chain. The server first replays its cached IDR so the decoder
// has something to paint at once, then sends COMMAND_SCREEN_KEYFRAME_REQ to
// the client, whose fresh IDR replaces the cache (the cached one cannot
// guarantee the following P-frames reference it).
//
// Mirrors CWebService::HandleKeyframe. Requests are limited to one per device
// per second, so a retrying frontend cannot spin the encoder.
func (h *wsHub) handleKeyframe(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "keyframe_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID  string `json:"id"`
		Req string `json:"req"`
	}
	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)

	reply := func(ok bool, msg string) map[string]any {
		m := map[string]any{"cmd": "keyframe_result", "ok": ok}
		if in.ID != "" {
			m["id"] = in.ID
		}
		if in.Req != "" {
			m["req"] = in.Req
		}
		if msg != "" {
			m["msg"] = msg
		}
		return m
	}
	if in.ID == "" {
		c.queue(mustJSON(reply(false, "Bad request")))
		return
	}

	allowed := false
	h.mu.Lock()
	if c.isWatching(in.ID) {
		now := time.Now().Unix()
		if last, ok := c.keyframeAt[in.ID]; !ok || now > last {
			if c.keyframeAt == nil {
				c.keyframeAt = make(map[string]int64)
			}
			c.keyframeAt[in.ID] = now
			allowed = true
		}
	}
	h.mu.Unlock()
	if !allowed {
		c.queue(mustJSON(reply(false, "Not watching device or rate limited")))
		return
	}

	cache := h.devices.ScreenState(in.ID)
	if !cache.Active {
		c.queue(mustJSON(reply(false, "No active screen session")))
		return
	}
	if len(cache.Keyframe) > 0 {
		c.queueBinary(cache.Keyframe)
	}
	if err := h.devices.SendToScreen(in.ID, []byte{protocol.CommandScreenKeyframeReq}); err != nil {
		c.queue(mustJSON(reply(false, "Failed to request keyframe")))
		return
	}
	c.queue(mustJSON(reply(true, "")))
}

// handleRdpReset asks the device to switch its screen capture back to the
// physical console session ("RDP 会话归位"). Useful when someone has RDP'd into
// the box: the device's screen thread is by default attached to whatever WTS
// session is currently active, so the operator may otherwise see a login
// screen or a different user's desktop instead of the local console.
//
// Fire-and-forget on purpose, matching the C++ server and the browser UI —
// front-end ignores any reply, so we don't send one. Failures (device offline,
// no active screen session, browser hasn't called `connect` yet) are warn-
// logged server-side only.
func (h *wsHub) handleRdpReset(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "rdp_reset_result") {
		return
	}
	deviceID := h.resolveWatchDevice(c, raw)
	if deviceID == "" {
		h.audit(c, true, auditRdpReset, map[string]any{
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "no_device",
		})
		return
	}
	// CMD_RESTORE_CONSOLE must go through the screen sub-conn — the client
	// dispatches it from CScreenManager::OnReceive, which only reads from
	// the screen sub-conn (see client/ScreenManager.cpp:996). Sending on the
	// main conn would silently no-op.
	if err := h.devices.SendToScreen(deviceID, []byte{protocol.CmdRestoreConsole}); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditRdpReset, map[string]any{
			"device_id": deviceID,
			"ok":        false,
			"reason":    "send_failed",
			"error":     err.Error(),
		})
		return
	}
	h.audit(c, false, auditRdpReset, map[string]any{
		"device_id": deviceID,
		"ok":        true,
	})
}

func (h *wsHub) handleGetDevices(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "device_list") {
		return
	}
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
		"cmd":     "device_list",
		"ok":      true,
		"devices": h.listDevicesWithOffline(),
	}))
}

// listDevicesWithOffline returns the online snapshot followed by historical
// devices that are not currently online. The online-ID set is derived from the
// same snapshot, so a device reconnecting between the two lookups cannot appear
// twice. With no history store wired up this is just the online list.
func (h *wsHub) listDevicesWithOffline() []hub.DeviceInfo {
	devices := h.devices.ListDevices()
	if h.history == nil {
		return devices
	}
	online := make(map[string]struct{}, len(devices))
	for _, d := range devices {
		online[d.ID] = struct{}{}
	}
	return append(devices, h.history.Offline(online)...)
}

// requireAuth validates the token embedded in raw against the authenticator's
// session store (not against c.token). Tokens live independently of WS
// connections — the browser may reconnect after a visibility/network blip and
// resume with the same token, so we must not tie validity to one WS lifetime.
// On the first authenticated message we cache the token/role on the wsClient
// so broadcasts know to deliver to this connection.
func (h *wsHub) requireAuth(c *wsClient, raw []byte, replyCmd string) bool {
	var in struct {
		Token string `json:"token"`
	}
	_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)
	if in.Token == "" {
		h.auditBadToken(c, replyCmd, "missing_token")
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false}))
		return false
	}
	sess, err := h.auth.ValidateToken(in.Token)
	if err != nil {
		h.auditBadToken(c, replyCmd, "invalid_token")
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false}))
		return false
	}
	resumed := false
	h.mu.Lock()
	if c.token == "" {
		c.token = in.Token
		c.role = sess.Role
		c.user = sess.Username
		resumed = true
	}
	h.mu.Unlock()
	if resumed {
		h.audit(c, false, auditSession, map[string]any{"method": "token"})
	}
	return true
}

// auditBadToken counts rejected tokens and records only the first one per
// connection: an attacker can loop protected commands with garbage tokens,
// and one line plus the close-summary count is enough to see it.
func (h *wsHub) auditBadToken(c *wsClient, replyCmd, reason string) {
	c.statInvalidToken++
	if c.auditInvalidTokenLogged {
		return
	}
	c.auditInvalidTokenLogged = true
	h.audit(c, true, auditBadToken, map[string]any{
		"command": strings.TrimSuffix(replyCmd, "_result"),
		"reason":  reason,
	})
}

// handleMouse forwards one mouse event from the browser to the device's
// screen sub-connection as a COMMAND_SCREEN_CONTROL packet carrying a
// single MSG64. Mirrors the C++ CWebService::HandleMouse path
// (server/2015Remote/WebService.cpp:773) so the client's
// CScreenManager::ProcessCommand sees identical bytes regardless of which
// server is serving the device. Unauthenticated and unknown event types
// drop silently — input is high-frequency, error replies would just spam
// the WS.
func (h *wsHub) handleMouse(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "mouse_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		Type   string `json:"type"`
		X      int32  `json:"x"`
		Y      int32  `json:"y"`
		Button int    `json:"button"`
		Delta  int    `json:"delta"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		return
	}
	deviceID := h.resolveWatchDevice(c, raw)
	if deviceID == "" {
		return // browser hasn't picked a device yet
	}

	var message, wParam uint64
	switch in.Type {
	case "down":
		switch in.Button {
		case 0:
			message, wParam = protocol.WMLButtonDown, protocol.MKLButton
		case 1:
			message, wParam = protocol.WMMButtonDown, protocol.MKMButton
		case 2:
			message, wParam = protocol.WMRButtonDown, protocol.MKRButton
		default:
			return
		}
	case "up":
		switch in.Button {
		case 0:
			message = protocol.WMLButtonUp
		case 1:
			message = protocol.WMMButtonUp
		case 2:
			message = protocol.WMRButtonUp
		default:
			return
		}
	case "move":
		message = protocol.WMMouseMove
	case "wheel":
		message = protocol.WMMouseWheel
		// Windows expects ±120 per notch in HIWORD(wParam). Browsers report
		// `deltaY` in pixels with sign flipped relative to Win32 conventions
		// (positive deltaY = scroll down). Normalize to one notch per call,
		// signed so up scrolls "up" on the remote.
		var wheel int16
		switch {
		case in.Delta > 0:
			wheel = -120
		case in.Delta < 0:
			wheel = 120
		}
		wParam = uint64(uint16(wheel)) << 16
	case "dblclick":
		// Windows synthesizes double-click from rapid down/up sequences, so
		// the C++ server only forwards this for macOS clients. We don't
		// currently track client OS on the Go side; drop the event — the
		// down/up pair the browser already sent is sufficient on Windows.
		return
	default:
		return
	}

	lParam := protocol.MakeLParam(in.X, in.Y)
	pkt := protocol.BuildScreenControlPacket(message, wParam, lParam, in.X, in.Y, tickMillis())
	_ = h.devices.SendToScreen(deviceID, pkt)
}

// handleKey forwards one keyboard event to the device. lParam is built to
// match the Windows convention so applications relying on TranslateMessage
// (e.g. text input fields) behave correctly. Mirrors
// CWebService::HandleKey at server/2015Remote/WebService.cpp:878.
//
// Scan code: the C++ server resolves the VK -> scan code via the local
// MapVirtualKey. Go is cross-platform so we leave the scan-code bits zero;
// the client side ultimately delivers events via SendInput/keybd_event
// which accept VK-only input, and the extended-key bit (bit 24) is what
// actually matters for distinguishing numpad/arrow keys.
func (h *wsHub) handleKey(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "key_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		KeyCode int  `json:"keyCode"`
		Down    bool `json:"down"`
		Alt     bool `json:"alt"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		return
	}
	if in.KeyCode == protocol.VKLWin || in.KeyCode == protocol.VKRWin {
		return // Windows keys stay local; matches both C++ server and client
	}
	deviceID := h.resolveWatchDevice(c, raw)
	if deviceID == "" {
		return
	}

	var message uint64
	switch {
	case in.Alt && in.Down:
		message = protocol.WMSysKeyDown
	case in.Alt && !in.Down:
		message = protocol.WMSysKeyUp
	case in.Down:
		message = protocol.WMKeyDown
	default:
		message = protocol.WMKeyUp
	}

	// lParam layout (Win32 keyboard message):
	//   bits  0..15: repeat count (= 1)
	//   bits 16..23: scan code (we leave zero — see handleKey doc)
	//   bit      24: extended-key flag (arrows, numpad, RCtrl, RAlt, ...)
	//   bit      29: context code (Alt held)
	//   bits 30..31: previous-key/transition flags (both set on key-up)
	lParam := uint64(1)
	if protocol.IsExtendedKey(in.KeyCode) {
		lParam |= 1 << 24
	}
	if in.Alt {
		lParam |= 1 << 29
	}
	if !in.Down {
		lParam |= 3 << 30
	}

	wParam := uint64(uint32(in.KeyCode))
	pkt := protocol.BuildScreenControlPacket(message, wParam, lParam, 0, 0, tickMillis())
	_ = h.devices.SendToScreen(deviceID, pkt)
}

// handleClipboardSet relays the browser's local clipboard text into the remote
// device's clipboard via COMMAND_SCREEN_SET_CLIPBOARD (25). The client's
// UpdateClientClipboard stores the payload as CF_TEXT (ANSI/GBK), so we encode
// the UTF-8 input to GBK here — matching the C++ WebService (explicit code
// page 936) and the existing MCP remote_clipboard convention. Non-GBK glyphs
// (emoji, some accented Latin) collapse to '?' — an accepted limitation.
func (h *wsHub) handleClipboardSet(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "clipboard_set_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		Text string `json:"text"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		return
	}
	if in.Text == "" {
		return
	}
	deviceID := h.resolveWatchDevice(c, raw)
	if deviceID == "" {
		h.audit(c, true, auditClipSet, map[string]any{
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "no_device",
		})
		return
	}
	gbk, err := simplifiedchinese.GBK.NewEncoder().Bytes([]byte(in.Text))
	if err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditClipSet, map[string]any{
			"device_id": deviceID,
			"ok":        false,
			"reason":    "encode_failed",
			"error":     err.Error(),
		})
		return
	}
	payload := append([]byte{protocol.CommandScreenSetClipboard}, gbk...)
	if err := h.devices.SendToScreen(deviceID, payload); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditClipSet, map[string]any{
			"device_id": deviceID,
			"ok":        false,
			"reason":    "send_failed",
			"error":     err.Error(),
		})
		return
	}
	// Record the size only — clipboard contents may be sensitive.
	h.audit(c, false, auditClipSet, map[string]any{
		"device_id":   deviceID,
		"ok":          true,
		"bytes":       len(gbk),
		"source_utf8": len(in.Text),
	})
}

// handleClipboardGet asks the remote device for its clipboard text via
// COMMAND_SCREEN_GET_CLIPBOARD (24, a single byte). The device replies with
// TOKEN_CLIPBOARD_TEXT, which the hub relays back to the browser.
func (h *wsHub) handleClipboardGet(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "clipboard_get_result") {
		return
	}
	deviceID := h.resolveWatchDevice(c, raw)
	if deviceID == "" {
		h.audit(c, true, auditClipGet, map[string]any{
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "no_device",
		})
		return
	}
	if err := h.devices.SendToScreen(deviceID, []byte{protocol.CommandScreenGetClipboard}); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditClipGet, map[string]any{
			"device_id": deviceID,
			"ok":        false,
			"reason":    "send_failed",
			"error":     err.Error(),
		})
		return
	}
	h.audit(c, false, auditClipGet, map[string]any{
		"device_id": deviceID,
		"ok":        true,
	})
}

// handleCreateUser provisions a new web account. Admin-only. Mirrors the
// C++ CWebService::HandleCreateUser semantics (WebService.cpp:1009): the
// password is hashed with a fresh salt, the user table is persisted, and
// any duplicate username is rejected.
func (h *wsHub) handleCreateUser(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	const replyCmd = "create_user_result"
	if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		Username      string   `json:"username"`
		Password      string   `json:"password"`
		Role          string   `json:"role"`
		AllowedGroups []string `json:"allowed_groups"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditUserCreate, map[string]any{
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "invalid_json",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid JSON"}))
		return
	}
	if in.Role == "" {
		in.Role = "viewer"
	}
	if err := h.auth.CreateUser(in.Username, in.Password, in.Role, in.AllowedGroups); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditUserCreate, map[string]any{
			"target":      in.Username,
			"target_role": in.Role,
			"ok":          false,
			"reason":      "create_failed",
			"error":       err.Error(),
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": err.Error()}))
		return
	}
	h.audit(c, false, auditUserCreate, map[string]any{
		"target":      in.Username,
		"target_role": in.Role,
		"groups":      len(in.AllowedGroups),
		"ok":          true,
	})
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": true}))
}

// handleDeleteDevice implements the device list's "Delete" action.
//
// The meaning depends on liveness, matching the MFC client's
// OnOnlineUninstall: an online agent is told to uninstall itself with the
// single-byte TOKEN_UNINSTALL command; an offline device has no agent to
// talk to. Either way the persisted history record is removed as well, so
// the deleted device does not linger in the offline list.
//
// Admin-only: this is destructive and irreversible.
func (h *wsHub) handleDeleteDevice(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	const replyCmd = "delete_device_result"
	if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID string `json:"id"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil || in.ID == "" {
		h.audit(c, true, auditDeviceAdmin, map[string]any{
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "invalid_id",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
			"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid device id",
		}))
		return
	}

	if h.devices.IsOnline(in.ID) {
		err := h.devices.SendToDevice(in.ID, []byte{protocol.CommandUninstall})
		if err == nil {
			// Drop the record too: after the agent uninstalls itself it will
			// never log in again, so keeping it would leave a dead entry in
			// the offline list. The disconnect event that follows finds no
			// record and is a no-op.
			if h.history != nil {
				h.history.Remove(in.ID)
			}
			h.audit(c, false, auditDeviceAdmin, map[string]any{
				"device_id": in.ID,
				"mode":      "uninstall",
				"ok":        true,
			})
			h.broadcastAuthenticated(`{"cmd":"devices_changed"}`)
			c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
				"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": true, "id": in.ID, "mode": "uninstall",
			}))
			return
		}
		// Lost the race with a disconnect between IsOnline and the send:
		// fall through to removing the (now offline) history record.
		if !errors.Is(err, hub.ErrDeviceOffline) {
			h.audit(c, true, auditDeviceAdmin, map[string]any{
				"device_id": in.ID,
				"mode":      "uninstall",
				"ok":        false,
				"reason":    "uninstall_failed",
				"error":     err.Error(),
			})
			c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
				"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": err.Error(),
			}))
			return
		}
	}

	if h.history == nil || !h.history.Remove(in.ID) {
		h.audit(c, true, auditDeviceAdmin, map[string]any{
			"device_id": in.ID,
			"mode":      "removed",
			"ok":        false,
			"reason":    "not_found",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
			"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Device not found",
		}))
		return
	}
	h.audit(c, false, auditDeviceAdmin, map[string]any{
		"device_id": in.ID,
		"mode":      "removed",
		"ok":        true,
	})
	// Other browsers (and this one) refresh their lists; the reply below
	// still gives the initiator a precise result/toast.
	h.broadcastAuthenticated(`{"cmd":"devices_changed"}`)
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
		"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": true, "id": in.ID, "mode": "removed",
	}))
}

// handleDeleteUser removes an account and revokes any of its live sessions.
// Admin-only. The bootstrap "admin" account is rejected at the wsauth layer.
func (h *wsHub) handleDeleteUser(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	const replyCmd = "delete_user_result"
	if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		Username string `json:"username"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditUserDelete, map[string]any{
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "invalid_json",
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid JSON"}))
		return
	}
	if err := h.auth.DeleteUser(in.Username); err != nil {
		h.audit(c, true, auditUserDelete, map[string]any{
			"target": in.Username,
			"ok":     false,
			"reason": "delete_failed",
			"error":  err.Error(),
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": err.Error()}))
		return
	}
	h.audit(c, false, auditUserDelete, map[string]any{
		"target": in.Username,
		"ok":     true,
	})
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": true}))
}

// handleListUsers returns the account table to admin callers. Field shape
// matches the C++ list_users_result the browser already parses: an array
// of {username, role, allowed_groups}.
func (h *wsHub) handleListUsers(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	const replyCmd = "list_users_result"
	if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return
	}
	users := h.auth.ListUsers()
	out := make([]map[string]any, 0, len(users))
	for _, u := range users {
		groups := u.AllowedGroups
		if groups == nil {
			groups = []string{}
		}
		out = append(out, map[string]any{
			"username":       u.Username,
			"role":           u.Role,
			"allowed_groups": groups,
		})
	}
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
		"cmd":   replyCmd,
		"ok":    true,
		"users": out,
	}))
}

// handleGetGroups returns the deduplicated set of group labels currently
// observed on online devices, plus a synthetic "default" entry that the
// admin UI uses for ungrouped devices. Admin-only — non-admins don't get
// to enumerate the device fleet's groups. Matches the contract of
// CWebService::HandleGetGroups (WebService.cpp:1130).
func (h *wsHub) handleGetGroups(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	const replyCmd = "groups"
	if !h.requireAdmin(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return
	}
	seen := map[string]struct{}{"default": {}}
	for _, d := range h.devices.ListDevices() {
		g := d.Group
		if g == "" {
			g = "default"
		}
		seen[g] = struct{}{}
	}
	groups := make([]string, 0, len(seen))
	for g := range seen {
		groups = append(groups, g)
	}
	sort.Strings(groups)
	c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
		"cmd":    replyCmd,
		"ok":     true,
		"groups": groups,
	}))
}

// handleTermOpen kicks off a web terminal session. On success the wsClient
// records `termWatching = deviceID` so subsequent term_input / term_resize
// have a target, and the hub sends COMMAND_SHELL to the device. The
// device's shell sub-conn arrives separately and is bound by the TCP layer
// via Hub.BindTerminalConn; that step fires OnTerminalReady to flip the
// browser into "ready" state.
//
// Single-viewer is enforced at the hub. The C++ side matches:
// server/2015Remote/WebService.cpp:1799.
func (h *wsHub) handleTermOpen(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	const replyCmd = "term_closed"
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, replyCmd) {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID string `json:"id"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil || in.ID == "" {
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": "Bad request"}))
		return
	}

	// Pin termWatching BEFORE asking the hub to open the session: the
	// device's shell sub-conn can arrive in <100 ms on LAN, and
	// OnTerminalReady filters by termWatching. Same race shape as the
	// screen path in handleConnect.
	h.mu.Lock()
	if c.termWatching != "" && c.termWatching != in.ID {
		active := c.termWatching
		h.mu.Unlock()
		h.audit(c, true, auditTermDenied, map[string]any{
			"device_id": in.ID,
			"reason":    "other_terminal_open",
			"active":    active,
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
			"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false,
			"msg": "Close current terminal before opening another",
		}))
		return
	}
	newSession := c.termWatching != in.ID
	c.termWatching = in.ID
	c.termCloseReason = ""
	if newSession || c.termStartedAt.IsZero() {
		c.termStartedAt = time.Now()
	}
	h.mu.Unlock()

	if err := h.devices.OpenTerminalSession(in.ID); err != nil {
		h.mu.Lock()
		c.termWatching = ""
		c.termStartedAt = time.Time{}
		h.mu.Unlock()
		msg := "Device offline"
		reason := "device_offline"
		switch err {
		case hub.ErrTerminalBusy:
			msg = "Terminal already open by another viewer"
			reason = "terminal_busy"
		case hub.ErrDeviceOffline:
			msg = "Device offline"
		default:
			msg = "Failed to start terminal"
			reason = "start_failed"
			h.log.Error("OpenTerminalSession(%s): %v", in.ID, err)
		}
		h.audit(c, true, auditTermDenied, map[string]any{
			"device_id": in.ID,
			"reason":    reason,
		})
		c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false, "msg": msg}))
		return
	}
	if newSession {
		h.audit(c, false, auditTermStart, map[string]any{
			"device_id": in.ID,
		})
	}
}

// handleTermInput forwards xterm.js keystrokes to the device's shell
// sub-conn verbatim. The client's ConPTYManager treats anything that
// isn't a known control byte (CMD_TERMINAL_RESIZE / COMMAND_NEXT) as
// raw PTY input — see client/ConPTYManager.cpp:244.
func (h *wsHub) handleTermInput(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "term_input_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID   string `json:"id"`
		Data string `json:"data"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		return
	}
	if in.ID == "" || in.Data == "" {
		return
	}
	h.mu.RLock()
	watching := c.termWatching == in.ID
	h.mu.RUnlock()
	if !watching {
		return // someone else's session, or no session
	}
	_ = h.devices.SendToTerminal(in.ID, []byte(in.Data))
}

// handleTermResize forwards xterm.js fit/resize events to the device's
// PTY. Legacy cmd-pipe mode silently ignores resize (the underlying
// pipes have no notion of geometry).
func (h *wsHub) handleTermResize(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "term_resize_result") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID   string `json:"id"`
		Cols int    `json:"cols"`
		Rows int    `json:"rows"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
		return
	}
	if in.ID == "" || in.Cols <= 0 || in.Rows <= 0 {
		return
	}
	h.mu.RLock()
	watching := c.termWatching == in.ID
	h.mu.RUnlock()
	if !watching {
		return
	}
	if !h.devices.TerminalIsPTY(in.ID) {
		return // legacy cmd pipe — ignored, same as the C++ guard
	}
	_ = h.devices.SendToTerminal(in.ID, protocol.BuildTerminalResize(in.Cols, in.Rows))
}

// handleTermClose tears down the active session. CloseTerminalSession
// fires OnTerminalClosed which the wsHub broadcast loop turns into the
// front-end's `term_closed` notification — no need to ack here.
func (h *wsHub) handleTermClose(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
	if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "term_closed") {
		return
	}
	var in struct {
		ID string `json:"id"`
	}
	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil || in.ID == "" {
		return
	}
	h.mu.Lock()
	watching := c.termWatching == in.ID
	if watching {
		// Consumed by OnTerminalClosed for the remote.terminal.stop audit
		// record (it fires synchronously inside CloseTerminalSession).
		c.termCloseReason = "user"
	}
	h.mu.Unlock()
	if !watching {
		return
	}
	h.devices.CloseTerminalSession(in.ID)
}

// tickMillis returns a 32-bit-truncated ms timestamp suitable for the
// MSG64.time field. The client compares these with GetTickCount(), which
// is also a 32-bit ms counter — exact origin doesn't matter, only that
// successive events have non-decreasing values within the wrap window.
func tickMillis() uint32 {
	return uint32(time.Now().UnixMilli() & 0xFFFFFFFF)
}

func mustJSON(v any) []byte {
	b, err := json.Marshal(v)
	if err != nil {
		// All callers pass simple map[string]any with primitive values;
		// marshal can't realistically fail. If it does, return a safe fallback.
		return []byte(`{"cmd":"error","msg":"internal encode error"}`)
	}
	return b
}