Commit Graph
10 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
yuanyuanxianganddeepseek-flash 951b4072e5 Feature: Embed the master's TLS certificate in generated clients
When the server has TLS enabled, the builder can now bake its certificate into
the client it produces, so a distributed client speaks TLS on its very first
connection instead of waiting for the anchor to be pushed after a plaintext
login. The dialog gets a checkbox (IDC_CHECK_TLS_ANCHOR) that is only enabled
for payloads and protocols where an embedded anchor makes sense; the choice is
remembered even when the control flips to disabled and back, so switching
protocols cannot silently undo a deliberate opt-out. Every label variant stays
short enough to fit the 196 DLU field, including the German ones. A template
that predates the anchor block no longer aborts generation: it warns, clears
the checkbox and produces a plain client, so a master upgraded without
rebuilding the ghost/ServerDll resources does not block every build.

The certificate lands in a fixed 4 KiB block (magic, version, length, FNV-1a
hash, master address, PEM) carved out of the payload at build time. The client
reads its trust anchor from four sources in order: the tls_disabled marker,
the certificate the server pushed into the registry, a PEM file next to the
executable, and finally the embedded block.

The embedded block only applies to a connection whose target matches the
master recorded at generation time, compared as an address set: an exact
string match when only one address is configured, or an intersection of
resolved IPv4 addresses otherwise. A transferred, shared or parallel instance
falls back to the old plaintext first-connect path instead of pinning itself
to a certificate it can never verify. That decision is made per connection,
not per process: shared and parallel instances are threads inside a single
client process, so a process-wide flag let whichever instance connected first
decide for all of them, and the first load of the TLS state cached that answer
for good. The TLS layer now keeps two cached states (embedded anchor allowed,
and not allowed), picks one per handshake, and reports the anchor source of
that handshake for the login capability bit. Matching by resolved address also
keeps parallel mode working, where the connection goes to the single IP the
domain pool selected while the configured master is a domain or a list.

Server side, generated and updated payloads get the block written in place;
the client reports the capability bit on login so the console can tell which
hosts are already TLS-only on first connect. Loading the anchor decodes every
PEM block in the chain rather than just the leaf, and an anchor that exists
but fails to load keeps the old fail-closed behaviour. A pushed anchor only
reconnects when the transport of the live connection actually changes, judged
against that connection's own target rather than the process-wide switch.

This was verified end to end against a freshly generated client with an empty
registry: the first connection was a TLS 1.2 ClientHello 0.2 s after start,
and a four-certificate fullchain loaded all four blocks. Re-verified after the
per-connection rework with the anchor block patched into a debug client: with
a matching master the first bytes are a ClientHello, with a foreign master the
client logs the skip and sends plaintext, and a domain master resolves to the
IP it connects to and still matches. A master domain that no longer resolves
falls back to plaintext within a second and is not looked up again for a
minute, instead of stalling every reconnect on a DNS timeout while holding the
lock the certificate verification needs.

Co-Authored-By: deepseek-flash
2026-11-01 20:40:02 +01:00
yuanyuanxianganddeepseek-flash 46f4bf2dfb Fix: Make the WebSocket transport reachable and bounded on every platform
The POSIX clients were built without a connection config - Linux, macOS and
Android all construct IOCPClient without the injected CONNECT_ADDRESS - so
ConnectServer saw protoType -1 and quietly dialled the master port in plain
TCP. Setting protoType to WS in their settings did nothing and logged nothing,
and since CLIENT_CAP_PROTO_SWITCH is Windows-only the server could not move
them either. Give the client a SetDefaultProto() for that construction path
and call it from all three mains before the reconnect loop, with a one-shot
log when neither a conn nor a default protocol is available so the silent
fallback becomes visible next time.

Bound what a peer can make the client read. ReadHeader accepted the 8-byte
extended length and rejected only the sign bit, so a frame length of nearly
2^63 kept the connection streaming into a frame that would never end - alive
but never delivering another packet. Cap single frames at 256 MB, the same
value ServerWsSession already applies to client frames, and drop the
connection past it; real traffic is far below that.

Stop Reset() from writing the receive thread's frame state. Disconnect() can
run from the heartbeat or command thread, not just the receive thread, so
Reset() now only flips the atomic ready flag and a new ResetFrames() clears
m_remaining, m_masked and m_maskPos from Handshake() alone, before the
receive thread starts reading the socket. Those fields keep a single owner
without adding a lock to the receive hot path.

Finish a dead WS session instead of leaving it to the keepalive timer. When
the session had closed but wsState was still WS_Ready, sends were dropped and
nothing woke the pending recv, so a peer that closed and then went quiet held
the context for the 3-minute keepalive. shutdown() the socket there so the
recv returns zero bytes and the normal -2 teardown runs; RemoveStaleContext
would deadlock against the caller's own IoRefCount and can hand back a reused
context.

That shutdown only finishes the connection if a zero-byte read still tears it
down, and on the plain path it no longer did. DispatchPlain answers an empty
buffer with "handled", so a peer's FIN left the connection in CLOSE_WAIT
until keepalive - holding an IOCP context, a pending WSARecv and a rate-limit
slot - where the pre-WS code called ParseReceivedData and tore down at once.
Restore that teardown on the TLS_Plain branch, matching the other two. Checked
against a Debug server: a plain socket that half-closes used to sit in
CLOSE_WAIT with the peer's recv timing out, and now disappears immediately
with recv returning zero.

Two smaller cleanups from the same review. Give the WS upgrade its own prefix
buffer (wsPreClassify) instead of borrowing the TLS sniffer's, which was
serially reused for two state machines and read as if it were one. And stop
deriving the build dialog's protoType from the combo box index: items now
carry the protocol value as item data, keyed off the index AddString returns,
so inserting an option in the middle can no longer write the wrong number into
the generated client without any error. ApplyProtoSwitch loses its bool
return, which contradicted its own side effects and was ignored by every
caller.

Co-Authored-By: deepseek-flash
2026-10-30 19:15:14 +01:00
yuanyuanxianganddeepseek-flash 50a489e316 Fix: Close the gaps the WebSocket transport review found
Three of the findings only bite in deployment. First, the client's TLS and
WebSocket handshakes run synchronously on the reconnect thread with no socket
timeout, so a peer that accepts TCP and then goes quiet (black-holed proxy
upstream, middlebox that only receives) blocks recv() forever and stalls the
reconnect loop until the process is restarted. Set a 15 s SO_RCVTIMEO and
SO_SNDTIMEO for the handshake window - the same value both server handshake
threads use - and clear them once the connection is up so the worker thread's
select plus blocking recv keeps working as before.

Second, per-IP rate limiting counted the getpeername address before the real
device was known. Behind a same-host reverse proxy that address is loopback,
which IPWhitelist always trusts, so WS traffic was neither counted nor banned;
behind a remote proxy every device shares one bucket, and tripping the
threshold disconnected all of them. Count and ban by the forwarded device IP
once the upgrade resolves it, mirroring the Go server's limitDirectPeer and
handleConnection split. Direct connections keep their accept-time count and
are not counted twice.

Third, the protocol switch disarmed its five-minute auto-revert as soon as the
new entry connected, which only proves TCP/TLS/WS handshaking finished. If
login is never accepted there (wrong backend, reverse proxy pointing at some
other WS service), the revert could never fire and the client would keep
retrying a dead entry. Disarm on the first CMD_MASTERSETTING instead, which
the server only sends after adding the host to its online list, and re-check
it on every heartbeat so a late one still counts.

The smaller items came along: free the handshake parameter when CreateThread
fails in both handshake starters, move the WS_Handshaking fail-closed guard
ahead of the TLS branch so it also covers WSS (where tlsState is already
TLS_Ready), generate the frame mask from a per-channel PRNG inside the send
lock instead of an unseeded global rand(), make the transport flags and the WS
session's ready flag atomic, drop rather than send unframed application bytes
when a WS session has closed, and abort a protocol switch whose PEM fails to
load instead of moving to an entry that cannot connect.

The Go server now bounds the upgrade sniff even when ReadTimeout is zero, and
the design doc records the two-stage limiter, the login-based disarm and the
review items that stay as known limits.

The protocol switch's input prompt is cut down to "reverse-proxy entry
(host:port)" - the label static is only 81 dialog units wide, and the old
sentence ran to roughly three times that.

The three language files follow: en_US and zh_TW gain the shortened prompt and drop
the long key it replaced, the German file gains the protocol-switch block it never
had, and its WebSocket tip key is corrected - it had picked up a Go-server clause
the source string never carried, so the tip was never translated at all.

Co-Authored-By: deepseek-flash
2026-10-30 18:11:34 +01:00
yuanyuanxiang d4f312c9d8 Feature: Tunnel the device protocol through a reverse proxy over WebSocket 2026-10-30 17:21:42 +01:00
6bfa4294cc Feature: Switch a Linux client's transport TLS at runtime
The server's TLS menu already wrote the trust anchor into the Windows
client's registry and expected a restart. The Linux client grew the same
command handling (166/167) but, like Windows, only read the anchor once at
startup, so enabling or disabling TLS still meant restarting it. Both
handlers now take effect immediately.

TlsChannelLinux.cpp no longer initialises through std::call_once. The
process-level state (context, enabled, load error) lives behind a mutex and
TlsReload() rebuilds it from whatever anchor file is on disk, so
TlsEnabled() reflects the new transport as soon as the anchor is written or
removed. In-flight sessions survive the swap because SSL_new increments the
SSL_CTX reference count; the unit test pins that down by keeping an
established TLS connection open across a reload that frees the old context.
A reload that hits a bad anchor keeps the previous state and only logs: one
bad push should not brick a working client, and the next start is still
fail-closed. The pushed PEM is parsed before it is written for the same
reason -- a corrupt anchor on disk would lock the client out of the server
with no way to correct it remotely.

Only a real transport flip (plaintext <-> TLS) asks for a reconnect. An
anchor swap alone, as in a certificate rotation, leaves the current session
alone and applies to the next connection. The receive thread never closes
the socket itself; it sets g_needReconnect and the main heartbeat loop
disconnects so the outer reconnect loop can re-handshake, matching how the
heartbeat timeout path already works.

IOCPClient now latches the transport per connection (m_useTls) at handshake
time instead of consulting TlsEnabled() on every send and receive. Without
the latch, the second or so between the reload and the reconnect would push
plaintext into an established TLS session, or the reverse, producing
protocol errors for no reason.

RES_TLS (szReserved[19]) is refreshed right before each login, including
the resend after a group change, so the TLS column on the server flips with
the transport instead of showing the value from process start.

The confirmation dialogs now say what each platform does, with translations
in en_US, zh_TW and de_DE; the keys carry the literal \n escape the INI
parser understands.

Ending a sub-connection is not an error. OpenSSL 3 classifies a peer that
closes without close_notify as an unexpected-EOF protocol error, so every
terminal or file transfer session logged an SSL_read failure on the real
servers even though Recv promises 0 for a plain close and neither side sends
close_notify. SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF restores the intended semantics.

Verified with the reload unit test (RELOAD-OK, covering the in-flight
connection across a context swap, garbage payload rejection and a broken
anchor keeping TLS alive), an abrupt-close test (recv now returns 0 instead
of SOCKET_ERROR) and end to end against a protocol-faithful fake server that
signs MasterSettings with libsign: plaintext login, 166, TLS reconnect with
RES_TLS=1, 167, plaintext reconnect with RES_TLS=0. The Linux client, the
Debug Windows client and the Debug MFC server all build.

The cost is inherent to taking effect immediately: a remote session in
progress is dropped when the transport changes, and the MFC server briefly
shows the client as a duplicate login until the old connection is reaped
and the standby entry is promoted.

Co-Authored-By: deepseek-flash
Co-Authored-By: Claude Code <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-28 14:15:40 +01:00
yuanyuanxianganddeepseek-v4-pro ca0d7626d2 Feat: One-way TLS transport for the device port
Add optional one-way TLS on the device port (6543), enabled per client via a
pinned trust anchor, so new clients encrypt their transport while legacy
plaintext clients keep working unchanged.

Server (server/go): sniff each accepted connection and wrap TLS peers
(ClientHello 0x16 0x03 + handshake type 0x01) in crypto/tls with MinVersion
TLS 1.2; everything else stays on the plaintext path. TLS is enabled only when
both YAMA_TLS_CERT and YAMA_TLS_KEY are set, and a cert/key load failure fails
startup loudly rather than silently serving plaintext.

Client (client/, Windows): Schannel one-way TLS. When the trust anchor is
present — registry value Software\<exehash>\settings\tls_cert (REG_SZ holding
the PEM), with fallback to settings.ini [settings] tls_cert or yama-ca.pem
beside the exe — every outbound connection (main + sub-connections) completes
a TLS 1.2 handshake before the app protocol and is strictly pinned to that
anchor via a chain engine with hExclusiveRoot; any handshake/cert failure is
fail-closed (no plaintext downgrade). Send uses EncryptMessage; Recv uses
DecryptMessage and reads plaintext from the stream-mode DATA segment (bufs[1])
rather than the record header.

Co-Authored-By: deepseek-v4-pro
2026-10-14 21:10:21 +02:00
yuanyuanxiang 71963b740b Fix: Authorization client use different keyboard log directory 2026-06-20 12:38:28 +02:00
yuanyuanxiang a354f1ed86 Improve: Embed Modern Terminal DLL in master's resources
Fix: keep Linux/macOS client alive across server restarts; gate all commands on auth-verified state to neutralize unauthorized servers
2026-05-09 00:43:55 +02:00
yuanyuanxiangandClaude Opus 4.7 ef8165c3b4 Feature: sub-connection auth (TOKEN_CONN_AUTH) with HMAC + clientID binding
Client first packet on every sub-connection signs (clientID || timestamp ||
nonce) and waits for server ack. Server verifies signature and pins clientID
on the sub-connection ctx, eliminating IP-reverse-lookup unreliability for
NAT/localhost scenarios. Sub-conn coverage: Win 12 sites, Linux/macOS 3-4
each. Main connection keeps existing TOKEN_LOGIN flow unchanged.

Includes:
- Protocol structs sized to 512/256 bytes with reserved space for future
  extensions (locale, OS info, session token, etc.)
- 5-min timestamp tolerance (Kerberos-grade replay window)
- 10-sec client wait for cross-pacific / weak-network tolerance
- Fix RemoveFromHostList side-effect ordering: MarkDeviceOffline and
  m_ActiveWndW.erase now only fire when ctx is actually removed from
  m_HostList, preventing sub-conn disconnects from misreporting main as
  offline (regression introduced by auth-set clientID on sub ctx)
- Fix latent bug: IOCPClient::m_conn was never assigned in ctor, leaving
  GetConnectionAddress() always NULL and FileManager V2 transfer's
  srcClientID always 0

Breaking change: new client cannot use sub-features against old server.
New server tolerates legacy clients (no auth). Future tightening can reject
unauthenticated sub-connections via IsAuthenticated() flag.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-07 00:04:40 +02:00
yuanyuanxiang 5a325a202b Init: Migrate SimpleRemoter (Since v1.3.1) to Gitea 2026-04-19 22:55:21 +02:00