Feature(Go): Web auth, WebSocket signaling and live device list (Phase 3)

This commit is contained in:
yuanyuanxiang
2026-05-17 22:18:29 +02:00
parent af2aa4893f
commit b1f229706c
13 changed files with 1211 additions and 21 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
package web
import (
"encoding/json"
)
// dispatch routes one inbound message to its handler. The `raw` payload is
// passed through so handlers can re-parse to their own shape.
//
// Phase 3 implements: get_salt, login, get_devices, ping, disconnect.
// Phase 4/5/6 commands (connect, mouse, key, term_*, etc.) get a friendly
// "not yet implemented" reply so the browser UI doesn't hang silently.
func (h *wsHub) dispatch(c *wsClient, cmd string, raw []byte) {
switch cmd {
case "get_salt":
h.handleGetSalt(c, raw)
case "login":
h.handleLogin(c, raw)
case "get_devices":
h.handleGetDevices(c, raw)
case "ping":
// no-op heartbeat; the read itself was the keep-alive signal
case "disconnect":
c.queue([]byte(`{"cmd":"disconnect_result","ok":true}`))
// Reserved for later phases. Reply with a benign failure so the UI can
// surface a clear error instead of spinning indefinitely.
case "connect":
h.replyNotImplemented(c, "connect_result", "Screen sharing not yet implemented on Go server")
case "rdp_reset":
// silently ignored — UI uses this as a fire-and-forget
case "mouse", "key":
// silently ignored — no remote screen yet
case "term_open":
h.replyNotImplemented(c, "term_closed", "Web terminal not yet implemented on Go server")
case "term_input", "term_resize", "term_close":
// silently ignored — no terminal session
// Admin operations (Phase 7).
case "create_user":
h.replyNotImplemented(c, "create_user_result", "User management not yet implemented")
case "delete_user":
h.replyNotImplemented(c, "delete_user_result", "User management not yet implemented")
case "list_users":
h.replyNotImplemented(c, "list_users_result", "User management not yet implemented")
case "get_groups":
c.queue([]byte(`{"cmd":"groups","ok":true,"groups":[]}`))
}
}
func (h *wsHub) replyNotImplemented(c *wsClient, replyCmd, msg string) {
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": replyCmd,
"ok": false,
"msg": msg,
}))
}
// ----- handlers ------------------------------------------------------------
func (h *wsHub) handleGetSalt(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
var in struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)
salt, ok := h.auth.GetSalt(in.Username)
// Do not leak which usernames exist: always return ok=true with a salt.
// For unknown users hand back the empty salt (matches admin convention)
// so the timing/shape of the response is uniform.
if !ok {
salt = ""
}
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": "salt",
"ok": true,
"salt": salt,
}))
}
func (h *wsHub) handleLogin(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
var in struct {
Username string `json:"username"`
Response string `json:"response"`
Nonce string `json:"nonce"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &in); err != nil {
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid request"}))
return
}
// Bind the response to the challenge we issued at connect time so that
// replays from a different connection can't reuse a captured response.
if in.Nonce == "" || in.Nonce != c.nonce {
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid challenge"}))
return
}
token, role, err := h.auth.VerifyLogin(in.Username, in.Response, in.Nonce)
if err != nil {
// Burn the challenge on failure too — forces a new round on retry.
c.nonce = ""
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": "login_result", "ok": false, "msg": "Invalid credentials"}))
return
}
c.nonce = ""
c.token = token
c.role = role
h.log.Info("ws login: user=%s role=%s addr=%s", in.Username, role, c.addr)
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": "login_result",
"ok": true,
"token": token,
"role": role,
}))
}
func (h *wsHub) handleGetDevices(c *wsClient, raw []byte) {
if !h.requireAuth(c, raw, "device_list") {
return
}
devices := h.devices.ListDevices()
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{
"cmd": "device_list",
"ok": true,
"devices": devices,
}))
}
// requireAuth validates the token embedded in raw against the authenticator's
// session store (not against c.token). Tokens live independently of WS
// connections — the browser may reconnect after a visibility/network blip and
// resume with the same token, so we must not tie validity to one WS lifetime.
// On the first authenticated message we cache the token/role on the wsClient
// so broadcasts know to deliver to this connection.
func (h *wsHub) requireAuth(c *wsClient, raw []byte, replyCmd string) bool {
var in struct {
Token string `json:"token"`
}
_ = json.Unmarshal(raw, &in)
if in.Token == "" {
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false}))
return false
}
sess, err := h.auth.ValidateToken(in.Token)
if err != nil {
c.queue(mustJSON(map[string]any{"cmd": replyCmd, "ok": false}))
return false
}
if c.token == "" {
c.token = in.Token
c.role = sess.Role
}
return true
}
func mustJSON(v any) []byte {
b, err := json.Marshal(v)
if err != nil {
// All callers pass simple map[string]any with primitive values;
// marshal can't realistically fail. If it does, return a safe fallback.
return []byte(`{"cmd":"error","msg":"internal encode error"}`)
}
return b
}