Feature(licensing): anonymous trial mode + server-side quota enforcement

This commit is contained in:
yuanyuanxiang
2026-06-04 09:23:57 +02:00
parent fcd3b13ca8
commit 4064bbe25d
8 changed files with 541 additions and 100 deletions

View File

@@ -16,8 +16,15 @@ const (
EnvLicensePubKeyPath = "YAMA_LICENSE_PUBLIC_KEY" // LocalSigner-as-LS: RSA public key PEM path
EnvLicenseHTTPAddr = "YAMA_LICENSE_HTTP_ADDR" // LocalSigner-as-LS: listen address, e.g. ":8443"
EnvLicenseOfflineHrs = "YAMA_LICENSE_OFFLINE_HRS" // RemoteSigner: cache TTL hours (default 24)
EnvLicenseDisabled = "YAMA_LICENSE_DISABLED" // set to 1 to force NoOpSigner (offline / dev)
)
// DefaultLicenseServerURL is the publicly-hosted License Server new downstream
// deployments hit when YAMA_LICENSE_SERVER is unset. "Zero config" trial mode
// uses this URL with no Bearer token — the License Server treats it as an
// anonymous trial (cap FreeMaxDevices, identified by source IP).
const DefaultLicenseServerURL = "https://web.just-do-it.icu:8080"
// DefaultOfflineGrace mirrors the "24 hours" decision recorded in the
// project memory's licensing design.
const DefaultOfflineGrace = 24 * time.Hour
@@ -28,6 +35,7 @@ type Mode int
const (
ModeLocal Mode = iota
ModeRemote
ModeTrial // RemoteSigner against License Server, but with no Bearer (anonymous trial)
ModeNoOp
)
@@ -37,6 +45,8 @@ func (m Mode) String() string {
return "local"
case ModeRemote:
return "remote"
case ModeTrial:
return "trial"
default:
return "noop"
}
@@ -48,16 +58,25 @@ func SelectedMode() Mode {
if os.Getenv(EnvSignPassword) != "" {
return ModeLocal
}
if os.Getenv(EnvLicenseServer) != "" && os.Getenv(EnvLicenseToken) != "" {
if strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EnvLicenseDisabled)) == "1" {
return ModeNoOp
}
if os.Getenv(EnvLicenseToken) != "" {
return ModeRemote
}
return ModeNoOp
return ModeTrial
}
// NewFromEnv builds the Signer chosen by env vars:
// - YAMA_SIGN_PASSWORD set → LocalSigner
// - YAMA_LICENSE_SERVER + YAMA_LICENSE_TOKEN set → RemoteSigner
// - neither → NoOpSigner
// NewFromEnv builds the Signer chosen by env vars. Decision tree (top-down,
// first match wins):
//
// - YAMA_SIGN_PASSWORD set → LocalSigner (operator deployment)
// - YAMA_LICENSE_DISABLED=1 → NoOpSigner (explicit opt-out)
// - YAMA_LICENSE_TOKEN set → RemoteSigner / paid (server URL
// defaults to DefaultLicenseServerURL
// if YAMA_LICENSE_SERVER is unset)
// - neither of the above → RemoteSigner / trial (anonymous,
// cap = FreeMaxDevices, default URL)
//
// If both LocalSigner and RemoteSigner vars are set, LocalSigner wins
// (an operator's own server should never accidentally call out to itself).
@@ -82,36 +101,43 @@ func NewFromEnv(lg Logger) (Signer, Mode, error) {
return s, ModeLocal, nil
}
if server != "" && token != "" {
if err := ValidateRemoteURL(server); err != nil {
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf("%s rejected: %w", EnvLicenseServer, err)
// Explicit opt-out: operator wants the binary to run with no licensing
// at all (dev, offline test, air-gapped). Screen/file features stay off
// on the client, device list still works.
if strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(EnvLicenseDisabled)) == "1" {
return NewNoOp(), ModeNoOp, nil
}
// From here on we're going to talk to a License Server. Determine the
// URL (env var wins over baked-in default) and the mode (paid if token
// is set, anonymous trial if not).
if server == "" {
server = DefaultLicenseServerURL
}
if err := ValidateRemoteURL(server); err != nil {
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf("%s rejected: %w", EnvLicenseServer, err)
}
grace := DefaultOfflineGrace
if hrs := os.Getenv(EnvLicenseOfflineHrs); hrs != "" {
n, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(hrs))
if err != nil {
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf(
"%s must be an integer (hours), got %q", EnvLicenseOfflineHrs, hrs)
}
grace := DefaultOfflineGrace
if hrs := os.Getenv(EnvLicenseOfflineHrs); hrs != "" {
n, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(hrs))
if err != nil {
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf(
"%s must be an integer (hours), got %q", EnvLicenseOfflineHrs, hrs)
}
if n < 0 {
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf(
"%s must be >= 0, got %d", EnvLicenseOfflineHrs, n)
}
grace = time.Duration(n) * time.Hour
if n < 0 {
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf(
"%s must be >= 0, got %d", EnvLicenseOfflineHrs, n)
}
grace = time.Duration(n) * time.Hour
}
if token != "" {
return NewRemote(server, token, grace, lg), ModeRemote, nil
}
if server != "" || token != "" {
// Partial config is almost certainly a misconfiguration — fail loudly
// rather than silently degrading to NoOp.
return nil, ModeNoOp, fmt.Errorf(
"%s and %s must be set together (got %s=%q %s=%q)",
EnvLicenseServer, EnvLicenseToken,
EnvLicenseServer, server, EnvLicenseToken, token)
}
return NewNoOp(), ModeNoOp, nil
// Anonymous trial: no Bearer token. License Server identifies by IP and
// caps at FreeMaxDevices.
return NewRemote(server, "", grace, lg), ModeTrial, nil
}
// LicenseServerFromEnv builds the License Server HTTP handler if (and only
@@ -150,5 +176,15 @@ func LicenseServerFromEnv(signer Signer, lg Logger) (*LicenseServer, string, err
// 5-minute eviction window — twice a typical heartbeat interval. Matches
// the discussion in quota.go.
return NewLicenseServer(local, pubKey, 5*time.Minute, lg), addr, nil
ls := NewLicenseServer(local, pubKey, 5*time.Minute, lg)
// Reuse the web's trust-proxy env var: standard deployment puts both
// /ws and /license/ behind the same nginx, so the answer is always the
// same. Honoring it here lets the anonymous-trial per-IP rate limit see
// the real client IP instead of 127.0.0.1.
if strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("YAMA_WEB_TRUST_PROXY")) == "1" {
ls.SetTrustProxy(true)
}
return ls, addr, nil
}

View File

@@ -253,23 +253,102 @@ func TestQuotaEnforcement(t *testing.T) {
}
}
// TestAuthRejectsMissingBearer: no token → 401, not 200 / not 500. Belt
// and braces — the auth check sits in front of /sign and /heartbeat.
func TestAuthRejectsMissingBearer(t *testing.T) {
// TestAnonymousTrialSignsAndCaps: no Authorization header → anonymous trial
// branch. /sign returns 200 with a real signature up to FreeMaxDevices, then
// 403 once the per-IP cap is reached. Replaces the older "missing bearer
// 401" test now that anonymous trial is a first-class mode.
func TestAnonymousTrialSignsAndCaps(t *testing.T) {
priv := testKey(t)
master := mustLocal(t, "master-auth-test-xxxxxxx")
master := mustLocal(t, "master-trial-test-xxxxxx")
ls := NewLicenseServer(master, &priv.PublicKey, time.Minute, silentLogger{})
ts := httptest.NewServer(ls.Handler())
defer ts.Close()
body := strings.NewReader(`{"client_id":"x","start_time":"y"}`)
resp, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/license/sign", "application/json", body)
call := func(clientID string) (int, string) {
body := strings.NewReader(fmt.Sprintf(
`{"client_id":%q,"start_time":"2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"}`, clientID))
resp, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/license/sign", "application/json", body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Post: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
var sr signResponse
_ = json.NewDecoder(resp.Body).Decode(&sr)
if sr.Signature != "" {
return resp.StatusCode, sr.Signature
}
return resp.StatusCode, sr.Error
}
// First FreeMaxDevices distinct clientIDs get real signatures.
for i := range FreeMaxDevices {
code, sig := call(fmt.Sprintf("trial-dev-%d", i))
if code != http.StatusOK {
t.Errorf("dev-%d expected 200, got %d (%q)", i, code, sig)
}
if sig == "" {
t.Errorf("dev-%d signature unexpectedly empty", i)
}
}
// Cap+1 → 403 quota exceeded.
code, msg := call("trial-dev-overflow")
if code != http.StatusForbidden {
t.Errorf("overflow expected 403, got %d (%q)", code, msg)
}
}
// TestAnonymousTrialIPRateLimit: anonymous /sign is capped at
// anonRatePerWindow requests per minute per source IP. Hitting the cap
// returns 429 with Retry-After.
func TestAnonymousTrialIPRateLimit(t *testing.T) {
priv := testKey(t)
master := mustLocal(t, "master-rate-test-xxxxxxx")
ls := NewLicenseServer(master, &priv.PublicKey, time.Minute, silentLogger{})
ts := httptest.NewServer(ls.Handler())
defer ts.Close()
// Reuse the same clientID so quota does NOT also reject — we want to
// isolate the rate limiter. quotaTracker.Reserve treats a repeat clientID
// as a refresh (always accepted), so all the 200s here are the same slot.
hit := func() int {
body := strings.NewReader(`{"client_id":"rate-dev","start_time":"t"}`)
resp, err := http.Post(ts.URL+"/license/sign", "application/json", body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Post: %v", err)
}
resp.Body.Close()
return resp.StatusCode
}
for i := range anonRatePerWindow {
if code := hit(); code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("req %d expected 200, got %d", i, code)
}
}
if code := hit(); code != http.StatusTooManyRequests {
t.Errorf("expected 429 after %d requests, got %d", anonRatePerWindow, code)
}
}
// TestAuthRejectsBadBearer: invalid JWT still returns 401 (we did NOT widen
// the auth surface; only "no Authorization header at all" enters trial).
func TestAuthRejectsBadBearer(t *testing.T) {
priv := testKey(t)
master := mustLocal(t, "master-bad-bearer-xxxxxx")
ls := NewLicenseServer(master, &priv.PublicKey, time.Minute, silentLogger{})
ts := httptest.NewServer(ls.Handler())
defer ts.Close()
req, _ := http.NewRequest("POST", ts.URL+"/license/sign",
strings.NewReader(`{"client_id":"x","start_time":"y"}`))
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer not.a.real.jwt")
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Post: %v", err)
t.Fatalf("Do: %v", err)
}
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusUnauthorized {
t.Errorf("expected 401, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
t.Errorf("expected 401 for malformed bearer, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
}
}

View File

@@ -16,6 +16,25 @@ import (
"golang.org/x/sync/singleflight"
)
// QuotaExceededError is returned by Sign when the License Server explicitly
// rejects the device because the customer's slot quota is full. Unlike
// transient network errors, stale-cache fallback is NOT appropriate — the
// License Server's 403 decision is authoritative, and serving a stale
// signature would silently bypass the operator's cap.
type QuotaExceededError struct {
Message string // raw error field from the License Server JSON body
}
func (e *QuotaExceededError) Error() string { return e.Message }
// IsQuotaExceeded reports whether err is, or wraps, a QuotaExceededError.
// Callers (e.g. handleLogin in cmd/main.go) use this to decide whether to
// close the device connection server-side after sending a zeroed signature.
func IsQuotaExceeded(err error) bool {
var qe *QuotaExceededError
return errors.As(err, &qe)
}
// RemoteSigner fetches per-login signatures from an operator-hosted License
// Server. ServerURL and Token (a JWT issued offline by the operator) are
// loaded from YAMA_LICENSE_SERVER / YAMA_LICENSE_TOKEN at startup.
@@ -153,8 +172,17 @@ func (r *RemoteSigner) Sign(startTime, clientID string) (string, error) {
return sig, nil
}
// Hard failure: fall back to stale cache if any. Better to keep an
// existing device alive than fail closed during a transient outage.
// Quota-exceeded is authoritative — skip stale-cache fallback entirely.
// Serving a cached signature here would bypass the operator's explicit cap
// decision; the caller (handleLogin) should close the connection instead.
if IsQuotaExceeded(err) {
r.logger.Error("RemoteSigner: quota exceeded for clientID=%s (%v); sending zeroed signature",
clientID, err)
return "", err
}
// Transient failure: fall back to stale cache if any. Better to keep an
// existing device alive than fail closed during a momentary outage.
r.mu.Lock()
c, ok := r.cache[key]
r.mu.Unlock()
@@ -179,7 +207,9 @@ func (r *RemoteSigner) fetch(startTime, clientID string) (string, error) {
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+r.token)
if r.token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+r.token)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
@@ -194,7 +224,17 @@ func (r *RemoteSigner) fetch(startTime, clientID string) (string, error) {
}
if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
// 401/403: token rejected — likely revoked or expired.
// 403 with a JSON error body: quota exceeded — this is authoritative,
// not a transient failure. Return a typed error so Sign() can skip
// the stale-cache fallback and callers can close the connection.
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusForbidden {
var sr signResponse
if jsonErr := json.Unmarshal(respBody, &sr); jsonErr == nil && sr.Error != "" {
return "", &QuotaExceededError{Message: sr.Error}
}
return "", &QuotaExceededError{Message: string(respBody)}
}
// 401 / 5xx: token rejected or server error — treat as transient.
return "", fmt.Errorf("License Server returned %d: %s",
resp.StatusCode, string(respBody))
}
@@ -265,7 +305,9 @@ func (r *RemoteSigner) sendHeartbeat() {
if err != nil {
return
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+r.token)
if r.token != "" {
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+r.token)
}
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := r.httpClient.Do(req)
@@ -280,7 +322,15 @@ func (r *RemoteSigner) sendHeartbeat() {
}
}
func (r *RemoteSigner) Mode() string { return "remote" }
// Mode reports "trial" if this RemoteSigner has no JWT (anonymous
// downstream against the operator's License Server, capped at
// FreeMaxDevices), otherwise "remote" (paid customer with JWT).
func (r *RemoteSigner) Mode() string {
if r.token == "" {
return "trial"
}
return "remote"
}
func (r *RemoteSigner) Close() error {
select {

View File

@@ -5,13 +5,36 @@ import (
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
)
// Anonymous-trial rate limit: per-source-IP cap on /license/sign +
// /license/heartbeat requests without a Bearer token. Picked at "high enough
// for any legitimate single deployment, low enough to make brute-force /
// signature-probing pointless." Each /sign costs 1, /heartbeat 1, in a 60s
// sliding window. Authenticated requests skip this.
const (
anonRatePerWindow = 10
anonRateWindow = time.Minute
// anonReapInterval throws away stale buckets so the map doesn't grow
// unbounded across IP-cycling attackers. Walk the map every N requests.
anonReapEvery = 200
)
// Log-throttle cooldowns: downstream devices reconnect every few seconds when
// over-quota, so without throttling these two Warn lines flood the operator's
// log file. One log entry per cooldown window per unique key is enough signal.
const (
quotaWarnCooldown = 5 * time.Minute // per (sub, clientID) pair
rlWarnCooldown = anonRateWindow // per IP, matches the rate-limit window
)
// LicenseServer is the HTTP service the operator's LocalSigner exposes for
// RemoteSigner customer deployments. It uses the same LocalSigner instance
// (same HMAC master key) to produce signatures so customers can issue
@@ -37,12 +60,32 @@ import (
//
// Security: serve plain HTTP and put nginx / Caddy in front for TLS. JWT
// "alg" is locked to RS256 in token.go; "alg":"none" tampering is blocked.
//
// Anonymous trial: requests without a Bearer token are treated as anonymous
// trial — the client's source IP is used as "sub" (key=`trial:<ip>`) and
// MaxDevices is capped at FreeMaxDevices. This is what lets a zero-config
// downstream binary "just work" for evaluation. Heavily rate-limited per IP
// to make brute-force / signature-probing pointless.
type LicenseServer struct {
signer *LocalSigner
pubKey *rsa.PublicKey
tracker *quotaTracker
logger Logger
mux *http.ServeMux
signer *LocalSigner
pubKey *rsa.PublicKey
tracker *quotaTracker
logger Logger
mux *http.ServeMux
trustProxy bool // honor X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP — set only behind a trusted reverse proxy
anonMu sync.Mutex
anonBuckets map[string]*anonBucket // ip → bucket
anonReqSeen int // counter for periodic reap
warnMu sync.Mutex
lastWarn map[string]time.Time // dedup key → last log time
}
// anonBucket tracks anonymous request count within a sliding window.
type anonBucket struct {
count int
windowStart time.Time
}
// Logger is the minimal logging interface we need. The cmd package's
@@ -59,17 +102,42 @@ type Logger interface {
func NewLicenseServer(signer *LocalSigner, pubKey *rsa.PublicKey,
evictAfter time.Duration, lg Logger) *LicenseServer {
s := &LicenseServer{
signer: signer,
pubKey: pubKey,
tracker: newQuotaTracker(evictAfter),
logger: lg,
mux: http.NewServeMux(),
signer: signer,
pubKey: pubKey,
tracker: newQuotaTracker(evictAfter),
logger: lg,
mux: http.NewServeMux(),
anonBuckets: make(map[string]*anonBucket),
lastWarn: make(map[string]time.Time),
}
s.mux.HandleFunc("/license/sign", s.handleSign)
s.mux.HandleFunc("/license/heartbeat", s.handleHeartbeat)
return s
}
// warnOnce emits a Warn log at most once per cooldown window for the given
// dedup key. Subsequent identical events within the window are silently
// dropped. This keeps high-frequency but expected conditions (quota exceeded,
// rate limit hit) from flooding the operator's log file while still providing
// one clear signal per event burst.
func (s *LicenseServer) warnOnce(key string, cooldown time.Duration, format string, args ...any) {
s.warnMu.Lock()
if t, ok := s.lastWarn[key]; ok && time.Since(t) < cooldown {
s.warnMu.Unlock()
return
}
s.lastWarn[key] = time.Now()
s.warnMu.Unlock()
s.logger.Warn(format, args...)
}
// SetTrustProxy switches IP extraction to X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP for
// the anonymous-trial branch. Only set this when running behind a reverse
// proxy you control (nginx / caddy / cloudflare); direct-exposure
// deployments MUST leave it false or attackers can spoof the header to
// evade the per-IP rate limit and the trial quota.
func (s *LicenseServer) SetTrustProxy(trust bool) { s.trustProxy = trust }
// Handler returns the http.Handler the operator wires into their HTTP
// server (or runs standalone via http.ListenAndServe).
func (s *LicenseServer) Handler() http.Handler { return s.mux }
@@ -92,13 +160,107 @@ func (s *LicenseServer) authenticate(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *Li
return claims
}
// resolveAuth decides whether the request is paid (Bearer JWT) or anonymous
// trial (no Authorization header). Returns a LicenseClaims structure either
// way:
// - Paid: claims from JWT, untouched.
// - Trial: synthesized claims with Subject="trial:<ip>", Tier=TierFree,
// MaxDevices=FreeMaxDevices, no Bearer required.
//
// Anonymous requests are rate-limited per source IP; if the IP's bucket is
// full we write 429 and return nil. Bad JWTs still 401 as before.
func (s *LicenseServer) resolveAuth(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) *LicenseClaims {
if r.Header.Get("Authorization") != "" {
return s.authenticate(w, r)
}
// Anonymous trial branch.
ip := s.clientIP(r)
if !s.allowAnon(ip) {
s.warnOnce("rl:"+ip, rlWarnCooldown, "License Server: anonymous rate limit hit for ip=%s", ip)
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", "60")
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests,
"trial rate limit exceeded; set YAMA_LICENSE_TOKEN for full license")
return nil
}
return &LicenseClaims{
Tier: TierFree,
MaxDevices: FreeMaxDevices,
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Subject: "trial:" + ip,
},
}
}
// clientIP returns the request's source IP. When trustProxy is set, prefer
// X-Real-IP, then the last entry of X-Forwarded-For. Otherwise fall back to
// r.RemoteAddr (host part only).
func (s *LicenseServer) clientIP(r *http.Request) string {
if s.trustProxy {
if v := strings.TrimSpace(r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP")); v != "" {
return v
}
if xff := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); xff != "" {
// Last entry is the one appended by the proxy closest to us.
parts := strings.Split(xff, ",")
last := strings.TrimSpace(parts[len(parts)-1])
if last != "" {
return last
}
}
}
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(r.RemoteAddr)
if err != nil {
return r.RemoteAddr
}
return host
}
// allowAnon enforces the anonymous-trial per-IP rate limit. Returns true
// when the call is admitted, false when the IP's bucket is full. Also reaps
// stale buckets opportunistically.
func (s *LicenseServer) allowAnon(ip string) bool {
s.anonMu.Lock()
defer s.anonMu.Unlock()
now := time.Now()
b, ok := s.anonBuckets[ip]
if !ok || now.Sub(b.windowStart) >= anonRateWindow {
s.anonBuckets[ip] = &anonBucket{count: 1, windowStart: now}
s.maybeReapAnonLocked(now)
return true
}
if b.count >= anonRatePerWindow {
return false
}
b.count++
return true
}
// maybeReapAnonLocked drops buckets whose windows are stale every N requests.
// Caller must hold s.anonMu.
func (s *LicenseServer) maybeReapAnonLocked(now time.Time) {
s.anonReqSeen++
if s.anonReqSeen < anonReapEvery {
return
}
s.anonReqSeen = 0
cutoff := now.Add(-anonRateWindow)
for ip, b := range s.anonBuckets {
if b.windowStart.Before(cutoff) {
delete(s.anonBuckets, ip)
}
}
}
func (s *LicenseServer) handleSign(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
if r.Method != http.MethodPost {
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusMethodNotAllowed, "method not allowed")
return
}
claims := s.authenticate(w, r)
claims := s.resolveAuth(w, r)
if claims == nil {
return
}
@@ -117,7 +279,8 @@ func (s *LicenseServer) handleSign(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// consume a slot — see quotaTracker.Reserve.
active, accepted := s.tracker.Reserve(claims.Subject, req.ClientID, claims.MaxDevices)
if !accepted {
s.logger.Warn("License Server: quota exceeded for sub=%s tier=%s active=%d max=%d clientID=%s",
s.warnOnce("quota:"+claims.Subject+":"+req.ClientID, quotaWarnCooldown,
"License Server: quota exceeded for sub=%s tier=%s active=%d max=%d clientID=%s",
claims.Subject, claims.Tier, active, claims.MaxDevices, req.ClientID)
writeJSONError(w, http.StatusForbidden,
fmt.Sprintf("quota exceeded: %d/%d devices in use", active, claims.MaxDevices))
@@ -154,7 +317,7 @@ func (s *LicenseServer) handleHeartbeat(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request)
return
}
claims := s.authenticate(w, r)
claims := s.resolveAuth(w, r)
if claims == nil {
return
}